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HAILE SELASSIE I, EMPEROR (NEGUS NEGASTI) OF ETHIOPIA
IN CORONATION ROBES

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ETHIOPIA, A PAWN IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

By ✓

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OAK TREE, INDIANA, ITALY, MUSKINGUM, ETHIOPIA

"Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God."



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DEDICATED TO MY WIFE,
WHO KEPT THE HOME FIRES BURNING
THAT I MIGHT SERVE IN ETHIOPIA
AND WHOSE VALUABLE HELP HAS
MADE THIS WORK POSSIBLE.

PREFACE

Mussolini's recent threats and warlike gestures toward Ethiopia (Abyssinia) have aroused among us a desire to know something of the background for the present Italo-Ethiopian controversy. To understand the present situation one must know something about the intense rivalries among the European powers exhibited in their insatiate grabbing of the black man's country. He must also be able to follow the complicated and devious route by which Ethiopia has found her way among them and thus far has been able to maintain her independence.

Until now no authentic work based upon the documents has been published in America. To fill this need this volume has been prepared. The author had the unusual privilege of serving for sometime as adviser in educational matters to the Ethiopian government. In this capacity he had opportunities to see the international play for European advantage at the court of the *Negus Negasti* as well as having the rare privilege of close association with the Emperor's family. He has also made a close study of the published French, Italian, German and English documents relating to Ethiopia and the European rivalries over that highland country.

Out of these experiences and this study this book has developed. The reader will find it authentic and fully documented. It is our hope and belief that upon a study of this book the reader will come to have a

better understanding of the position of Ethiopia and a fuller appreciation of these delightful people. If through its pages we may have some little part in having America see the real situation we shall be glad. It is a pity that such enlightened nations as those of Europe will not permit this last bit of Africa to remain independent. If Italy is permitted to succeed in her present designs the black man's culture will be lost under a veneer of European imposition.

The Author.

Muskingum College,
August, 1935.

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CHAPTER I

THE LAND AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

Ever since the days of Prester John, Abyssinia, more properly Ethiopia, has been a land of mystery to the whole world and an object of exploration and exploitation to Europe in particular.¹ In more recent years it has become a prize of the most intense rivalries among the leading colonial-minded countries of Europe. This rivalry, indeed, has not been confined to present day Ethiopia only, but it has included all of Africa. In ancient times the greater part of Africa was included within the term "Ethiopia" and it is, therefore, proper to refer to that part of Africa south of Egypt as Ethiopia. When speaking of Africa, the ancient writers always referred to two parts; namely, Egypt and Ethiopia. The word Ethiopia is a Greek word ΑΙΘΙΟΨ *Aithiops* (*Aithi*, to burn, and *ops*, face); *Aithiops*, therefore, means "burnt-faced man".² Certainly then Ethiopia was the land of the burnt-faced people. Evidently to the ancients, Ethiopia began where Egypt ended and extended as far south in Africa as "burnt-faced people" could be found. At present, however, we are not concerned with this larger field but

¹Officially, Ethiopia is the proper designation for this country and the government wishes it to be so called. Europeans have usually referred to it, however, as Abyssinia. Abyssinia is but one section of the Empire of Ethiopia. Because both terms are used in the documents, we have used them interchangeably in this work.


²My colleague, Prof. C. J. Marshall.

only with that part of it which, in modern times, has been referred to as Abyssinia, whose boundaries until recently have been rather vague and indefinite.

That we may be clear in the use of the terms Ethiopia and Abyssinia then, we should locate the country and in a general way, at least, establish the boundaries claimed for the Ethiopians. Menelik II, (1889-1913) the great unifier of his country, when he was being beset on all sides by European Powers bent on setting up claims to any and all unoccupied territory in Africa, addressed a letter to them in which he defined his boundaries.³ Though Menelik's knowledge of the geography of some of the territory to which he laid claims appears faulty, it is evident in this letter that he was claiming for Ethiopia that part of Africa extending from the Nile to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, included, roughly, between the 5th and the 15th parallels of north latitude. In addition to defining thus the boundaries of Ethiopia, he declared that if Africa was about to be divided among the European Powers, he did not propose to stand idly by as a mere observer, but intended to get his share and thus extend his borders far beyond these claims.

It is true, of course, that Europeans have never recognized these claims of Menelik. They have characterized them as extravagant, asserting that, since Menelik had never brought all the native tribes in-

³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, doc. IV, p. 81, annesso V; cited also in *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 356, No. 1985; Sir J. Rennell Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, Second Series, p. 167; René Ferry, *L'Ethiopie*, *Annales des sciences politique*, t. XXV, p. 22; Comité de L'Afrique, *Bulletin* Juillet, 1893, p. 8.



cluded within these claims under his control, the territory could not be considered his. To Europeans, any and all parts of Africa not already appropriated by some European state became the property of that state which could take it. Regardless of these assertions, however, Menelik's claims must be considered. Certainly he had a better claim by every test, unless we accept that of conquest, than had any or all European Powers. In ancient times Ethiopia had included all this and much more. While her capital was located at Meroë (Merowi), Ethiopia extended indefinitely to the west of the Nile. Because Ethiopia of the nineteenth century was the successor of the ancient state of the same name, Menelik as her Emperor had a much better right to reconquer even the Sudan from the Arabs, than had any European state the right to lay claim to any part of Africa. Certainly there could be no objection from Europe to his claims to that part of this territory lying east of the Nile, much of which had never submitted to control by the Arabs. Because no better definition of the extent of Ethiopia at the beginning of the European scramble for Africa can be had, for our purpose we shall consider Menelik's claims as legitimate.

Our Ethiopia, then, included all that African territory lying between the 5th and the 15th parallels of north latitude, extending from the Indian Ocean to the White Nile. It had been surrounded by turbulent tribes, fanatic Dervishes, and encroaching neighbors from Africa and Asia. It now became the very object of European greed and national rivalries.

This territory consists, for the most part, of a high plateau, surrounded by a few miles of low desert coast line on the north and east, and the broad Sudanese plain, stretching from the foothills of the plateau to the Nile river on the west. As Ethiopia is thus elevated and lies wholly within the torrid zone, abundance of rain falls annually. For four months of the year (June-September) rain falls in such torrents that the soil is unable to retain it all, and the result is the great overflow which carries life and renewal of soil down the Nile valley to enrich Egypt and the eastern Sudan. The soil is fertile and under proper cultivation capable of producing abundant crops. Its mountains are known to contain rich deposits of mineral wealth not yet exploited. The climate is, perhaps, the most agreeable to be found in any African country within the torrid zone. Being thus situated, it has held a peculiar attraction for Europeans in their policies of colonial expansion.

This plateau is inhabited by an intelligent, liberty-loving, and warlike people of Semitic-Hamitic blood and traditions. The several tribes comprising its population were being brought by Menelik to recognize, in some fashion, the overlordship of the Amharic tribe, over which Menelik, upon the death of Johannes VI, had come to rule as Negus. Given time and sympathetic assistance, Menelik was in position to establish an effective, and the only, black man's empire in this entire continent.

This liberty-loving, warlike attitude so characteristic of these African highlanders is fittingly represented

by the insignia displayed on their banner and seal. The crest for the Ethiopian Empire is a rampant crowned lion, bearing a scepter in his right paw, and a motto which declares that "The Lion of the Tribe of Judah has conquered."⁴ During all the centuries which have elapsed since the days of Solomon, from whom the ruling tribe claims descent, these people, though overrun at times by the floods of invasion, as in the time of Mohammed Gran, have never been conquered, nor will they ever be conquered without a terrific struggle and an exterminating conflict. They are prepared to fight to the death to defend their long maintained liberties. It is to be hoped that the Christian nations will recognize, though thus tardily, the justice and the necessity of permitting this last bit of independent territory in Africa to keep alive and to develop to its highest possibilities the culture of the black man. This is the last opportunity for the European nations to make any amends for their ruthless conduct in appropriating African territory. It is to be hoped that these nations may yet display some practical results from the benefits of centuries of Christian theory.

Though Ethiopia for centuries, in order to maintain her independence, had been in conflict with Egyptian and Arabian invaders, yet, prior to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, her only contacts

⁴The ruling class here claims, of course, to have descended from Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. Their traditions support this claim and I find no good reason to deny it. The present emperor, Haile Selassie I, affirms the same within the constitution which he has recently granted his people and in the preparation of which I have the honor of having played some little part.

with the European nations had been those with the Portuguese, who, during the first half of the sixteenth century, came to the aid of the Ethiopians in their struggle to repel the waves of Mohammedan invasions under Mohammed Gran.⁵ A century after the expulsion of these invaders the Ethiopians came to learn that *protectors* may easily become *oppressors* and the Portuguese in turn had to be driven out; whereupon the country was closed to Europeans.

The modern story of Ethiopian history begins in 1855 when Theodore was crowned in the sacred city of Axum. A few years after his coronation, Theodore had succeeded in uniting the different factions of his country and in the early days of his reign he was well disposed toward Europeans. But before long this feeling changed to one of mistrust and suspicion which produced conflicts, ending in Theodore's death by his own hands at Magdala. Like Saul on Mt. Gilboa, who fell upon a sword that he might not fall into the hands of the Philistines, so Theodore destroyed himself rather than fall into the hands of the Napier Expedition of 1869.⁶

The cause of this change of attitude is to be found mostly in a conflict between two cultures and the failure of Europeans to recognize that the Ethiopian monarch who had conquered a territory larger than France

⁵Clement R. Markham, *A History of the Abyssinian Expedition*, p. 18; R. S. Whiteway's translation of Castanhoso's *The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia*.

⁶The best accounts of these matters are to be found in Markham's *A History of the Abyssinian Expedition, 1869*; and Hormuzh Rassam's, *Narrative of the British Mission to Theodore, 1869*.

expected to be treated as a monarch and not as Europeans had been in the custom of treating men of another complexion. A good example of such misunderstanding, arising from lack of appreciation of differences in culture and failure to recognize position, is related by Mr. Rassam.⁷ Theodore had, as he thought, treated Europeans like brothers only to receive from them the treatment due a shopkeeper. He was especially grieved at M. Lejean, a French consul, who, riding upon a donkey, an act which in itself showed a great lack of respect, had called to see the Emperor. But, to add insult to injury, Lejean had proposed to talk business with the Negus. Upon being permitted to do so, to Theodore's astonishment, Lejean produced a "bundle of rags" and declared to Theodore that the silk merchants of France had commissioned him to display these samples in the hope of barter with Theodore. That an ordinary Frenchman should presume to deal directly with him—the Emperor of Ethiopia—was a great insult. Theodore thought to himself, "What have I done that these people insult me thus by treating me like a shopkeeper?" Theodore bore the insult then, but a few days later his spirit was pressed beyond endurance. Lejean, dressed in full uniform, wished to have an audience with the Emperor, who was too busy to see him at once. Upon being informed that the Negus could not admit him, Lejean flew into a rage and informed Theodore that since he was dressed in royal French robes he could not disgrace them by

⁷Cited by Leonard Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, p. 142.

taking them off before he had had his interview and demanded to be seen at once. Whereupon Theodore cried "Minabit!⁸ Seize him!" and he put Lejean in chains in the very dress of his King. Though Theodore later released Lejean because he thought that any one who would act like that must be out of his senses, yet he never forgot the insult. Lejean could not understand that an African Emperor, though black, who had conquered and ruled an empire larger than France, expected to be treated with imperial respect. This incident illustrates the misunderstandings, of which there are many, arising from differences in culture and traditions but into which we need not go further here.

The other great cause of conflict, however, which we do need to realize, appeared early in the European penetration of Ethiopia. This arose over the conflicts and counter incriminations of the different European Nationals among themselves, especially between the French and the English, in their efforts to gain ascendancy over the others in dealing with Ethiopia.⁹ The French writers accuse the English of political purposes even in their missionary efforts, having "recourse to that contemptible and hypocritical body which is composed of the legions of Methodists, Quakers, parsons, and pious laymen. All the missionaries were

⁸"Minäbit" is an Ethiopian expression of contempt. It means "Who's your father?" indicating that one must have had a very negligent father who has failed to teach his son good manners else he would not act as the one who is the object of contempt has acted.

⁹Jean Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, chapter IX; Lemonon, *L'Europe et la Politique Britannique*, 1910 ed., p. 146.

spies, agents, provocateurs, well paid, without faith or law, who poisoned Ethiopia with their fantastic Bibles."¹⁰ To counter this, Englishmen declared that the French,

seem to protect their Roman Catholic Church and use it as a means for interfering in the country. An Abyssinian to improve his position will nominally get converted to the Roman Catholic faith by a French priest. This is the stepping stone to French protection and every one who has travelled in the East knows what that means.¹¹

In nearly every agreement or treaty made by any of the European Powers with the local chiefs there was an article requiring the chiefs, who had come under the protection of one European state, to deny to all others any rights and privileges. The chiefs were warned by each protector to beware of all other Europeans and to avoid all agreements without first consulting the European state giving the warning. All these conflicts and counter warnings among their would-be European benefactors tended to confuse the natives and render them suspicious.

It is difficult for us to understand these jealousies and bickerings of great European nations over Ethiopia. Apart from Ethiopia's geographical position with reference to other possessions already in European hands or those whose possession was eagerly anticipated, this undignified struggle is unintelligible. Reference to the map will at once reveal to the student of history and geography the strategic position of Ethiopia in the

¹⁰Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, p. 144, quotes Bussidon, *Abyssinie et Angleterre*.

¹¹Augustus B. Wyld, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 142.

modern world. Since it borders on the Red Sea—the long throat of commerce between Europe and the East—it is possible for the Power in control there to have a strangle hold upon the life of that commerce. Since upon its mountains fall the abundant rains which furnish the very life of Egypt and the eastern Sudan, it is possible for the state in possession of these mountains to flood the valley of the Nile or make of it a blistering desert at will.¹² The reader who hopes to understand the mysterious and complicated web of European diplomacy in dealing with Ethiopia must constantly keep in mind these two facts in regard to the natural geography of Ethiopia as he studies the chain of events which brought Europe into African relationships. From the building of the Suez canal, all those countries having interest in India and the Far East sought to find stations along the route thither. Elsewhere along that route all available territory had been taken up and Ethiopia offered the most desirable points to be had. Then, too, the caravan trails from the highlands of Abyssinia and eastern Sudan led out to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. But most important of all to those Powers that should come into possession of Egypt and the Sudan, control of the source of water supply for the Atbara and the Blue Nile was essential. Already both France and England were interested directly and jointly in Egypt, and both anticipated expansion in the upper Nile valley. Italy, likewise, disappointed in Tunis, came to center her attention upon the Red Sea area. Ethiopia, therefore, became the strategic

¹²Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité, coloniale*, p. 349.

key to effective possession of unoccupied African territory.

When in 1875, Disraeli bought for £3,680,000, the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal Company, he displayed a generous portion of one of the outstanding traits of his race and brought England into most active interest in the affairs of Northeastern Africa.¹³ The French, who had completed in 1869 the building of this most important waterway, let slip into the hands of their rival the very key to eastern commerce and the control of the eastern Mediterranean lands. It would seem strange that, after the enterprise of French capital and the skill of French engineers had accomplished such far-seeing results, French statesmen should allow an Englishman, by the mere exercise of his wits, to deprive France of the fruits of the efforts of her sons. It is true, of course, that for some years, (1879 to 1883) after England had purchased the controlling shares in the Suez Canal, there existed a dual control by England and France, but there could scarcely be any doubt that the country which held the controlling shares, whose interest in eastern commerce was most extensive and who was "mistress of the seas", would finally control the canal.¹⁴

It is not our purpose to recount the story of Egypt here. That is too well known to require retelling. But to understand England's active interest in Ethiopia, it must be recalled that, because she came to control

¹³Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, pp. 36, 37, 224.

¹⁴Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 226.

Egypt, she could scarcely ignore the source of Egypt's very life—the head waters of the Nile—and, since these were located in the mountains of Ethiopia, England must be concerned as to the control there. Moreover, the Red Sea now became England's main thoroughfare to the east and she of necessity had to become interested in any territory adjoining this highway. The building and sale, therefore, of the Suez Canal has had a tremendous effect upon the destinies of Ethiopia. It brought this otherwise mysterious and little known country into the vortex of European diplomatic intrigue, from which she has never been able to extricate herself and by which she has been tossed about by every shift in European rivalries until she has been fairly dizzy and needs time to regain her equilibrium.

Scarcely had the dual control of England and France over the Suez Canal and in Egypt been instituted when complications arose. The Khedive was an oriental spendthrift and the almost four million pounds received from England from the sale of the canal shares was soon squandered.¹⁵ Khedive Ismail, through Nubar Pasha, an Armenian in his employ who pocketed a large share for himself, had borrowed, at a high rate of interest, from citizens of European countries to such an extent that the House of Rothschilds, fearing for their money, appealed to England and France. Because neither made a prompt move to come to their aid, the Rothschilds took their case to Bismarck, who

¹⁵W. S. Blunt, *Secret History of English Occupation of Egypt*. (Gives a good account of conditions in Egypt and European interference).

threatened to intervene if England and France did not. It was Bismarck's policy at this time to keep England and Russia from coming to blows, over the Near Eastern questions.¹⁶ It was well known to Bismarck that the road to India would, in British eyes, become insecure if Russia should take possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and he hoped that control in Egypt would reconcile England to Russia's occupation of Constantinople. He, therefore, urged England to seek undisputed control of the Suez Canal and Egypt, and thus assure the peace of Europe at the expense of Turkey.¹⁷ In a memorandum of June 15, 1877, he wrote, "If only England and Russia would come to an agreement on the basis of one controlling Egypt and the other the Black Sea both might find it possible to remain content with maintaining the *status quo* for a long period."¹⁸ He also characterized as "very sensible" the efforts of Nubar Pasha to pave the way for a British protectorate over Egypt.

To adjust the matter of the Khedive's debts, he was induced to create by royal decree a "Commission of Debt" whose business it was to control the collection of taxes and expenditures of moneys applied to the national debt.¹⁹ Originally this commission consisted of one representative each from Austria, England, France and Italy, to which were added in 1885 two others, a

¹⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. II, p. 69, No. 250.

¹⁷Note: Bülow suggests the same solution of the situation in a communication to Münster, Nov. 27, 1876, see *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. II, p. 105, No. 263.

¹⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. II, p. 153, No. 294.

¹⁹Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. I, p. 12; *Ibid*, Vol. II p. 86 f.

German and a Russian.²⁰ In spite of this commission, however, the Khedive could not be controlled, and matters went from very bad to much worse until in 1879, at the suggestion of England, Germany and France, the Sultan deposed Ismaïl, and appointed Tewfik, Ismaïl's son, Viceroy, whereupon Ismaïl left Egypt for Italy with £3,000,000 sterling.²¹ In 1881 the mutiny of Arabi called for forceful intervention from the Powers.²² In this, France refused to join, and England took the first step in acting alone by bombarding Alexandria and landing troops, in July 1882, under Lord Wolesley.²³

The matter now became a live international question and remained one of the principal bones of contention between France and England from that time down to the final settlement of their difficulties in 1904. In this controversy, England claimed that her occupation of Egypt should be temporary in nature and that she proposed to withdraw but would set no date for such withdrawal.²⁴ She was opposed to international control, however, on the ground that the various interests of the Powers would come to light and cause divisions. Then, too, combined European treatment would only complicate the situation.²⁵ At every op-

²⁰Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 304.

²¹Blunt, *The Secret History of English Occupation of Egypt*; Woolf, *Empire and Commerce*, p. 139.

²²*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série t. IV, doc. Nos. 314, 323, 327.

²³John Morley, *Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, Vol. III, p. 78; *Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série t. IV, p. 417; Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, p. 113.

²⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, pp. 41, 42, No. 731.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 26, No. 724.

portunity, France insisted upon the international nature of the Egyptian question and demanded that England should set a definite date for withdrawal.²⁶ In this France was joined by Russia, whereas Germany seems to have played a somewhat independent role. When discussing the question with Frenchmen she insisted that the Egyptian question should retain its European character.²⁷ But in the presence of Englishmen she was willing that England should have a free hand in Egypt, provided always that Germany should be compensated elsewhere.²⁸ In September of that same year, Herbert Bismarck, who had been sent to London as a special representative, wrote his father, reporting a conversation he had had with Lord Granville and Dilke, under-secretary of the Foreign Office, and informing Bismarck that Dilke had denied any anti-German feeling in England. Dilke had said that Russia was the only nation that inspired bitter feelings in England. The apparent antipathy for Germany was shown because England believed that Germany was Russia's friend and intended to stand by her. Turning to France, Dilke said, "They behave like children. They have no idea of politics . . . I am very much anti-French for they have so many divergent interests. They are very troublesome to us."²⁹ He went on to enumerate the many places in Africa in which France had interfered

²⁶*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série t. V, p. 295, No. 274.

²⁷*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série t. IV, p. 542, doc. 563.

²⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 272; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. III, p. 32.

²⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 38, No. 730.

with England's activities. In the margin of this communication Bismarck had written, "You (England) might let them have a corner."

England was grateful to Germany for letting her have a free hand in Egypt and Granville expressed appreciation for Germany's goodwill, but the Kaiser probably states Germany's real reason for withdrawal and also Germany's general attitude in the whole Egyptian question when he wrote in the margin of this document, "We did not withdraw our ships out of goodwill, but in order to avoid becoming involved in any hostile action, and in order to leave England alone to bear the consequences of her faulty policy."³⁰ It was the hope and belief among German diplomats that England and France should be left alone to intervene in Egypt, feeling sure, should they do so, there must soon follow increased tension between them; this was to Germany's liking.³¹ The price for this apparently friendly German attitude toward England was to be paid later. Bismarck expected to collect by having Great Britain pay with British acquiescence in German colonial expansion.³² Germany had no political interests in Egypt, but she intended to have such interests elsewhere.³³

England was now firmly intrenched in Egypt. While she kept protesting that her occupation was but temporary, she showed no signs of withdrawal; nor

³⁰*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 47, No. 735.

³¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 30, No. 725.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 48, 49, No. 736; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. I, p. 169.

³³*German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. I, p. 189; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 96, No. 758.

indeed could she withdraw.³⁴ In spite of the fact that "Egypt was like a noose about the British neck, which any Great Power could tighten when it wanted to squeeze a diplomatic concession from the mistress of the seas", Great Britain would not,—perhaps, could not, let go.³⁵

Having Egypt, England must wish to control the sources of Egypt's life—the water supply. These sources are to be found in the mountains of Ethiopia, and the moment England became the *protector* of Egypt she sought to control the Nile valley and to watch with jealous eye any other European powers which sought concessions or exercised privileges that might possibly interfere with the free flow of the waters of the Blue Nile and the Atbara. Egypt must always, as a matter of self-defense, be in a position to dominate Ethiopia, either directly or indirectly, or to live on the most friendly terms with her highland neighbors.³⁶ "If I were the Mahdi, I would make Egypt pay for every quart of water that runs down the Nile",³⁷ quotes Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett in the House of Commons, March 28, 1895, and Sir Colin Scott-Moncrief makes a clear cut distinction between the ideals and methods of Europeans and of native folks in Africa when he says,

As for diverting the Nile in the Sudan and depriving Egypt of its water, though there might be no danger from the Mahdi, what the Mahdi could not do, a civilized

³⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 34, No. 728.

³⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 96, No. 758; Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Vol. I, p. 126.

³⁶A. S. White, *Expansion of Egypt*, p. 29.

³⁷*Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, Vol. XXXII, p. 391.

people could do. It is very evident that the civilized possessor of the Upper Nile valley holds Egypt in his grasp . . . A civilized nation on the Upper Nile would surely build regulating sluices across the outlet of the Victoria Nyanza and control that great sea as Manchester controls Thirlmere. This would be an easy operation. Once done, the Nile supply would be in their hands and if poor little Egypt had the bad luck to be at war with this people in the upper waters they might flood Egypt or cut off the water supply at their pleasure.³⁸

Of course these men were thinking of the White Nile and Lake Victoria no doubt. That the real danger to Egypt's water supply is not to be found however, in the head waters of the White Nile but rather in the Blue Nile and the mountains of Ethiopia, is evident from Lord Cromer's report to the British government of the work of Sir William Garstin who had been employed by the government to make a very careful study of the whole question.³⁹ Garstin discouraged the idea of attempting any control of the waters of the White Nile because little benefit could come from such efforts. He declared that the Blue Nile is much better suited for the purpose and that it traversed fertile plains, easy to be irrigated. All that would be necessary for a rival power to do, in order to transform the beneficent Nile, which has created Egypt, into a destructive flood would be simply to make a breach in the barrier of rock at its source.⁴⁰ To be convinced that the ancients had recognized this possibility one needs only to understand the meaning of the Ethiopian "Feast of the Cross," (Mascal). This

³⁸*Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, Vol. XXXII, p. 391.

³⁹*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. XCI, Egypt, No. 2 (1901), also Vol. CXI, (1904).

⁴⁰Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 349.

festival celebrates the return, by the Egyptians, of the "true Cross" to Ethiopia, to repay the Ethiopians for their assurance that they would never divert the waters of Lake Tsana. With the source of the Nile in control of the Ethiopians, Egypt, and now England as Egypt's *protector*, need have no fear that its water supply would be cut off; but in the scramble for Africa, it was likely that some *civilized* European nation, which had forgotten the meaning of the Cross, would seek to *protect* Ethiopia and thus endanger Egypt. To make sure that that European Power, if any, should be England's friend became at once a most important consideration.

Though France withdrew from joint military occupation of Egypt with England when the latter landed troops there, she had no idea of resigning Africa to British domination. At the very time that England was bombarding Alexandria, France was seeking elsewhere a foothold for an entrance into Ethiopia. In 1881, she remembered that in 1862 for 50,500 francs, she had purchased Obock on the northern shore of the Gulf of Tajura from the local Danakil chiefs.⁴¹

Since the opening of the Suez Canal, France's interest in the Far East had been greatly increased and she sought some strategic point along the route thither. That this action was wise seems proven because in 1883, when France was engaged in the Tonkin war with China in Annam, England closed the port of Aden to French ships. Because of this English action the

⁴¹Sir Edward Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 628, No. 181.

French decided to establish a naval base of their own at Obock. Obock would also serve as a center of commerce for Harrar, Shoa, and southern Abyssinia, and since England was now playing a lone hand in Egypt, the Gulf of Tajura offered for France the best approach to the highlands of Ethiopia and the Nile.⁴² That the French were thinking only of a stopping place on the way to the far East, even at that date, cannot be accepted. They, like other European Powers, as most of the documents would have us believe, found the local chiefs possessed with so fervent a desire to give away their possessions and to come under the protection of France that within a few years France had *accepted* from Sultan Ahmed-ebn-Muhammad of Tajura and others, sovereignty over the whole coast extending from Ras Dumeira, on the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to Jibuti.⁴³ It is necessary to notice that France was careful to exact from these donors a statement in each treaty that they would not enter into similar relations with any other European Power.⁴⁴ Moreover, in case of dispute the French text alone would constitute the official agreement.

No sooner had France recalled her possession of Obock, than the Italian statesmen, whose memories of bitter disappointments in Tunis were so lively, began to search their Italian minds to discover whether or not Italy might not have some grounds for claims upon

⁴²C. de la Jonquiere, *Les Italiens en Erythrée*, p. 42.

⁴³See *Treaties*, April 9, 1884, Sept. 21, 1884, etc.; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition Vol. II, p. 630ff.

⁴⁴Note: Some years before making this arrangement with France the Sultan of Tajura had made similar agreement with the English East India Company on behalf of England.

the Red Sea, and sure enough, they recalled that, though Italy had never accepted a gift of territory from any local chief in his search to find some generous European state ready to take him, and incidentally his territory, under its beneficent protection, they did recall that an Italian citizen by the name of Sapeto had purchased in 1869, for 6000 M. T. dollars such a foothold at Assab, about forty kilometers north of Bab-el-Mandeb.⁴⁵ Strange to say, too, Assab was purchased on behalf of that Rubattino Company which had figured so prominently in Tunis in its purchase of the English railway there. Upon recalling that the Rubattino Company had made its purchase and knowing that the French were reviving their claim in the Gulf of Tajura, the Italians acted promptly that they might not suffer the fate they had experienced in the Mediterranean, and with one boat belonging to the Company, *supported by two gunboats of the Italian government*, they took possession of this territory so long neglected and Assab became an Italian colony.⁴⁶ Within the next few years, Italy took over several other small territories in the neighborhood of Assab and thus secured a landing place within the borders of Ethiopia.

Although England was fully occupied at this time with Egyptian matters, she could not look upon these French and Italian activities, being carried on along

⁴⁵De le Jonqui re, *Les Italiens en Erythr e*, p. 19; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition Vol. II, p. 446; Note: "M. T. Dollars"—This is the common name applied to the silver dollar of Ethiopian currency. It is the old Marie Theresa dollar of Austria. It varies in value with our dollar of course. At present it would be worth about forty cents.

⁴⁶De le Jonqui re, *Les Italiens en Erythr e*, p. 21.

her route to India and just opposite her barren port at Aden, without showing more than curious interest. In Aden she already had a stepping stone to the East, but she could not permit her European rivals to slip up from the other side and steal away from her the Ethiopian headwaters of the Nile and rob her of the full returns for her troubles in Egypt by controlling the source of Egypt's life. She felt called upon to look after her own interests in Somaliland. British policy was, in these particular years (1881-1885), in a peculiar and difficult position as regards Ethiopia. It must be remembered that at this time the government of England was in the hands of the Gladstone Ministry, notoriously opposed to further expansion. Herbert Bismarck, in a communication to his father, declared early in 1885, "There is no point in discussing the foreign policy of a great country with Mr. Gladstone, as he has no comprehension of it whatever."⁴⁷ But in spite of this antipathy of the Prime Minister for foreign matters, the course of events was such that England was becoming more and more involved, while stoutly protesting her intention to withdraw. The Kaiser, at least, had little faith in these repeated declarations, since in the margin of a communication from his representative, stating that Lord Salisbury had declared that England should remain in Egypt until public order had been restored and the international position of the country was secure against outside danger, he wrote—"4-500 jahren zu erwarten."⁴⁸

⁴⁷*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 100, No. 760.

⁴⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 154, No. 1783.


Having occupied Egypt, England was forced to become interested in all territory then claimed by Egypt, which included the Red Sea, Somaliland, the Harrar, Northern Abyssinia, and the Sudan. The reader must also keep in mind the fact, that the Sultan of Turkey still claimed suzerainty over all these, as well as over Egypt itself. England's relationship to all this had never been defined and the Sultan, encouraged by France and Russia, kept insisting that England had no right there.⁴⁹ The situation was sufficiently complicated for a government desiring expansion, but doubly difficult to one opposed to imperialism. Mr. Gladstone already had in Egypt and the Sudan more than he thought England should possess. He certainly wished for nothing in Somaliland. Even those Englishmen who believed that England should possess herself of some part of Ethiopia were embarrassed by Egypt's claims about the coast. If Egypt were to be occupied only temporarily and England claimed to be her *protector*, then it would be difficult to explain to the world why England should take territory from her protégé. Rather England would be expected to defend Egypt against such aggression as that accomplished at Tajura Bay by the French and at Assab by the Italians. Egypt, like Duncan in Macbeth's home, was in England's protection in double trust. Egypt either belonged outright to England or she was her protectorate. In either case England should close the door against "the deep damnation" of Egypt's dismemberment, not bear the knife herself.

⁴⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 164, No. 1792.

England wavered, but in 1884, self-interest, and her inability to stand by and see her rivals appropriate the whole coast prevailed. She could not resist the urge to occupy lands claimed by her protégé. In spite of remonstrances from the Porte at Constantinople, she bore the knife herself and sliced off what is now British Somaliland, just southeast of the French possession.⁵⁰ By taking possession of Assab, the Italians had set a definite limit to French expansion northward along the Red Sea coast. Now England, by hoisting the Union Jack at Zeila and laying claim to the coast as far as Bender Siyada, had set a narrow limit to French ambitions in that direction. Here then by 1884, we have the three rival colonial-minded powers of Europe planted at the entrance of the den of the Lion of Ethiopia, each ready to strike, should the lion emerge, and jealous, suspicious, and watchful of the others.

This situation, with its background, has given rise to one of the most interesting and most complicated stories of international rivalry and imperialistic tendencies in European diplomacy. It is our purpose, having brought the reader thus far to see the situation, to ferret out for him the intricate, devious, complicated, mysterious, and at times, hidden trails by which Europeans, between 1880 and 1906, sought to filch from the Ethiopian his lands and to outdo each other in the attempt. Before proceeding, however, from this point, it will be necessary to scan briefly, the activities back in

⁵⁰Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. I, p. 409; Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, pp. 49-51; *State Papers*, Vol. LXXVII, pp. 1263-1269 for treaties with chiefs.



Map Showing European Occupations in Ethiopia, On Red Sea Coast.

Europe among the competing nations in the bid for Ethiopia. This in itself is an interesting story, and, for a clear understanding of our problem, is essential.

While these events were being enacted in the eastern Mediterranean and along the newly acquired route to the East, in Central Africa, the stage was being set for the final closing in upon Ethiopia. By 1884 England and the Dutch Boers had arranged their difficulties, for the time being, in the London Convention.⁵¹ Germany and England had had their controversy over the Angra Pequena territory, where Herr Lüderitz had hoisted the German flag in face of English protest.⁵² Leopold II had established himself firmly in the Congo.⁵³ At the suggestion of Jules Ferry,⁵⁴ Bismarck had joined in a protest against the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, by which England had sought to cut off Leopold's Congo from an outlet to the sea, and had forced withdrawal of the treaty.

Until now Germany had taken little interest in the partition of Africa. For the first decade following the unification of Germany, Bismarck had not favored colonial possession. In the peace arrangements with France following the Franco-Prussian war, he had refused France's offer of Cochin China in lieu of Alsace-Lorraine. He had declared that Germany could not afford such luxuries; that "a colonial policy for us

⁵¹*State Papers*, Vol. LXXV, p. 5; also pp. 528-553.

⁵²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 56, No. 741—note; *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁵³See *Acts of Recognition by European States*, Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, pp. 573-601.

⁵⁴Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 1004; *State Papers*, Vol. LXXV, p. 476.

would be just like the silken sables of Polish families who have no shirts."⁵⁵ But as Germany came to feel her importance among the European nations she came to demand "a place in the sun". When, therefore, Bismarck came to sense this change of attitude among the German people, he became very active. He proposed to make up for late arrival upon the field by intensity of action.

Now began in earnest the European game of "Grab for Ethiopia", with England, France, Italy and Germany as chief players. On the side lines, more or less interested in the outcome for themselves, were lined up several other states, some of whom had already won their stakes in Africa and were now bent upon holding their own, at least, if indeed they might not find opportunity for extending these possessions. As in all games where there is anything of value at stake, there must be developed certain rules of the game. Out of the confusion which followed Germany's entrance into the game, there arose the necessity for international agreement upon future procedure which culminated in the calling of a conference of the Powers to formulate these rules.

When one recalls the intensity of Germany's entrance upon colonial expansion and England's determination to brook no interference with her schemes in that part of the world, one can understand the necessity for some regulations. With such vigorous, intense rivalry something must be done to avoid conflict. When

⁵⁵M. Busch, *Tagebuchblätter*, Vol. II, p. 157, cited by Moon, in *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 23.

England protested against Herr Lüderitz's action in hoisting the German flag at Angra Pequena, cited above, declaring that even if England were not prepared to take formal possession here, she considered that she had the right to prevent other nations from doing so, Bismarck responded with vigor.⁵⁶ He described England's assertion as a "Monroe Doctrine of Africa" and informed her that Germany was not "disposed to recognize any such aggression and shall dispute England's right in the matter"; that in England's high-handed attitude, "The Monroe Doctrine, *that monstrosity in International Law*, was being applied in favor of England to the coast of Africa".⁵⁷ He was so much disturbed over this incident that he thought it necessary to send his son, Herbert Bismarck, to London as a special envoy, to bolster up his minister's resistance. After long discussions (during which Herbert Bismarck wrote his father that it was difficult to keep Lord Granville to the point, as he was suffering from a bad case of gout and loss of memory upon certain essential matters) the British resolved not to question the position claimed by Germany in that part of Africa.⁵⁸

Later Bismarck wrote Münster, who was in charge of German affairs in Egyptian matters,

Public opinion in Germany lays so great a stress upon our colonial policy, that the government's position in the country actually depends upon its success. I beg you, therefore, not to forget that Egypt in itself is quite indifferent to us and is merely a means of overcoming England's objections to our colonial aspirations. The smallest corner of New Guinea or West Africa, even

⁵⁶*German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. I, p. 174 (note).

⁵⁷*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 59, No. 743 (*Italics mine*).

⁵⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 64, No. 745; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. I, p. 180 (note).

if quite worthless in itself, is just now of greater importance to our policy than the whole of Egypt and its future.⁵⁹

Then, too, it was in the latter part of 1884 that the notorious Dr. Karl Peters and his group landed at Zanzibar.⁶⁰ Immediately they concluded a large number of treaties with the local Sultans in what later became German East Africa—now called Tanganyika Colony.⁶¹ Though at that time, Bismarck disclaimed any connection of the German government with Peters and his scandalous methods of securing the local chieftains' consent to part with their lands for mere trinkets, yet subsequent events prove beyond question their close co-operation.

Thus when Jules Ferry, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, while protesting against English action in the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of February 26, 1884, proposed to Bismarck that some sort of international convention should be called to formulate rules by which to govern the annexation of African territory in the future, he found a ready response. Bismarck was about to launch a most vigorous colonial policy and he needed French support to cope with what he considered British high-handed methods. After several

⁵⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 96, No. 758.

⁶⁰Note: The Dr. Karl Peters referred to here is the German who with several companions went to Zanzibar under several *aliases* where in the hinterland he travelled about presenting gifts and gin to the chiefs. When the chiefs were under the influence of liquor, he had them sign treaties giving away all their lands to the German Empire. Peters would then shake the chief's hand heartily, run up the German flag, fire a salute and lo, Germany had a new protectorate. One of the sad things about this method of Peters' is that it was not unusual.

⁶¹Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 681; *State Papers*, Vol. LXXII, p. 10.

exchanges of notes between them in which he and Jules Ferry discussed the agenda and came to agreement in advance upon what should be done at such a conference, Germany issued the invitation to the leading states of Europe and the United States of America, calling for an international conference to meet at Berlin.⁶²

This conference met in Berlin in the latter part of 1884 and completed its work by signing February 26, 1885, an agreement, which has become known as the General Act of Berlin.⁶³ There were present at this conference representatives of all the Majesties of Europe with representatives of his Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, and the presidents of France and the United States of America.⁶⁴ *But there was no Ethiopian present.*

They declared "In the Name of Almighty God", in the preamble to this Act,

wishing in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favorable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions of Africa, and to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation on the two chief rivers flowing into the Atlantic Ocean; being desirous, on the other hand, to obviate the misunderstandings and disputes which might in future arise from new acts of occupation on the coast of Africa; and concerned, at the same time, as to the means of furthering the moral and material well-being of the native population, have resolved, on the invitation addressed to them by the Imperial Gov-

⁶²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. III, pp. 419, 421, 424, 427, Nos. 684, 687, 688, 689; *Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1re série, Vol. V, p. 368, No. 366; p. 392, No. 385; p. 404, No. 395.

⁶³G. F. de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2e série, Vol. X, p. 414; Hertzslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 468ff.

⁶⁴While the United States took active part in the proceedings of the Conference, our government did not become responsible for the General Act by signing it.

ernment of Germany, in agreement with the Government of the French Republic, to meet for those purposes in Conference at Berlin.⁶⁵

With this pious declaration the Conference set to work to formulate rules for the partition of Africa in the hope of thus avoiding European conflict over the spoils. It was careful to make provision for commercial opportunities. The principle of free trade for all Conference Powers was provided for within the whole of Central Africa between latitude five degrees north and the Zambezi river.⁶⁶ But an effort of the American delegates to have this entire zone neutralized and war forever prohibited was defeated. Certain European states could not resist the opportunity provided here to secure new and wider fields of battle. Instead of neutralizing the whole area, therefore, the Conference adopted a possible innocuous optional neutrality for the Congo state alone.⁶⁷

The two provisions of this General Act of Berlin with which we shall be most concerned in our problem are those dealing with future occupations and annexations. While the immediate occasion which had prompted Jules Ferry and Bismarck to call a conference of European Powers to deal with African questions was the Anglo-Portuguese attempt to seize the mouth of the Congo river and thus to be able to control the traffic from the interior Congo basin, that now was in the past and had been settled by England's failure to ratify the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. The Berlin Con-

⁶⁵*Preamble to the General Act of Berlin*, Feb. 26, 1885.

⁶⁶See *Chapter I*, Article I of the Act.

⁶⁷See *Chapter III*, Article X of the Act.

ference had made sure that this attempt should not be repeated by providing for the free navigation of the rivers. But its real purpose was to provide for the future and to prevent excessive land grabs by any one or more European states. The "one or more" state aimed at here by France and Germany was, of course, England.

To accomplish this purpose the Conference provided, first, in Article XXXIV, that in the future any Power claiming a new protectorate in Africa should notify the other members of the Conference of such claims. This provision was intended to insure the others opportunity either to protest the proposed annexation or to make similar annexations. Since there will be occasion to refer frequently to this Article, it seems best to quote it here. It provided that,

Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coast of the African Continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claim of their own.⁶⁸

The second provision of this Act to which we shall have occasion to refer is that providing for effective occupation. It was intended by this provision to prevent wholesale annexations on paper, without explorations ever having been made within the territory claimed.⁶⁹ The reader should not take too seriously the provision of this Article. The European states

⁶⁸See *Chapter VI*, Article XXXIV, of the General Act.

⁶⁹See *Chapter VI*, Article XXV, of the General Act.

agreeing to it did not let its existence bother them. They construed "occupation" in its broadest possible sense. To "occupy" a vast province, all that seemed necessary was to secure from its chief an *urgent request* that the occupying Power *protect* him. Whereupon the occupying agents built some sort of rude fort, hoisted the flag of their country, and sang or repeated, if unable to sing, God save the Majesty in whose name they acted.

Such was the effort of this great European Conference, which had within its grasp an unparalleled opportunity, "In the Name of Almighty God", as its preamble asserted, to provide for the development of a whole continent of backward people. It might have provided safeguards against the debauchery of the natives and prevented the exploitation of their rights. Means could have been devised to prevent greedy aggression and international conflict had the diplomats at Berlin willed it, but they did not will it. They could not see beyond the present nor outside their own national interest.

As might have been expected, having set up these rules to be followed in the future partition of Africa, each of the leading states of Europe went directly from the Berlin Conference of 1885 into the most intense effort to out-do the others in securing for itself the most desirable parts of that continent still unclaimed by some European State. Each Power did its best to "steal a march" on the others by finding local chieftains, weary of independence, and magnanimously coming to their relief by *accepting* a protectorate over their

possessions. Agents of all sorts would race to distant places with presents in one hand and rifles in the other. Each had his pockets full of blank treaties in case the psychological moment should arrive in which a chief, seized with a sudden emotion, should desire to give away his lands, the opportunity would be at hand for him to make his mark upon the dotted line at once, lest the desire would pass with the gin presented him. Whether a chieftain desired the *protection* of one state rather than another depended wholly upon which one reached him first. Sometimes, in his zeal to part with his possessions and his sovereignty, and to be certain they were really gone, he forgot and gave them a second time.

Among the most notorious and at least *among* the unscrupulous of these agents was the Dr. Karl Peters referred to above. Shortly before the Berlin Conference, he and other members of the colonization society which he represented, landed at Zanzibar where he concluded a large number of treaties with the local Sultans in the hinterland. Peters had returned to Germany within a few days of the signing of the General Act of Berlin and soon after his return, Germany notified the Powers, according to the provisions of that Act, that Germany had secured a protectorate over this territory.⁷⁰ On May 25th, Lord Granville replied to this notification in diplomatic language, stating that the British government was favorable to the proposed German colonization but there was a scheme

⁷⁰Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 682f.

"of some prominent British capitalists for a British settlement in the country between the coast and the lakes, which are the source of the White Nile, and for its connection with the coast by railway".⁷¹ In order to avoid a clash between England and Germany he suggested a delimitation of territory. To make matters more difficult for German colonial hopes in Africa, Mr. Gladstone's ministry fell in June of that year (1885) and it was followed by that of Lord Salisbury which was much more aggressive in British expansion.⁷² Lord Salisbury, however, was friendly toward Germany and sought to bring about better relations between the two countries.

There followed long and interesting negotiations, agreements and protocols dealing with questions arising out of rival positions in both East Africa and West Africa,⁷³ and finally the struggle for Uganda with the Jackson-Peters incident.⁷⁴ Then, too, when Kaiser William II. ascended the throne of Germany in 1888 the Russo-German relations grew worse. In this situa-

⁷¹*Parliamentary Papers*, Africa No. 1 (1886). Note: The prominent British capitalists to which Lord Granville referred were, no doubt, the Manchester Merchants who had taken over a group of treaties secured by Sir Harry Johnston from Chiefs in the neighborhood of Mt. Kilimanjaro, near where Karl Peters had taken his treaties. These Manchester Merchants formed the British East African Association later reorganized as the Imperial British East African Company.

⁷²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 100, No. 760.

⁷³See Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 681ff; *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 868-899; *Parliamentary Papers*, Africa No. 1 (1886); *State Papers*, Vols. LXXVI and LXXVII. (Germany) see contents.

⁷⁴Sir Harry Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, Vol. I, pp. 231ff. In Sir Harry's two volumes on Uganda there is to be had a very interesting account of the religious and international struggle in Uganda.

tion Bismarck sought some new ally to replace Russia in his efforts to guard against France in Europe, hence the necessity of a friendly gesture toward England.⁷⁵ Germany, therefore, accepted England's suggestion that they confer with a view of delimiting their respective spheres of influence in the whole of Africa.

Accordingly, representatives of both countries met in Berlin and succeeded in completing an agreement between Germany and England, July 1, 1890.⁷⁶ In many respects this is one of the most significant treaties in the history of colonial expansion and certainly of great importance in its bearing upon the outcome in our investigation. It is from this treaty that Germany secured the long coveted island of Heligoland, valued as an outpost sentinel upon the approaches to the Kiel Canal in exchange for permitting the British a free hand in large stretches of African territory.⁷⁷ Germany secured, as some of her citizens claimed, a button in exchange for a whole suit of clothes.⁷⁸ It is in this treaty that Germany and England provided for Italy's protectorate over Ethiopia.⁷⁹ It was upon this treaty that Germany based her arguments in demanding the withdrawal of Article III of the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of May 12, 1894.⁸⁰ Then, too, this document formed the basis of German support for British

⁷⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IV, p. 177, No. 819.

⁷⁶de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XVI, p. 894; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition Vol. III, pp. 899-906; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1890 (C-6046); State Papers, Vol. LXXXII, p. 35.

⁷⁷See Article XII, of the Treaty.

⁷⁸Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 126.

⁷⁹See Article I, section 2, of the Treaty.

⁸⁰See *Infra*, Chapter IV, p. 174.

contentions in most of the Anglo-French disputes in the Nile Basin territory. By this agreement the two countries marked out their respective spheres of influence in East and Central Africa, by a line beginning at the mouth of the Uмба (or Wanga) river on the Indian Ocean, and extending directly to the base of Mount Kilimanjaro, thence, skirting that mountain to the north so as to leave Kilimanjaro within the German sphere, it resumed its former direction and extended in a straight line to the intersection of the eastern shore of Lake Victoria with the first parallel of south latitude. From this point it followed the first parallel of south latitude westward across Lake Victoria and on to the border of the Congo Free State but skirted Mount Mfumbo to the south so as to exclude that mountain from the German sphere.⁸¹ Germany was assigned the territory to the south of this line and to England was given that north of it.

Both German and British spheres were to extend to the west to join directly with the Congo Free State, but it was agreed that England's western boundary should extend northward apparently beyond the Congo Free State, "by the western watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile".⁸² This provision assured to England, German approval of her claims to Uganda and the whole basin of the Upper Nile, a claim which France proposed to challenge.

Moreover, in fixing the northern boundary of England's sphere, Germany further recognized Eng-

⁸¹See *Article I* of the Treaty of 1890.


⁸²*Article I*, British Sphere to the West, 3, of the agreement, 1890.

land's control over the whole Nile Basin to the borders of Egypt and agreed with England in recognition of Italy's claims upon Ethiopia as a protectorate. Here they agreed that the northern limit of the British sphere should be delimited by a line which began at the mouth of the Juba river, and followed the northern bank of that river until its intersection with the southern boundary of the territory they reserved for Italy. It then continued "coterminous with the territory reserved to the influence of Italy in Gallaland and Abyssinia, as far as the confines of Egypt".⁸³

In 1889, by the Treaty of Ucciali with Menelik, Italy had claimed Ethiopia (Abyssinia) as a protectorate and England had recognized that claim in replying to Crispi's notification of the same.⁸⁴ But neither England nor Italy had fixed the boundaries of this claim. True, Italy claimed *all* Ethiopia and, as we have seen Menelik's claim for Ethiopia extended to the south to the fifth parallel of north latitude and in a hazy manner to the White Nile on the west. If then, England and Germany in 1890, intended to recognize Italy's claims to be coterminous with those of Menelik, Germany in this agreement granted to England a free hand in all that vast territory extending from the Indian Ocean to the confines of Egypt (wherever those confines might be) lying between the line separating the German-English spheres to the south and this line bounding the Italian sphere, namely: the Juba river to the fifth parallel of north latitude to the White Nile,

⁸³Article I, British Sphere. To the North, 2, of the Agreement of 1890.

⁸⁴See *Chapter II*, p. 91.



thence following the White Nile to the confines of Egypt. It included Kenya, Uganda, Buganda and whatever of the Sudan lay to the south of the border of Egypt. Since England was now in control of Egypt, it mattered not whether the southern border of Egypt was at the Tropic of Cancer or the Equator. In either case England subject to agreement with Italy, could now lay claim to the whole of the Nile valley, confident of German support.

The only possible point of dispute, henceforth, between England and Germany, so far as African territory was concerned, lay in the delimitation of the eastern confines of the Cameroons and this was agreed upon in an Anglo-German treaty concluded in Berlin, November 15, 1893.⁸⁵ By the terms of this agreement the influence of Germany, eastward from the Cameroons, in respect to her relations with Great Britain, should not extend beyond the basin of the River Shari, and that Darfur, Kordofan, and Bahr-el-Ghazal should be excluded from the German sphere.⁸⁶ This agreement completed the whole line of demarcation of boundaries and spheres of influence between Germany and England so far as African territory was concerned.

By reference to the map the reader will observe that these agreements completely shut off Germany from Ethiopia by a broad band of British territory extending clear around Ethiopia on the land side. By

⁸⁵Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 913.

⁸⁶Article IV of the *Anglo-German Agreement* of Nov. 15, 1893.

these treaties Germany agreed to confine her influence south and west of the line beginning on the Indian Ocean at the mouth of the River Wanga (Umba) and extending directly to the intersection of the eastern shore of Lake Victoria with the first parallel, south latitude, and following this parallel to the eastern border of the Congo Free State with which the British sphere joined directly until the boundary of that state reached the river-divide between the Ubanghi and Bahr-el-Ghazal. From this point northward the separating line followed the divide between the Nile basin and the Atlantic river basin. From these agreements Germany dropped out as a possible contender in the final race for Ethiopia. There remained England, France and Italy.

Though England had agreed, in principle, to the Italian protectorate over Ethiopia, she had never agreed to any particular boundaries for that protectorate. She never had any intention to assign to Italy the eastern part of the basin of the Nile. By this time, because of a more nearly perfect understanding of the real source of the water supply for Egypt and because of the certain needs of uplands upon which to construct her proposed Cape-to-Cairo railway, so strongly advocated by such empire builders as Cecil Rhodes in South Africa and Joseph Chamberlain in London, she intended to move the western boundary of Ethiopia just as far east as possible. For this reason the northern and eastern boundary of her sphere of influence agreed upon with Germany in the Treaty of 1890 was anchored definitely at one end only—the Juba river sec-

tion. From the headwaters of the Juba to the confines of Egypt the boundary line was left dangling in the air. It remained possible to swing it either direction—east or west. England proposed to swing it as far to the east as possible. Her manner of doing this and the degree of her success we shall see in our next chapter, in the protocols of March 24 and April 15, 1891.⁸⁷

While England was thus given a free hand, so far as Germany was concerned, to deal with France and Italy for Ethiopia, she had made one great blunder in permitting Germany's East African territory to join directly with that of the Congo Free State. With South Africa from the Cape right up to German East Africa now under her control and a clear right of way, so far as Germany was concerned, from Uganda to the Mediterranean for the Cape-to-Cairo route, she had permitted Germany, by joining directly to the Congo, to block, effectively, her purposes here.

Fortunately for England the General Act of Berlin (1885) had provided for the free navigation of the rivers and lakes of this territory, including Lake Tanganyika.⁸⁸ Fortunately, too, Rhodesia bordered on the southern extremity of Lake Tanganyika. By the agreement of 1890 England had included within her sphere Lake Albert Edward. There remained, therefore, only the short distance between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert Edward which she needed to complete a British route from the Cape to the headwaters of the

⁸⁷See Chapter III, p. 128.

⁸⁸*General Act of Berlin* (1885), Chapter I, Article I; Chapter IV, Articles XIII, XVI.

Nile. After 1890, therefore, there were two main directions in British diplomacy, namely: to secure somehow this connecting link between the two lakes and to gain undisputed control of both the eastern and western sections of the Nile basin.

It was now too late to rectify the error in failing to provide a lane through the German sphere. By this time, if indeed she had not from the first realized it, Germany had come to see her strategic position with reference to British ambitions. To get German consent now to a route through her territory would cost far too much. There remained Leopold II and the Congo Free State. Leopold was always on the lookout for a bargain. That was what prompted him to secure the Congo in the first place. For the hinterland of his vast Congo, he, like the French, sought an outlet upon the Nile. As England, since the Anglo-German Agreement, felt quite secure in considering herself the European guardian of the whole Nile territory, she could supply him with this desired outlet upon the river, provided always Leopold was prepared to offer inducements commensurate with the benefits to be derived (English measure). England now had plenty of sand and swamp leading to the Nile. She needed a right of way behind the German territory. She would trade. Leopold was willing.

Accordingly, May 12, 1894, England signed with Leopold II, the Anglo-Congolese Agreement whereby England secured a corridor leading from the northern end of Lake Tanganyika to the southern extremity of Lake Albert Edward and Leopold gained an outlet

upon the Nile.⁸⁹ By this agreement the British government granted to Leopold II a lease upon a large tract of land in the Upper Nile Valley upon which England as yet had established no valid claim.⁹⁰ The territory included within this lease was bounded by a line starting from a point immediately south of Mahagi on Lake Albert and running directly to the nearest point of the frontier fixed upon the watershed between the Nile and the Congo. Thence it followed this watershed up to the 25th meridian east of Greenwich, which it then followed up to its intersection with the 10th parallel north. From this intersection it followed the 10th parallel east to the Nile river just north of Fashoda. From this point it followed the "thalweg" of the Nile southward to Lake Albert, continuing along the western shore of this lake to the point of beginning.⁹¹ This lease was to continue in force during the life of Leopold.

Nevertheless, by an additional paragraph, it was arranged that all that part of the territory thus leased situated to the west of the thirtieth meridian east of Greenwich, as well as a strip twenty-five kilometers in width stretching from the Nile-Congo watershed down to the western shore of Lake Albert and including the port of Mahagi, should become a permanent possession of the Congo Free State.

Thus Leopold secured from England, during his

⁸⁹de Martens, *Recueil général de traités* 2^e série Vol. XX, p. 805; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96. Treaty Series No. 15, 1894 (C-7358); Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 578.

⁹⁰Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences* (1876-1906), p. 155.

⁹¹Article II of the *Anglo-Congolese Treaty* of May 12, 1894.

lifetime a vast territory within the Bahr-el-Ghazal, the very territory over which France was preparing to set up a claim. In addition he secured a perpetual lease for the Congo Free State, upon all that vast territory lying to the west of the 30th meridian and assurance of a lane twenty-five kilometers wide reaching down to Lake Albert from his frontiers and was thus guaranteed a port on the Nile.


In exchange for all this, Leopold recognized the validity of the Anglo-German treaty of 1890, and leased to Great Britain, under the same terms as those applying to Leopold's leased territory west of the 30th meridian and the lane reaching down to Lake Albert, a corridor twenty-five kilometers wide, extending from the most northerly port on Lake Tanganyika, which was included in the lease, to the most southerly point of Lake Albert Edward.⁹² Thus England gained a right of way for her much coveted Cape-to-Cairo railway over Congo territory lying just back of German East Africa. In the meantime by the protocols of 1891, which we shall discuss later, she had secured from Italy by agreements in delimiting their respective spheres to the east of the Nile river, sufficient territory to insure an upland route for her railway north of Lake Victoria and guarantees which safeguarded Egypt's water supply from the east.⁹³





Such was the setting of the stage for the final act in the dismemberment of Ethiopia. By the agreement of 1890, Germany had withdrawn as a contestant, ap-


⁹²See *Article III of the Anglo-Congolese Treaty* of May 12, 1894.

⁹³See Chapter III, p. 128.

MAP OF THE ANGLO-CONGOLESE TREATY, MAY 12, 1894.



-  -- Leased by England to Leopold II, during Leopold's lifetime.
-  -- PERMANENT lease by England to Leopold.
-  -- PERMANENT land granted by England to Leopold.
-  -- PERMANENT CORRIDOR granted England by Leopold.




Map Showing
ANGLO- CONGOLESE
TREATY OF 1894.

parently in favor of English success. There remained three anxious, active contenders with several other European states playing minor parts. Along the Red Sea front, England, France and Italy stood cheek by jowl. In the rear, Italy had occupied Italian Somaliland, bordering the Indian ocean. France had taken possession of the French Congo and other territories in West Africa and had begun to expand toward the Bahr-el-Ghazal. England had occupied Egypt and had rapidly come through from the south to the borders of Ethiopia. Each was determined to carve out for herself a great African Empire and the time was short. Italy had chosen for her empire the whole of Ethiopia, stretching across the eastern continent from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland. England aimed to have and to hold all that vast territory extending from Kenya Colony to the Mediterranean, including the entire basin of the Nile. France had been dreaming of a vast North African Empire stretching right across the continent from her West African possession to Jibuti, to include all of Ethiopia and much more, and she began now to feel that her dreams should come true. After their settlement in 1891 over western Ethiopia, the claims of Italy and England somewhat paralleled each other and, therefore, some cooperation was possible. But the claims of France ran directly counter to both of the others; hence at every turn there was intense rivalry and sharpest conflict.

It is our purpose in the following chapters to trace the complicated diplomatic struggle engaged in by these three Powers, each to secure control for herself

and to prevent the others from securing such control; to show, if possible, that in the midst of this struggle of the Powers, in spite of it all, perhaps because of it, Ethiopia, though mutilated, has thus far maintained her independence. The diplomatic struggle of the powers was fought to a standstill and the Pawn escaped them all.



CHAPTER II

ITALY TRIES FOR THE PAWN

THE TREATY OF UCCIALLI

The young Italian state, like a youth just become conscious of his strength and importance in the world generally and of the restrictions and limitations of surroundings, had scarcely come of age in 1870 when she felt the urge to expand her *Italia Irredenta* into *Italia Espansione*. On the continent of Africa, no more natural place for Italian expansion could be selected than that of Tunis with Bizerta as its port. But in the eternal shifting of international interest, European diplomacy had arrayed England and Germany with France against Italian aspirations in this direction.¹ Accordingly, in the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the diplomatic jugglers with Bismarck as "honest broker" or "diplomatic umpire", one is not sure which, had decreed that Carthage (Tunis) ought not to remain in the hands of the Barbarians. Moreover with Cyprus in British hands, they decided that Tunis should fall to the tender mercies of the French. Therefore Tunis was assigned to the French in spite of the fact that British writers charge that the French occupation of Tunis was a fine example of "barefaced aggression" and an act of "flagrant immorality".² With equal jus-

¹J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History*, p. 649.

²Lord T. H. L. Newton, *Lord Lyons*, Vol. II, p. 242.

tice, perhaps, French writers make the same charges with reference to British occupation of Egypt.³

Young Italy was one of the few European powers to come away from the Congress of Berlin with nothing in her pockets and her youthful importance hurt. Instead of withdrawing from Tunis, however, she redoubled her activities there and when the British-owned railway was offered for sale, Italy appeared in the person of the Rubattino Company as a formidable bidder for its purchase. By so doing she forced the French to raise their offer of 1,000,000 francs to 2,605,000 francs, and later won a suit in the British courts which set aside the sale of the railway to the French as invalid.⁴ A new sale was ordered and the Rubattino Company purchased the railway from the English for 4,125,000 francs, more than four times the original French estimate of its value. To check this Italian victory the French secured a concession, of course at the expense of Tunis, for another French-owned railway and in the course of a few months later found occasion to intervene with military force and Tunis became a protectorate of the French State.⁵

England through Lord Lyons, protested diplomatically against these high-handed methods, but that both the French and British governments understood perfectly that the British protest was purely formal and meant only for international effect, is convincingly shown by Darcy's comment upon the French reply.

³French historians are practically agreed upon that point.

⁴Woolf, *Empire and Commerce*, p. 98.

⁵Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 1184f.

M. Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, being little desirous of wishing to raise a discussion on these delicate points, gave a sufficiently evasive reply. He glided lightly over the character of our occupation, *because he knew so well that on this point the opposition of England was purely formal* (Italics mine). In colonial matters, the words military occupation, conquest, annexation and protectorate are fundamentally identical, and, if at the beginning of an expedition, statesmen willingly employ words of good omen these are simply oratorical precautions intended to reassure the parliament which votes the credits and the foreign cabinets which show signs of uneasiness.⁶

Regardless of the relative force of the respective claims of different European states or of the justice or injustice of *any* of them, France was now in possession of Tunis, and apparently, in international usage, possession is ten-tenths of the law. Italy, therefore, like all the other European states, faced an accomplished fact. She knew that now the only way by which Italy could displace France in Tunis was by force of arms. She was not prepared to use that method. She, therefore, accepted the situation with reservations, and sought satisfactions elsewhere. These satisfactions were to be found, as far as African territory was concerned, in Tripoli and the Red Sea area; and in the determination to secure friends against the day when France should attempt another *coup d'état* in a *fait accompli*. These friends she sought in the unnatural Triple Alliance of 1882.⁷

It is the Red Sea area with which we are here concerned. Even here France had preceded Italy, but to prevent the French possession at Obock from ex-

⁶Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 200; Note: Darcy was a strong advocate of the imperialistic idea and prone to defend imperial methods. This quotation therefore coming from him is all the more significant.

⁷Crispi, *Memoirs*, Vol. III, p 49 and p. 10.

tending along the Red Sea coast and to secure a new footing for possible colonial possessions in Africa, Italy now revived her claims to Assab, purchased from the local chieftain in 1869 by Joseph Sapeto for the Rubattino Company. As intimated above with one ship belonging to the Company and several government gunboats, she took possession of this point in 1880.⁸ Before Italy had taken formal possession of Assab, the Italian press had been laying claims to African territory with such force as to arouse the suspicions of the French minister in Rome, who as early as the beginning of 1880 had communicated the matter to Paris, declaring that certain Italian ships had anchored at Assab and that he was convinced it was the intention of Italy to extend her hold in these regions.⁹ It became the belief among the French generally that the Italians intended to find in Ethiopia the Empire which they had failed to secure in Tunis, and subsequent events would support this belief.¹⁰

Even before Italy had become a united kingdom, Cavour's attention had been called to the importance of establishing relations with the Negus of Ethiopia, and as early as 1872 correspondence had been carried on between Victor Emanuele II and Menelik, King of Shoa.¹¹ In 1873 Menelik had sent Abba Michele as a messenger to Italy and Italy had returned the compli-

⁸Chapter I, p. 22.

⁹*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série, tome III, p. 45.

¹⁰*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série, tome III, pp. 2, 3.

¹¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 3, doc. 1; *Ibid.*, p. 8, doc. 3; *Ibid.*, p. 25, doc. 11; *Ibid.*, p. 25, doc. 12.

ment by sending an expedition into Shoa under Menelik's protection.¹² Between this time and the landing at Assab there had been infrequent communications between them, and about the middle of 1880, Menelik had requested, from Umberto and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, rifles and other war materials.¹³ During these years the documents make frequent references to the activities of a certain Italian *Geographical Society* in Ethiopia, but shortly after the occupation of Assab, Italy dispatched Conte Antonelli upon an official mission to Shoa to support M. Antinari, who was already there, in an effort to secure a treaty from Menelik whom Umberto addresses as "Carissimo Fratello e Cugino."¹⁴ Antonelli succeeded in securing such a treaty in 1883.¹⁵ Thus began an official relationship, filled with intrigue and misunderstanding, of some thirteen years' duration.

To understand the international relations in Ethiopia in the eighties, it will be necessary to trace briefly the events that had taken place in the country since the death of Theodore in 1869. One explanation for the ease with which the Napier expedition had reached Magdala and had succeeded in the destruction of Theodore's rule, is to be found in the fact that the British had received aid and comfort from many Ethiopian Rases and Chieftains.¹⁶ Be it said to their credit, *and they say it*, the British in 1869, having accomplished their aims in rescuing the Europeans held prison-

¹²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 30, doc. 16.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 71, doc. 42; and p. 72, doc. 43.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 75, doc. 47.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 128, doc. 61.

¹⁶Markham, *History of the Abyssinian Expedition*, pp. 301-308.

ers by Theodore withdrew and left Ethiopia to the Ethiopians. Disraeli, then Prime Minister, being especially anxious that the world should be informed as to the purity of his government's purposes there, remarked,

When it was first announced that England was about to embark on a most costly and perilous expedition, merely to vindicate the honour of our Sovereign and to rescue from an unjust but remote captivity a few of our fellow subjects, the announcement was received in more than one country with something like mocking incredulity. But we have asserted the purity of our purpose, in an age accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of selfishness and a too great regard for material interests, it is something, in so striking and significant a manner, for a great nation to have vindicated the higher principles of humanity. It is a privilege to belong to a country which has done such deeds.¹⁷

Why should not a *great* nation do such deeds habitually? If such conduct among European nations was so unusual in 1869 as to call for official self-congratulations, it has since been unheard of among them. Even temporary occupation has come to mean permanent possession.

Upon British withdrawal from Magdala, there followed a period of internal warfare approaching anarchy in Ethiopia among the leading Rases.¹⁸ In 1872 the ruler of Tigré gained sufficient control to enable him to declare himself Emperor with the title of Johannes VI. By this time, the Egyptians had taken advantage of the internal disorders and had invaded the

¹⁷Ward and Gooch, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, p. 19.

¹⁸The word Ras is the term used in Ethiopia to indicate a high official. It is third in order in rank. The order is Negus Negasti (Emperor), Negus (King), then Ras, similar but not synonymous with governor. The present tendency is to drop the title and position of king. In that case Ras will become second in rank.

country from the north, and in 1875 they had taken Harrar on the east. Münzinger Pasha, a Swiss in Egyptian service, attempted to invade Ethiopia from Zeila but was defeated by Johannes. Several other Egyptian efforts from the north had been repelled. By the time, then, that Johannes had brought his turbulent chieftains under his control and stopped the Egyptians, Ethiopia had lost to outsiders the whole Red Sea coast and the territory inland to a line formed by such places as Kassala, Keren, Massowah, and Harrar.¹⁹

Of this lost territory, as we have seen, the Italians held Assab and its environs, France was entrenched at Obock and England stood guard at Zeila. Disappointed at Tunis, the Italians now undertook to gain compensation in Ethiopia, expecting to find in the Red Sea the key to the Mediterranean.²⁰

Because of her position in Egypt, England had been drawn into Egypt's quarrel with the Mahdists in the Sudan, but by 1883 the Gladstone government had decided to withdraw its forces from this undertaking. To facilitate this withdrawal, England sought the aid of Johannes. With this purpose in view she dispatched a mission, consisting of Sir William Hewett, to represent England and Mason Bey, an American officer in Egyptian service, to represent Egypt, to confer with the Negus.²¹ In June 1884 at Adowa this

¹⁹Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, pp. 23-28; Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, pp. 388-390.

²⁰Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi, *Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Vol. II, p. 165.

²¹Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 47f.

commission concluded a treaty with Johannes which provided that Johannes was to lend aid to the Anglo-Egyptian garrisons in their withdrawal from Sudanese frontiers and to permit these forces to retreat across Ethiopian territory. In exchange for this service which was fully carried out, Johannes was to receive the province of Bogos which was turned over to him September 12, 1884.²² Then after the disaster at Khartum in 1885, in which General Gordon lost his life and his forces were annihilated, the Mahdists overran the Sudan. That they might have some support against these Mahdists, the British encouraged the Italians to occupy Massowah.²³ Early in 1885 the murder of some Italian travelers in the neighborhood furnished the excuse for an attack upon this port which fell into their possession with little resistance. Most English writers pass over this situation by admitting briefly that Massowah may have passed into Italian hands with British approval; few admit that it was undertaken upon British instigation. That England knew of Italy's intention before the act and made no objection cannot be denied. Italy through Negri, ambassador at London, had sounded out Lord Granville upon the subject. Granville had

informed Count Negri that her Majesty's government were desirous of showing their friendly feeling toward Italy in all ways. The Egyptian Government were unable to continue their hold on all the African coast littoral of the Red Sea. I was glad I continued to observe that M. Mancini fully recognized that we had no

²²Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 49.

²³Edgar d'Rouard de Card, *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, p. 26; Dr. Paolo, D'Agostino Orsini, *L'Italia nella Politica Africana*, p. 140.

right and made no pretensions to give away that which did not belong to us. If the Italian government should desire to occupy some of the ports in question, it was a matter between Italy and Turkey, but I was able to inform him that Her Majesty's Government, for their part, had no objection to raise against the Italian occupation of Zulla, Beilul, or Massowah.²⁴

This broad hint was all that was necessary to move the Italian Squadron into the port of Massowah and Egypt withdrew at once. The Sultan was indignant that this should have been done without even consulting him and registered an angry protest with the European Powers that had so recently guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ Flushed by this first easy success, and strengthened by British moral support, Italy resolved to extend her authority upon all the coast of the Red Sea.

The French, who had looked upon Italy's activities at Assab with suspicion, were now aroused.²⁶ They accused England of using Italy as a sort of a cat's paw to oppose the Dervishes and at the same time to forestall French ambitions. Italy had been encouraged by the English to occupy Massowah and to send "scientific" and "commercial" expeditions "hither and thither". England was preparing for Italian occupation in Ethiopia, which England herself could not occupy.²⁷ The occupation of Massowah by the Italians had a disturbing effect also upon the other members of the Triple Alliance. Both Germany and Austria had

²⁴Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 55.

²⁵See *Treaty of Paris*, 1856.

²⁶*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 1^{re} série, t. III, pp. 2, 3.

²⁷Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 364-380, chapter IX, part III.

looked upon Italy's move here, without first notifying them as being not altogether in accord with the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, and Bismarck sharply condemned the step but wished "to give the Italians time to reform".²⁸

Before their occupation of Massowah the Italians, not knowing who would finally be the man with whom they would have to deal when the time should come to take over the whole country under their protection, had been carrying on negotiations with both King Menelik of Shoa and the Negus Negasti, Johannes of Tigré. We have already referred to the Antonelli Mission to Menelik and the treaty concluded with him in 1883. At the same time that Antonelli was securing these arrangements from Menelik, Cav. Bianchi, who had been sent on a similar mission to Johannes, was making an effort to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce with that ruler.²⁹ He had come authorized to decorate Johannes with the order of the *Gran Cordone della Corona d'Italia*. On June 4, 1883, during an audience with the Negus, Bianchi presented the decoration and proposed a treaty with Johannes. Johannes was greatly pleased with the decoration but reserved a reply upon the project of a treaty just then.³⁰

From that time on the Italian representatives worked incessantly to encourage revolt on the part of Menelik and to accomplish the destruction of Johannes

²⁸A. F. Pribram, *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, Vol. II, p. 45.

²⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 136, doc. 63.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 139, doc. 66; and p. 142, doc. 68. Note: This proposed treaty may be found on page 143 of *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV.

and his supporters. On February 10, 1885, a few days after the Italians had taken over Massowah, Umberto, King of Italy made a last attempt to quiet the fears of Johannes by writing him a letter in which he tried to explain to the Negus the great benefits to both Johannes and Italy that must derive from Italian occupation, declaring it would assure all the benefits that the English occupation of Egypt had secured for that country.³¹ With this attempt at assuring the misgivings of Johannes, Italy proceeded to occupy Massowah.

The Italian occupation of Massowah became a matter of deep concern, not only to all the leading powers of Europe, but it at once aroused suspicions among the Ethiopians and produced active opposition. The Negus Johannes wrote Menelik then King of Shoa, a letter urging the necessity of unity between them and condemning Italian aggression.³² He declared "The Italian deception and bad faith will never cease." He was disgusted with their occupation of Massowah and condemned their sending expeditions into his country to spy out the land. "They are not serious people, but intriguers. They have come", he wrote, "to seek aggrandizement but with the aid of God they shall depart humiliated, discontented and with honor lost before all the world. If we remain united we can conquer, not only the *fiacchi* Italians but also other strong nations."

When Menelik had heard of the occupation of

³¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 169, doc. 83.

³²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 203, doc. 95; Francesco Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, pp. 11, 12.

Massowah, just about a month after it had been accomplished, he called Antonelli to his *Guibe* at once and declared to him that Italy's act was the prelude to certain and swift war between Italy and Ethiopia.³³ The next day Menelik dispatched two letters to Italy, one addressed to the king, Umberto, and another to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In these letters he declared that, since Italian blood had been shed at Beilul, which also had been occupied by Italian troops, Italy might claim that place, but at Massowah there had been no disturbance. Therefore, Italy should not have taken it without first having come to an understanding with the Emperor Johannes, and he asked for an explanation of Italy's purposes.

In July Umberto replied to Menelik's letter explaining that the events which had recently taken place in the Sudan and upper Egypt had made it necessary to occupy Massowah with Italian troops, lest it should fall into the hands of the Dervishes. He further declared that Italy had only the purpose of developing friendship and commerce with Ethiopia.³⁴ We are not told just what Menelik thought of Italy's method of developing "friendship and commerce", but certainly it must have been difficult for the average Ethiopian to understand this European approach to friendship. Among their tribesmen, an unprovoked attack, resulting in the slaughter of many of their people and the

³³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 191, doc. 87; Note: *Guibe* is the name applied to the enclosure containing the home and other buildings of the Negus Negasti. It is used somewhat as Europeans would refer to the Emperor's palace.

³⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 197, doc. 93.

destruction of their property, had not been looked upon as a mark of unbounding love and friendship. Here was something new. Knowing thus Menelik's attitude, Antonelli could not be sure of the effect of Johannes' letter to Menelik in which he so severely condemned the Italians for this aggression. He reported, however, to Italy that he doubted whether Menelik could be induced to revolt because between Menelik and the Emperor there then existed a sacred oath of reciprocal fidelity. If this oath should be broken the priesthood would object. Then, too, the memory of Gojam was too vivid. Though Shoa had been the conqueror in that war, she had lost most of the fruits of victory and was not prepared to meet the combined forces of the Emperor and the King of Gojam, and lastly, Menelik's cousin, Masciascia, and rival candidate for preferment was with the Emperor.³⁵

Thus matters stood after Italy had made her first move in the game with Ethiopia as the pawn. On the side line, sympathetic toward Italy, in anticipation of division of the spoils, stood England, busy with a game of her own, but prepared to offer aid and suggestion, especially when a move of her protégé gave promise of playing into her own hand. Across the table sat France, Italy's chief opponent, confident from victory

³⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 203, doc. 95; Note: The authority of the Emperor Johannes had not been so well established over the whole country that he could prevent local conflict. As was the case in Europe during feudal days when great lords carried on feudal wars among themselves, though they were all vassals of the King, so here Menelik and the King (Negus) of Gojam, had just had such a feudal war, though in theory both were subject to Johannes.

over this same antagonist in their last game over Tunis, keeping an eye on England and her game in Central Africa, and feebly backed from a distance by Russia. In the background stood Germany and Austria, regretting that the newly acquired member of their group had thus early shown such a propensity for the gambling spirit, but resolved to offer no obstructive objections. Perhaps Italy would win and they could be proud that she was one of their allies. In Constantinople, raved the baggy trousered Turk, sure to be the loser no matter who won, while within the pawn itself there was discord surrounded by whirling Dervishes. What a game!

No matter to whom Massowah really belonged, the Italians certainly never had the least shadow of a claim to it. They could not have taken it without the approval of the British and most certainly did not, without her invitation, as practically all the French writers assert, and German and Italian sources imply, and some Englishmen admit.³⁶ There can scarcely be any doubt that England hoped to provide in Italian movements here a strong obstruction to the Mahdists, else why the secret clause in the treaty of 1891, permitting Italy to occupy Kassala?³⁷ This also helps to explain the hasty change of British plans immediately following Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896.³⁸ But having once taken Massowah, the Italians needed no further invi-

³⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 373, No. 1995; L. J. Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 398; Woolf, *Empire and Commerce*, p. 159; *State Papers*, Vol. 87, p. 722, Umberto's address to Italian Senate.

³⁷See Article II of the *Treaty*.

³⁸See Chapter IV, p. 187.

tation to proceed. For the next five years it is not clear that their activities in this neighborhood had the full approval of England.

Seeing that Massowah had been occupied so easily and held with so little objection, Italy cast about to find some more territory exposed to seizure. Probably the most attractive point left exposed to eager expansionists by the withdrawal of the Anglo-Egyptian forces after the fall of Khartum in 1885, was the flourishing trade center of Harrar. When this post was evacuated, the British left in control there a rather fanatical Mohammedan, the Emir Abdulla. Abdulla wished to shut out all European traders from the markets of Harrar. He observed that most of the Europeans were engaged in a sort of wholesale business. To be able to shut them out and still keep the semblance of law, he discovered that "wholesale trade" might be classed, according to his mind, as usury. Since his religion forbade usury as a sin, all he had to do, therefore, to exclude European traders from the Harrar markets was to enforce the Mohammedan law against usury. It would seem that Europeans, like children forbidden an object, desired the more to trade in Harrar. The Italians were no exception in this respect and in 1886, under the leadership of one Gaetano Sacconi, an Italian Jew, they undertook to secure the trade. Sacconi got into trouble with Abdulla by dealing wholesale in Harrar coffee. When in trouble Sacconi carried his case back to Italy where he gained the attention of a group of colonial minded compatriots who regarded this particular time, when Egypt was withdrawing from the Harrar

and as yet no other European Power had appropriated it, as a most desirable time to gain its trade with an opportunity eventually to take over the Emir and his territory. This group formed a society known as the "Society for the Commercial Exploration of Africa". This society fitted out an expedition and started for Harrar. This expedition, though small, gave the appearance of a military undertaking, and even in Aden, it was looked upon with suspicion. When the men composing this expedition reached the frontiers of Abdulla's territory they were ordered by this ruler not to enter, but protesting that they came bearing presents to Abdulla, they refused to heed this command and proceeded. Whereupon they were surrounded by the Emir's followers and were cut down to a man.³⁹

Since the first efforts to deliver presents to the Emir of Harrar had met with such unfortunate results, Italy gave up, for the moment, her efforts there and concentrated upon the region about Massowah. As shown above, in 1884, just before Italy had begun to expand from Assab, England had felt called upon to seek the aid of Johannes in her ill-fated effort to withdraw from the Sudan. At that time Admiral Hewett had signed a treaty with Johannes which amounted to an alliance.⁴⁰ By this treaty, it was agreed that for his assistance to the Sudanese garrisons bordering his territory, Johannes should regain the Bogos country and that there should be free transit "through Mas-

³⁹Dr. Philip Paulitschke, *Harar Forschungereise Nach den Somal-und Galla Landern Ost-Afrikas*, pp. 399-404.

⁴⁰Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 422.

sowah to and from Abyssinia for all goods, including arms and ammunition, under British protection".⁴¹ In spite of the fact that Johannes had faithfully carried out his part of the agreement and England had restored to him the Bogos country, Italy now, with English approval, had captured that very Massowah through which goods and ammunition were guaranteed by England to pass freely to Abyssinia.⁴² It may be that England had assumed that Italy would permit this clause of her agreement with Johannes to be carried out, but Crispi's ardent expansionists had no such idea.

Though the whole extent of the Red Sea coast for some years had been in control of Egypt, the Ethiopians had never acknowledged Egypt's position there and they still claimed this region as their own. Menelik, some years before, had addressed a letter to the Powers of Europe in general and to England in particular, reclaiming a port upon the Sea.⁴³ He protested that the whole coast from Massowah to Berbera was then in possession of the Egyptian sons of Mohammed and that it should belong to the crown of Abyssinia. Furthermore he now declared to Italy that Italy's taking of Massowah meant swift and certain war with the King of King's of Ethiopia. Johannes also protested against this occupation, but their protests met with the response

⁴¹*Article I of Treaty*; Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, Appendix II, p. 472.

⁴²Mr. Wylde, in *Modern Abyssinia*, page 35, declares the five stations held by the Abyssinians were the only ones throughout the whole Egyptian Sudan that did not fall into the hands of the Mahdi, that the Abyssinians had accomplished here what England had failed to do elsewhere in the Sudan.

⁴³Carlo Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, pp. 15 and 425.

that Italy had done it as a mark of friendship and she began at once to lay plans for similar marks of friendship. In 1886 Italy proceeded to occupy several other places on the coast and to send inland certain "scientific" and "commercial" expeditions. The next year the leader of one of these fake expeditions, Count Salimbeni, was taken prisoner some fifty miles inland from Massowah by one of Johannes' Rases, Ras Aloula, who demanded that the Italian occupation be confined to Massowah.⁴⁴ Ras Aloula's demands were refused and an Italian force invaded his territory. Aloula's warriors at Dogali practically annihilated this Italian punitive expedition; whereupon the Governor of Massowah sent to Italy for reinforcements.⁴⁵ The war for the conquest of Ethiopia was at hand.

From the first, Italy knew that she could come to no agreement with Johannes and she sought to drive a wedge between him and Menelik. We have seen that after the taking of Massowah she had sought to quiet Menelik's fears and had sent Antonelli as a special representative to his court on Entoto. Antonelli's chief mission seems to have been to detach Menelik from Johannes. Frequently in his reports to Rome he discussed the chances of revolt on the part of Menelik.⁴⁶ The situation in Ethiopia was particularly favorable at this time for such division. Before the death, without heirs, of Ras Areya, Johannes' only legitimate son and husband of Zauditu, Menelik's daughter, Menelik had

⁴⁴Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, p. 163.

⁴⁵Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 49.

⁴⁶See *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 214, doc. 101, and others.

hoped through the marriage of his daughter to the only son of the Negus Negasti, to become the grandfather of a King of Kings.⁴⁷ Now he began to entertain ambitions of becoming King of Kings of Ethiopia himself, certainly upon the death of Johannes, if not earlier.⁴⁸

Knowing this situation, Rome had been fanning these smouldering ambitions fervently and now when actual bloodshed had precipitated a condition of war at Dogali, Robilant, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dispatched a note March 11, 1887 to Antonelli directing him to assure Menelik that; first, the Italian occupation of Massowah was peaceful and intended for the security of the country and its commerce; second, the sending of Italian soldiers to Una and Saati was caused solely by the imprudent attitude of Ras Aloula who had imprisoned Count Salimbeni and others; third, the whole responsibility of bloodshed was Ras Aloula's.⁴⁹ Enclosed with this note was a communication in cipher to Antonelli containing the following significant questions. (1) "Is Menelik disposed to give, in an opportune moment, effective co-operation against Johannes? (2) What should be eventually the useful effect of such co-operation? (3) Failing effective co-operation, will he take such an attitude as to occupy part of Johannes' forces in the south or will he be absolutely neutral in

⁴⁷Zauditu later became Empress upon the dethronement of her nephew, Lij Yasu, in 1916 and remained Empress until her death in 1930, when the present Emperor, Haile Selassie I, was crowned King of Kings of Ethiopia.

⁴⁸Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 38.

⁴⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, pp. 260-262, doc. 117.

the conflict?" A second enclosure was a personal letter from Umberto to Menelik regretting the killing of his soldiers and peaceful Christian travelers by Abyssinians.

While Antonelli was carrying on such Italian diplomacy in Menelik's court, he was indignant when others intimated that Italy was trying to incite Menelik to revolt. He was especially disturbed over the activities of one Dr. Parisis, a Greek attached to the Court of Johannes. This man he describes as more of a political agent than a doctor. He held a high place at the Court. He was authorized to carry *l'ombrello rosso* and sat with the King, the Abuna and members of the Royal Family. His mule was caparisoned in the royal trappings and he wore, hypocritically, about his neck a bishop's cross of gold. This man had come upon a letter from the King of Italy addressed to Menelik. Umberto had addressed Menelik as "King of Shoa, of Kaffa", *et cetera*. In translating it to Johannes, "Doctor" Parisis had read it "Menelik II, King of Shoa, of Kassa", *et cetera*. Now "Kassa" was Johannes' former name and this court favorite had Johannes believing that Umberto was recognizing Menelik as Emperor and wished Menelik to rebel against Johannes.⁵⁰ As a matter of fact Italy was doing that very thing, but Antonelli was very indignant that this Greek carrier of *l'ombrello rosso* should accuse her of it. Antonelli believed that Menelik, personally, would not be sorry to see conflict between Italy and Johannes but that such a conflict would make Menelik's position difficult. After the

⁵⁰*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 214, doc. 101.

Tigrians had annihilated the Italian forces at Dogali, they had taunted Menelik by telling him that his Italian friends were people of little valor, *i suoi amici Italiani sono gente che val poco* and should he continue to support Italian claims he would lose standing in Ethiopia.⁵¹ Under the force of all these considerations, Menelik weakened and signed at Addis Ababa, October 20, 1887, a convention of neutrality in case of war between Italy and Johannes.⁵² For this defection, Italy was to furnish Menelik five thousand Remington rifles and Italy's friendship.

Hardly had Menelik taken this position, until he seems to have regretted his act and he made an offer to Crispi to attempt mediation between Johannes and Italy. To this offer Crispi replied, November 27, his thanks and regrets, but stated that operations were already under way and that it was *impossibile interromperle* (impossible to interrupt them), but that Menelik could render a great service to the Negus by counseling him to seek peace.⁵³ Even before Crispi had returned this reply to his first offer of mediation, Menelik had dispatched a second offer, in which he had plead that both Italy and Johannes were his friends and that no cause for war existed that could not be settled some other way.⁵⁴ In transmitting this letter of Menelik to Crispi, Antonelli wrote that he believed that Johannes would not submit his cause to mediation

⁵¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 264, doc. 118. Note: The Italian quoted here is translated "Your Italian friends are people of little valor".

⁵²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 274, doc. 123.

⁵³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 276, doc. 125.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, doc. 126.

because of his pride. Whether Johannes would submit to mediation or not, he did not know. What he did know was that the Italian government had no intention of accepting mediation which should mean anything short of complete submission of Johannes or his elimination. As a matter of fact even Antonelli learned later on, that Johannes had agreed to accept Menelik's mediation. Some months after Johannes' death, Antonelli reported to Crispi that the Abuna Mathios had taken Menelik's offer of mediation to Johannes and that Johannes had accepted. Johannes stated, however, that he had been greatly wronged by both Italians and English in spite of the fact that he had come to their aid against the Mahdi. Nevertheless, he was disposed to have peace.⁵⁵ Moreover Menelik had written Umberto, informing him of the Emperor's willingness to arbitrate and begging Umberto to accept also.⁵⁶

In response to this urgent request for peace, Crispi replied, January 13, 1888, for his "August Sovereign" that "Peace and war are in the hands of Omnipotence" and the Queen of Italy sent a present and good wishes to Tāitu, Menelik's Queen.⁵⁷ No doubt Crispi was planning to act the role of "Omnipotence" in Ethiopian affairs. At any rate he promptly dispatched to Menelik one thousand Remington rifles with munitions, remarking "May they increase your power and carry destruction among your enemies *and those of my coun-*

⁵⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 308, doc. 129.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 310, doc. 130.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 311, doc. 132.

try". Crispi sadly lacked certain powers of "Omnipotence", however, when he could not see that, within a few years, these very arms *would* serve to carry destruction among Ethiopia's enemies and that these enemies would be those of Crispi's own country.

These Ethiopian efforts for peace were doomed to failure. War seemed inevitable. The position of Johannes was most precarious. Though he had checked the Italian advance at Dogali, he knew that, when reinforcements should arrive from Italy, another forward movement from Massowah was to be expected. He was practically surrounded by those who sought his destruction. Since the destruction of General Gordon's army at Khartum, the fanatical Dervishes of the Sudan were running wild. Flushed by overwhelming successes, they now had become most threatening to Ethiopia from the west. In the east Italian agents were inciting the tribesmen to revolt. To the south Menelik's uncertain attitude was most disconcerting. Even England, with whom he had made an alliance upon England's request in 1884 and for whom he had wholly completed his part of the alliance, was now growing cold in her attitude toward him. The conduct of England in Ethiopian matters between the Italian occupation of Massowah (1885) and the treaty of Ucciali in 1889 is one of cautious vacillation, or probably more properly, one of "watchful waiting". She had sought to use both Italy and Ethiopia to further her own purposes in Africa. To accomplish her purpose she had made promises to both of them in the hope, no doubt, that the interests of Italy and Ethiopia, both her allies,

would never conflict and thus she would never have to make a choice between them.

Mr. A. B. Wylde, who was British Vice Consul for the Red Sea area at the time and who certainly ought to have known the situation, gives the clearest, and what seems to be the most nearly accurate description of England's conduct at this time. He writes, in relating the precarious situation of Johannes that,

From the north he ought to have been safe if our treaty with him (that of 1884) went for anything. Look at our behaviour to King Johannes from any point of view and it will not show one ray of honesty, and to my mind, it is one of our worst bits of business out of the many we have been guilty of in Africa, and no wonder our position diplomatically is such a bad one with the rulers of the country at present. England made use of King Johannes as long as he was of any service, and then threw him over to the tender mercies of Italy, who went to Massowah under our auspices with the intention of taking territory that belonged to our ally, and to allow them to destroy and break all the promises England had solemnly made to King Johannes after he had faithfully carried out his part of the agreement. The fact is not known to the British public, and I wish it were not true for our credit's sake; but unfortunately it is, and it reads like one of the vilest bits of treachery that has been perpetrated in Africa or in India in the eighteenth century.⁵⁸

This is certainly a scathing accusation of "Albion perfide" by one of her own sons, and Africa with India includes a lot of territory, but why limit it to the "eighteenth century"?

One of the worst features of European diplomacy in the scramble for Ethiopia, has been just the fact that this diplomacy has been carried on in secret or in semi-secret fashion. The public has not been kept informed as to the government's questionable conduct. The

⁵⁸Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, (1901), p. 39.

average person may know all about certain curious African customs and the cruel treatment certain chiefs sometimes inflict upon their followers. Everybody may know that King Johannes "barbarously" objected to smoking tobacco and snuff. They have heard in great detail and much exaggeration how he punished "snuffers" by cutting off their noses, and smokers by mutilating their lips. Europeans lament with pious denunciation that slavery exists in Ethiopia. But few voices were raised against a diplomacy of treachery and breach of faith to the black man that robbed him of his country and brought about the slaughter of his people.

England then had two allies, one Ethiopian and the other European. One had already served England's purposes; from the other she hoped to profit in the future. Her European ally, at England's suggestion, had come into position from which she could threaten the existence of England's Ethiopian ally, and moreover, she was determined to do so. England must make choice between them. She chose to support Italy, the one whose usefulness seemed future, and thus deserted Ethiopia, whose service appeared to be in the past.

While Johannes had been battling to maintain the independence of his Empire against his many foes, Italy had been paving the way by which she hoped to secure dominant influence in Ethiopia. After the ill-starred attempt of Gaetano Sacconi's "expedition" to get into Harrar, the Italians had withdrawn from that neighborhood and had encouraged Menelik in his desire to re-

take it from the Emir Abdulla.⁵⁹ As early as 1883, Menelik, in a letter to Umberto, had laid claim to all the territory lost at the time of the devastating Mohammed Gran, and especially to the Harrar, declaring that as the Christian King of Shoa it was his duty to rescue the Harrar from the Musselmans.⁶⁰ Accordingly in 1887 he attacked Abdulla and occupied the Harrar. Upon Menelik's growing power being thus demonstrated, and their relations with Johannes becoming more difficult, the Italians sought more and more to come to terms with Menelik. By 1888, Crispi had come to the conclusion that it was useless to seek control through Johannes as he was convinced that the French missionaries were acting as spies for the Abyssinians and that the French Consul at Massowah was there for no other purpose than political.⁶¹ In a note of July 31, 1888, addressed to the Italian ambassadors at the various European capitals he complained, that until Italy had occupied Massowah there had been no French Consul there, but after the Italian occupation a French Consul had arrived and had proposed to the Negus a formal treaty with France, by which Ethiopia should recognize France as her protector to the exclusion of all other Powers.⁶²

Being made more sure that Johannes could not long hold out against his many enemies by the rebellion of the King of Gojam, and disturbed lest France, if

⁵⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 203, doc. 94 ter.

⁶⁰*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 201, doc. 94, bis.

⁶¹*The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Vol. II, p. 278.

⁶²*The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Vol. II, p. 313.

given time would come to the aid of Johannes, Italy decided to act promptly and more vigorously so as to insure her own dominant influence in Ethiopia. After looking over the field for possible successors of Johannes, the Italians selected Menelik as the most likely successor and the one least likely to continue strenuous objections to Italy's occupation of Ethiopian territory in the north, and perhaps one who even might be induced to permit extension of that occupation, in return for Italian support toward the seizure of the throne of Johannes. Crispi's government, therefore, lost no time in preparing a proposed treaty to present to Menelik with the intention that its provisions should become operative upon Menelik's becoming Emperor.⁶³ Thus prompted she hastened to suggest to Menelik that he should be King of Kings of Ethiopia instead of Johannes. Menelik in the hour of success, was thought likely to be susceptible to Italian suggestion. Accordingly hearing of Menelik's annexation of the Harrar, Crispi dispatched a commission led by Antonelli and Pestalozza to Ethiopia. Antonelli carried with him a copy of Italy's proposed treaty of alliance.⁶⁴ To secure Menelik's signature to this proposal became Antonelli's whole concern from the date of his arrival until the conclusion of the treaty of Uccialli.

On August 6, 1888, Antonelli sent a telegram to Crispi stating that Menelik had decided to join Italy against Johannes and would be ready to take the field

⁶³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 427, doc. 236.

⁶⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 346, doc. 154.

in October.⁶⁵ To this communication Crispi promptly responded acknowledging Italy's acceptance of the alliance. But he stated that Menelik must give guarantees in the shape of territory and hostages, and demanded that the hostages should be members of Menelik's own family, who, while held in Italy, would receive all the honors of their station. In addition to these guarantees, Crispi demanded that certain Italian officers should be placed with Menelik's army.⁶⁶

This then was the proposition that Italy's emissaries carried to Menelik in 1888. Circumstances had combined to put Menelik in a peculiarly receptive mood toward their tempting offers. After his successes at Harrar, Menelik had been directed by the Emperor to proceed against the Dervishes and then against the Italians at Saati. Upon his return from Saati, he found the Emperor's attitude wholly changed toward him. Through the influence of bad advisers, Johannes had been led to believe that Menelik had urged the Italians to take Massowah and that he was wholly disloyal to Ethiopia's cause. Johannes being thus led to doubt Menelik's loyalty wrote him at Gondar, whither he had taken his army, that he should return to Shoa, as he had no further need of Menelik's help.⁶⁷ Menelik grieved at his dismissal, had just returned from Gondar to Shoa, when he was met in the way by the Italian mission. Conscious of his ability and stung by his dismissal from Ethiopian service Menelik was induced to

⁶⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 337, doc. 150.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 338, doc. 151.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 338, doc. 152.

listen to Antonelli's proposals, and he went into negotiations with the Italians.

Agreeing with Crispi's instructions to him as to certain conditions demanded by Italy in return for aid in placing Menelik upon the throne of the King of Kings of Ethiopia, Antonelli carried in his pockets a proposed treaty of alliance, which, should it be accepted by Menelik, would provide for the handing over to Italy outright of vast Ethiopian territories and the recognition of Italy's overlordship of all the rest of the country.⁶⁸ It was this proposed treaty, without doubt, that caused other European countries to believe that Italy and Menelik had actually come to an agreement in 1888. It is likely to this proposed treaty that writers, such as Leonard Woolf and L. J. Morié refer, believing that Italy and Menelik had made a treaty in 1888 by which Italy was to have recognized Menelik as Emperor of Ethiopia on condition that he would join Italy in a campaign against Johannes.⁶⁹ From the records it does not appear that any treaty was actually signed in 1888, but it is very evident that the proposal had been made and was under discussion as early as that. On October 8, 1888, Crispi had telegraphed Antonelli asking him to inform Menelik that he would find Italian troops occupying Asmara and Gura at once.⁷⁰ To this Antonelli, on his way to Menelik, replied from Aden that just then was a good time for

⁶⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, Vol. XV, p. 437, doc. 236, annesso II.

⁶⁹Woolf, *Empire and Commerce*, p. 165; Morié, *Histoire de l'Éthiopie*, Vol. II, p. 402.

⁷⁰*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 354, doc. 164.

Italy to take Asmara. He reported that "Teklé Aimanot, King of Goggiam" had rebelled. Moreover Johannes had gone to compel Teklé Aimanot's submission, and Ras Aloula was at Debra Tabor. With these three great warriors thus engaged only Debeb remained to confront the Italians at Asmara.⁷¹ The actual signing of any treaty with Menelik, however, could hardly have taken place in 1888, since Antonelli reports that he arrived in Shoa in February, 1889.⁷² These writers are correct, however, in assuming that there was something going on behind the scenes and that arms and munitions of war were passing through Massowah from Italy to Menelik. Antonelli himself admits that upon his arrival in Shoa he presented Menelik with arms, rifles, munitions, and many gifts, with assurances that Italy would operate against Johannes in the north.⁷³ Before any treaty was actually signed between Italy and Menelik, by the battle of Gallabat and the subsequent death of Johannes, March 11, 1889, Menelik was relieved from joining hands with the real enemies of his country and leading his followers against his King of Kings, elect of God, and Emperor of Ethiopia.

Johannes, thus deserted by his ally and surrounded on all sides by enemies, must either surrender or be prepared to meet his foes should they close in upon him. If he fought, which enemy should he attack first? Johannes believed that the most likely method of uniting

⁷¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 355, doc. 165.

⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 427f, doc. 236.

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 427 ff, doc. 236; Note: Antonelli also reports that Menelik was not wholly satisfied with the gifts. He thought that the Italians were not helping enough in the north.

the Ethiopians against the Italians would be to attack the Dervishes quickly and vigorously. By defeating them, he would be accepted by the Christian Abyssinians as the elect of God and the great champion of Christianity against the Mohammedans.⁷⁴ He, therefore, laid plans to attack the Mahdists on his western border. In 1888 he conducted a brief and successful campaign against them, and early in 1889 he hoped in one stroke to annihilate their forces in Gallabat and then to hasten back to meet the Italians advancing from the north. That he might have as many of the Dervishes congregated in one place to meet him so that he would not need to spend time traveling from place to place to make an end of them, he informed them sometime in advance that he was coming. He even sent word to the Khalifa at Omdurman, that after he had destroyed the Dervishes at Gallabat he would march upon Omdurman.⁷⁵

When, therefore, Johannes arrived at Matemma he was confronted by a large force.⁷⁶ On Saturday, March 10, 1889, there occurred a terrific struggle in which Johannes completely routed the Dervishes, but unfortunately, he himself was struck by a ball above the heart, and in the moment of victory, fell mortally wounded. Though wounded unto death he carried on command of the battle until evening, when the Dervishes were driven from the field. Johannes continued to live until the next evening, March 11, 1889, when

⁷⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 427, doc. 236.

⁷⁵Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 40 ff.

⁷⁶Note: This place, the capital of Gallabat, is found spelled Matemma, Metemma, Matamma, and Metammeh, all in *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 227.

he died.⁷⁷ Before his death Johannes called his Rases about him and acknowledged his illegitimate son, Ras Mangasha, and named him as his successor.⁷⁸ Monday, while retreating with the dead body of their Emperor, the small group of loyal supporters were surrounded by the Dervishes, who, because they had not been pursued after the battle of Gallabat, had returned to learn the reason. In the hand to hand struggle that followed, most of the Ethiopians were cut to pieces and Johannes' body was carried off.⁷⁹

Ras Aloula, who was not of royal blood, could lay

⁷⁷There have been several different dates given by writers for this event. The confusion arising, no doubt, from the fact that none of them have gone to official documents for the facts, but have talked to someone who "remembered" it, or more often one writer has followed another, making the same error. A. B. Wylde in his *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 41, states that the battle was fought March 9, 1889, giving as his authority Ras Aloula and a priest, who was with Johannes. L. J. Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 405, says this is incorrect, though he does not give his own authority for placing the date on November 4, 1889. Leonard Woolf in *Empire and Commerce*, accepts Morié's date as preferable, though he does not tell us why he adopts Morié's date in preference to Wylde's. From the documents, clearly Morié is wrong. In a dispatch of March 26, 1889, Antonelli informs Crispi that the battle occurred March 10, 1889, and in a letter of Menelik to Umberto dated March 26, 1889, Menelik fixed the date for the battle as March 10, 1889. (See *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 408, doc. 224). Then the next day, March 27, 1889, Antonelli confirms his dispatch of the day before, fixing the date of Johannes' death as March 11, and recording other details connected with the event. (See *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 412, doc. 225). Again a dispatch of May 3, 1889, fixes the date of the battle as March 10, 1889. (See *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 406, doc. 221.) Clearly then the battle occurred March 10, 1889, and Johannes died Sunday evening, March 11, before the retreat began, though it was reported that he was still alive when the Dervishes attacked them again.

⁷⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 412, doc. 225.

⁷⁹Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 40f. Note: It is said that in order to be able to carry the body on a mule, it had been cut in halves. When the Dervishes captured it they carried the head off to the Khalifa at Khartum.

no claim to the Empire.⁸⁰ He, therefore, promptly acknowledged Ras Mangasha, the illegitimate son of Johannes, as King of Kings. Few of the others did so and there threatened a period of anarchy of which Italy took every advantage possible.⁸¹ Upon confirmation of the death of Johannes, Crispi dispatched a telegram to Antonelli asking what Menelik's attitude was likely to be and suggested that this was the proper time for Menelik to assume the throne.⁸² With the prestige that Menelik had gained for himself, there was little doubt but that in time he could bring the other chiefs to submit to his rule. Now with the active support of Italy, his success was assured.

News of the death of Johannes reached Shoa in the midst of these negotiations between Italy and Menelik. At once Italy sought to know what Menelik intended to do, and she hastened the completion of details in concluding the treaty she had undertaken with Menelik as King of Shoa. In the meantime Menelik lost no time in assuming the title of Negus Negasti at Gondar, March 26, 1889, and proceeded at once to bring into subjection the hesitating chieftains.⁸³ To aid him in this, Italy kept furnishing him with arms and munitions of war in order that she might the more easily conclude her much desired treaty proposed in 1888 and in the process of completion when news of the death of Johannes had arrived to disturb matters for the time being.

⁸⁰*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 408, doc. 224.

⁸¹A. B. Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 42.

⁸²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 405, doc. 219.

⁸³George F. H. Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 17.

Antonelli with the proposed treaty in his pocket, arrived in February, 1889. Johannes had fallen mortally wounded on the field of battle March 10, 1889 and had died the next day. Menelik had proclaimed himself King of Kings at Gondar immediately afterwards and matters moved rapidly to the signing, at Menelik's military camp, of the famous treaty of Ucciali, May 2, 1889 (25 Mazzia 1881) (Ethiopian Calendar).⁸⁴

This is a treaty of "Friendship and Commerce" of some twenty articles, only a few of which we need to consider in this study. The treaty of May 2 is almost identical with the proposed treaty submitted to Menelik as King of Shoa some months before in anticipation of his becoming Emperor.⁸⁵ The most important article of this treaty, Article XVII, is identical with Article XVI, of the proposed treaty except, in the treaty of Ucciali, Menelik's title is recorded as *Re dei Re d'Etiopia*, whereas in the proposed treaty he is designated as simply, *il Re Menelik*. It is no doubt the confusion brought about by the similarity of these two documents that has led many writers to conclude that there were actually two treaties signed, one in 1888

⁸⁴*Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, raccolti per cura del ministero degli affari esteri*, Vol. dodicesimo (12) p. 77; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XVIII, p. 697; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 437 ff. doc. 236, annesso I; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 254f. Note: This treaty was ratified by the King of Italy September 29, 1889.

⁸⁵For a comparison of these two documents the reader is directed to *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 437 ff, doc. 236. The proposed treaty is given in *Annesso II* of that document and the treaty of Ucciali in *Annesso I*, both are part of Antonelli's report.

with Menelik as King of Shoa and the other May 2, 1889, with Menelik II, as King of Kings of Ethiopia. It may be this also that has led such historians as *Morié*, followed by *Woolf*, to fix the date of Johannes' death (Nov. 4, 1889) as following the treaty of Ucciali rather than preceding it. In their desire to show that Italy was dealing with Menelik against Johannes before Menelik had become King of Kings and prior to Johannes' death, they have moved the latter event so as to have it follow the treaty of Ucciali. By documentary evidence it has been shown above, beyond any question, however that Johannes died March 11, 1889 and it is well known that the treaty of Ucciali was not signed until May 2, 1889. With the knowledge of this proposed treaty, it is not necessary to have the death of Johannes follow Ucciali to be thoroughly convinced that it was Italy's purpose to conclude the treaty with Menelik as early as possible regardless of the death of Johannes. Could she have done so, of course, she would have had it signed before that event. That it was not signed until after the Emperor's death, is not, in the least, any mark of the purity of purpose of Italy's conduct. Though no treaty was signed, *Wylde* is correct in assuming that there must have been an understanding while the proposed treaty was being negotiated between them.⁸⁶ Article III of the treaty of Ucciali repeated the boundary line formerly agreed upon between Italian possessions in the Red Sea area and Ethiopia. It assigned, as did this proposed treaty, a large

⁸⁶Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, pp. 49, 50.

area of Ethiopia to Italy outright.⁸⁷ The treaty provided that, if at any time Menelik should have the intention of granting special privileges to the subjects of a third state, he should always give preference to Italians.⁸⁸ In case of any necessity to refer to the text of the treaty both the Amharic and the Italian versions were to be considered official and of the same authority.⁸⁹ But it is Article XVII of this treaty that caused the trouble later on between Italy and Menelik and that has caused the treaty to become known as the most famous of the many African treaties made by European *protectors*.

Article XVII of the treaty of Uccialli is so important that it seems necessary to repeat it as a whole. It reads in translation from the Italian text, "His Majesty, the King of Kings of Ethiopia, consents to avail himself of the Italian government for any negotiations which he may enter into with the other Powers or Governments, (*per tutte le trattazioni di affari che avesse con altre potenze o governi*)".⁹⁰ This as the reader will recognize at once, placed Ethiopia as a protectorate under the care of Italy. Henceforth all transactions of whatever nature dealing with other states must be carried on not directly between Ethiopia and the state concerned, but by way of Rome.

Having concluded this treaty with Menelik, Antonelli hastened to depart for Rome. The news of his

⁸⁷See Article III of the Treaty.

⁸⁸See Article XVIII of the Treaty.

⁸⁹See Article XIX of the Treaty.

⁹⁰See Article XVII of the Treaty in any of the citations; also Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 41.

success was too good, however, to await his arrival. By a runner, Antonelli dispatched the information to Aden, where it was received by Cecchi, Italian Consul at Aden, and by him was transmitted to Rome as a telegram. "King Menelik", he reported, "has signed the treaty with concession of territory. I am now with Degiacc Maconen,⁹¹ governor of Harrar, who will be sent as ambassador to our August Sovereign."⁹² The very next day Crispi replied, congratulating Antonelli upon his success as a diplomat, and added that Italy would recognize only Menelik as Emperor of Ethiopia.⁹³ He was happy to hear that Makonnen was intending to come to Rome and promised that a royal boat would be sent to Zeila to bring the Ethiopian mission to Italy whenever he should be informed of the date of its arrival. Three weeks later he concluded that a "royal boat" was not sufficiently impressive apparently, for after making sure that England would prepare the way in Zeila, England's port, he stated that a war vessel would come for Makonnen and assured him that he would be received with great honor in Italy.⁹⁴

There was great rejoicing in Italy. Apparently she was, at long last, going to secure her much desired and often-denied African Empire. Her expansionists could now see a broad belt of green stretching across the map of Africa from the Red Sea to the Indian

⁹¹This is Italian spelling for Dejatch (Dejazmach) Makonnen, later made Ras Makonnen, Menelik's cousin, Father of the present Emperor, Haile Selassie I.

⁹²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 413, doc. 226.

⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 414, doc. 227.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, doc. 228.

Ocean and including this highly desirable and fabulously rich Empire of Ethiopia. The stage was set to give Makonnen a royal reception, and his arrival was awaited eagerly.

Having secured assurance from Lord Salisbury that Her Majesty's government would look after the safety of Menelik's mission while in Zeila, Crispi dispatched the *Colombo* to bring Dejazmach Makonnen to Italy.⁹⁵ At nine o'clock August 21, 1889, the *Colombo* arrived at Naples.⁹⁶ Makonnen's party consisted of himself, his confessor, Abba Walde Micalé, Jusuf Neguissie, the interpreter and five other officials, and several under officials and many servants.⁹⁷ At Naples they were met by many officials and soldiers, and especially by members of the *Società Geographica* who accorded them a wonderful reception.⁹⁸ One week later Makonnen was received in solemn audience by King Umberto. In approaching Umberto, Makonnen after the custom of his country, prostrated himself in the middle of the room and again at the foot of the throne. After presenting a large number of gifts he explained his mission.

First in order was a series of brilliant receptions in each of the principal cities all over Italy.⁹⁹ In every city the Italians kept Makonnen delightfully entertained. Of this Makonnen, gentleman as he was, was always

⁹⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 2, docs. 2 and 3.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6, doc. 4.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4, doc. 1, Annesso.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, bis. p. 6, doc. 4.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, bis. pp. 12-18, doc. 12-28.

highly appreciative.¹⁰⁰ In Naples Antonelli, having been directed verbally beforehand by his government to do so, informed Makonnen of the intention of the Italian government to notify the Powers of the relation existing between Italy and Ethiopia, by virtue of Article XVII of the treaty of Uccialli. After having spoken to Makonnen about this matter Antonelli reported back to Rome by telegram, September 25, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that "Maconen recognizes the utility of such notification and approves that it be done at once."¹⁰¹

Less than one week later, the serious business of Makonnen's mission was concluded by the signing, in Naples, October 1, 1889, of an Additional Convention, intended to be annexed to the treaty of Uccialli of May 2, 1889.¹⁰² By the terms of this Additional Convention, Ethiopia received from Italy recognition of Menelek as Emperor of Ethiopia, and a loan of 4,000,000 lire, which was to be contracted by the Emperor of Ethiopia with an Italian bank under guarantee of the Italian government. Half of the loan was to be paid in silver and the other half was to be deposited in Italy to meet purchases which Ethiopia should make in Italy.

¹⁰⁰All persons who have known Ras Makonnen and all writers with whom I am familiar, agree that he was an exceptionally well balanced Christian gentleman of the highest type of Ethiopian man. His son, His Majesty, the present Emperor Haile Selassie I is of the same mold.

¹⁰¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, bis, p. 18, doc. 29.

¹⁰²Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 456; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XVIII, p. 702; *Trattati e conventioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, raccolti per cura del ministero degli affari esteri*, Vol. Dodicesimo, p. 137 (1892).

In return for these favors, Ethiopia must recognize the sovereignty of the King of Italy in the colonies about the Red Sea and rectify the boundaries between these colonies and Ethiopia, as indicated in the treaty of Ucciali, so as to include any territory taken in possession by Italy since the signing of that treaty May 2, 1889. In addition she was required to have her coinage struck in Italy and to place the receipts of the Custom House at Harrar as security for the loan to be contracted from Italy; and, in case of nonpayment of the loan regularly, she must turn over to Italy the whole administration of the Harrar Custom House.¹⁰³

The reader will understand Italy's desire to have the boundaries, as indicated in the treaty of May 2, rectified so as to include the territory in her possession when the "Additional Convention" should have been ratified, when he knows that since the signing of the Treaty of Ucciali under pretenses of aiding her new ally, Menelik, Italy had taken Asmara and other territories without resistance.¹⁰⁴ She, therefore, wished to have Menelik recognize Asmara as belonging to Italy. It will also be seen that, whether Menelik should ever be able to pay the Italian loan or not, the loan was wholly to Italy's advantage. Since Italy believed that by Article XVII, Ethiopia was now a protectorate of Italy, any territory conquered by Menelik by means of this financial support would, of course, come under Italy's protection. On the other hand, if Menelik should not meet

¹⁰³See "Additional Convention", Article VI.

¹⁰⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 426, doc. 234; Note: This "Additional Convention" was ratified by Menelik at Macallé, February 25, 1890.

the payments as due, Italy had the right to take over the Harrar Custom House and thus control the finances of the country to her own advantage.

Crispi, being thus fortified, felt that the time was at hand to proclaim to the world Italy's protectorate over Ethiopia. He now had the Treaty of Ucciali and Antonelli's report of a conversation with Makonnen which represented Makonnen as being agreed that Article XVII of the Treaty should be notified to the Powers. In addition to these assurances the final signing of the "Additional Convention" on October 1, seemed to indicate that he should carry out the provisions of Article XXXIV of the Berlin Act at once. This he proceeded to do. On October 11, 1889, he dispatched letters to the Italian representatives to the various countries that had signed the "General Act of Berlin" February 26, 1885, and to the United States of America.¹⁰⁵ In these letters he asked each representative to notify the government to which he was accredited that "In conformity with Article XXXIV of the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885,"¹⁰⁶ Italy was serving notice that

Under Article XVII of the perpetual treaty between Italy and Ethiopia, signed by His Majesty King Mene-lik on the 2nd May, 1889, and ratified by His Majesty the King of Italy on the 29th September last, it is provided that His Majesty the King of Ethiopia consents to avail himself of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for the conduct of all matters which he may have with other Powers or Governments.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, bis, p. 21, doc. 31.

¹⁰⁶Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. II, p. 414.

¹⁰⁷Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 457.

James G. Blaine; who at that time was our Secretary of State, replied, that since United States had not finally signed the Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885 it was impossible to determine the duty of the Federal Government or the proper importance to be attached to Crispi's announcement. Most of the other Powers that had been notified replied, promptly, acknowledging receipt of the notification. France, however, was disturbed over the situation.¹⁰⁸ When this notice was read in the French Chamber there was considerable discussion over its meaning. The French did not seem to understand just how much of Africa Crispi meant by "Ethiopia". Russia, too, registered some objection on behalf of Turkey.¹⁰⁹ But Italy gave no signs of withdrawal.

While Antonelli was negotiating the Treaty of Ucciali with Menelik, Signor Filonardi another Italian agent, then Consul at Zanzibar, had been courting the local chiefs or sultans along the Indian Ocean coast lands from Cape Guardafui to the Juba river. In the very month of May 1889 in which Menelik placed his seal upon the famous Treaty of Ucciali, Filonardi discovered that the Sultan of all the Mijjertayns (Mijertins) and the Sultan of Oppia further south, were in the proper state of mind to seek the protection of Italy.¹¹⁰ Since this strip of the Somali coast, as well as that of Eritrea and Ethiopia, had been included in

¹⁰⁸Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, bis, p. 52, doc. 70; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, pp. 60, 61.

¹¹⁰Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 1119 and p. 1123f.


the Italian scheme for their African Empire, Italy was glad to accommodate these two Sultans and she promptly notified the Powers that she had taken the territory of Oppia and the Mijjertayns under her protection.

From the southern boundary of Oppia to the Juba river there remained a strip of coast land known as the Benadir and claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar. It will be recalled that the coast land as well as the whole territory of the unfortunate Sultan of Zanzibar was the very territory over which Germany and England had been carrying on negotiations ever since 1885, each trying to get as large a share as possible of the Zanzibar coast.¹¹¹ Nothing daunted by this Anglo-German controversy nor by the fact that the Benadir actually belonged to the Sultan of Zanzibar, Crispi within the six months following Uccialli announced to the Powers that Italy had taken over the Benadir as her protectorate.¹¹² Italy's rights east and north of the Juba, if not those of the Sultan of Zanzibar, were promptly recognized by both England and Germany in their treaty of July 1, 1890, in which they came to agreement upon their own respective spheres of influence as well. Therefore by the work of her consul at Zanzibar, Italy had become the protector of the whole coast from the Juba river to Cape Guardafui, now known as Italian Somaliland.¹¹³

¹¹¹*German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. I, pp. 217-227.

¹¹²In 1892 Italy arranged with England in regard to this territory, *State Papers*, Vol. 84, p. 630.

¹¹³In July 1924, in partial fulfillment of Article XIII of the London pact of 1915, whereby the Allies promised compensation to Italy in Africa if they should annex the German colonies, England granted Italy a strip of 33,000 square miles west of the Juba river.




Thus by the close of 1889, Italy had practically reached her objective and secured the Pawn. By co-operating with England, in support of the Anglo-Egyptian policy in dealing with the Dervishes in the Sudan, she had gained the goodwill of that country in establishing herself at Massowah. Although the other members of the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria, had disapproved of Italy's operations about Massowah without first consulting them, they had offered no great objections and were hoping that she might succeed. Among the European countries only France and Russia had offered any serious objection or sought to put obstacles in her way. In Ethiopia herself, by the astounding diplomacy of Count Antonelli, combined with unusually favorable circumstances within the country, Italy had outstripped France in the race and had secured from Menelik, not only cession of territory and recognition of her position on the Red Sea, but actually the placing of his whole territory under Italy's protection in exchange for Italy's aid in compelling Ethiopia to submit to his rule and thus to Italy's rule. In the meantime, by the same methods and with as little right, Signor Filonardi had secured the consent of the Sultans along the Indian Ocean to Italy's protection in that quarter. Italy could now prepare her new map of Africa with a whole eastern corner of the continent with the exception of the French and of the British Somalilands marked green in recognition that Italy had finally secured her African Empire.

That other countries accepted the situation and recognized Ethiopia as an Italian protectorate is best

proven by recalling that when England came to issue the Second Edition of Hertslet's *Map of Africa by Treaty* in 1896, the whole north eastern section of Africa with the exception of British Somaliland and French Somaliland, stretching from the Red Sea right across Ethiopia to the Indian Ocean was designated as belonging to Italy.¹¹⁴ It will be recalled, also, that in the Anglo-German treaty of July 1, 1890, these two countries recognized Italy's claims in Ethiopia. With this recognition Italy felt secure in her possession in spite of French and Russian activities.

¹¹⁴Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty, Second Edition* (1896), Vol. I, p. 18; also *First Edition* (1894), Vol. I, opposite p. 19. These books were printed for Her Majesty's stationary office by Harrison and Sons, printers in ordinary for Her Majesty. Thus it would seem that England recognized Ethiopia as belonging to Italy. It is interesting to note that the map of this territory is quite different in the Third Edition of the same work.



Map of Italian
Claims - May 5, 1894
to March 1, 1896

CHAPTER III

ITALY LOSES THE PAWN—ADOWA

Italy's one-sided triumph was short-lived. The patient waiting and devious diplomacy of Antonelli in seeking to detach Menelik from Johannes, who was supported by such grizzled and capable old warriors as Ras Aloula, had produced astonishing results in the last year of his efforts. But whether he suspected it or not, Antonelli would be called upon in a few months to wrestle, in vain, with that same Menelik to maintain for Italy the position he had claimed for her in Ethiopia. Johannes VI, King of Kings of Ethiopia, had fallen in battle on March 10, 1889, and his death, the next day, removed one of the obstacles to Antonelli's hopes of having Menelik occupy the ancient throne. On March 26, Menelik had proclaimed himself Emperor and on May 2, Antonelli had concluded with him the much desired but long delayed Treaty of Uccialli. The latter part of August had found him back in Italy with Ethiopia, by virtue of the Treaty of Uccialli, in his pocket and accompanied by Dedjasmach Makonnen, Menelik's cousin, who should conclude an additional convention with Italy to bind the sacrifice more firmly upon the altar. Umberto, the King of Italy, had ratified Antonelli's work; the "Additional Convention" had been concluded; Crispi had notified the Powers of Italy's protectorate over Ethiopia; and Makonnen had started for home early in December. All these momentous events had taken place in less than a year.

Surely Italy felt reason for self-congratulation upon the results of her African diplomacy in 1889.

In the meantime, Menelik had gone about the business of subduing his people. When Antonelli was on his way to the coast, after having secured Menelik's seal to the Treaty of Uccialli, he had assured Italy that Menelik would finish in triumph because, (1) he had a very strong and large army, (2) the chief leaders were in sympathy with Menelik and most of them had already recognized him, (3) the clerics, including the three Abunas of Tigré, Gojam, and Shoa, considered him already Emperor. Only the *Eccighie Theofilos* sought to create opposition but would not be dangerous.¹ And he added, "Menelik will need our support, *which will render possible our influence over all Ethiopia.*" It was upon the question of this support to Menelik that General Baldissera had vigorously disagreed with Antonelli.² Baldissera had believed that Italy's policy should continue to be one of "divide and conquer"; that Italy should play off the Tigrian Chiefs of the north against Menelik and thus weaken them both. Now, when Italy adopted Antonelli's policy, Baldissera believed Italy was playing to lose Ethiopia finally, and resigned his command. Ostensibly he asked to be recalled because he was suffering from ophthalmia, but in Italy it was diagnosed as "Ophthalmia Antonelliana".³

Though considerable opposition to Menelik de-

¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 415, doc. 230.

²On January 1, 1890, the Italian possessions on the Red Sea were united by royal decree into one province under a Governor and designated as "The Colony of Erythra". (Eritrea)

³Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 23.

veloped in the north, under the leadership of Ras Aloula, who had rallied the Tigrrians around Ras Mangasha, Menelik was destined to finish promptly and in triumph, as Antonelli had predicted. The northern chiefs felt especially aggrieved that Menelik, by the Treaty of Ucciali, had handed over to Italy a considerable block of their territory and the records show that for many years Menelik could not be sure of their loyalty. Even up to the very eve of the battle of Adowa, Ras Mangasha was negotiating, through the British, to throw in his lot with Italy against Menelik.⁴ Within a few months, however, Menelik felt his position was strong enough to make arrangements for his official coronation. Accordingly on November 3, 1889, while Makonnen was still in Italy, on the high summit of Mount Entoto, which overlooks "The New Flower", Ethiopia's present capital, he was crowned as "The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Menelik II, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia".⁵ Two days later Taïtu, Menelik's Tigrrian wife, was crowned Empress. This double coronation was the occasion of an elaborate feast lasting eight days.

Wishing to share the joy at his elevation on this occasion with fellow sovereigns and governments, Menelik dispatched announcements of his coronation to the different states of Europe. At the time of his coronation only Tigré with some of the smaller local chiefs, was in open rebellion against Menelik and in defiance of Italy. The Italians had already occupied

⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 124, doc. 268.

⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 52, doc. 69.

Asmara and now (January 1890) with Italy as his ally on the north, Menelik advanced with his army northward to bring the Tigrians under his control. At the same time the Italian army under General Orero advanced southward to support him. Caught thus between the two arms of a vise, Mangasha could have been crushed, but, upon reaching Adowa, the capital of Tigré, the Italians stopped. Likewise Menelik came to a halt when he had occupied Macallé, the capital of Ethiopia while Johannes VI had been Emperor.⁶ Here matters halted and apparently at Menelik's request, the Italian Government ordered General Orero to evacuate Adowa. It will be noticed that Adowa was not within the territory that Menelik had ceded to Italy in the Treaty of Ucciali and the fact that he objected at once to Italian occupation of this post would seem to support the idea that he was not at all conscious, at that time, of the Italian claim of a protectorate over all Ethiopia. He was, on the contrary, careful that Italy might not have excuse to lay claim to possession of Adowa on the grounds of conquest and occupation.

Upon Italy's withdrawal from Adowa, however, Menelik found to his regret that the Tigrians were not ready to permit him to be crowned in the historic church of coronations in the holy city of Axum. He, therefore, withdrew and left the Tigrians to the encroachments of the Italians for a few months more, in the hope that later they would welcome him as their liberator. At this halt in affairs, Italy undertook to have the boundaries fixed according to the Treaty of Ucciali, as recti-

⁶Berkeley, *Campaign of Adowa*, p. 26.

fied by the "Additional Convention" signed at Naples by Makonnen, October 1, 1889, and ratified by Menelik, while at Macallé, February 25, 1890.⁷ According to Article III of that "Additional Convention" each was to retain all territory actually in his possession.⁸ Italy had sought this change from the original boundary line, as drawn in the Treaty of Ucciali because, while Antonelli and Makonnen had been on the way from Ethiopia to Rome, Italy had taken Asmara which was within the Ethiopian sphere. Between the signing of the "Additional Convention" October 1, 1889, and Menelik's ratification of it, February 25, 1890, Italy had seized additional territory. In the meantime, however, Menelik by a secret treaty had given this newly seized territory to one of his own followers.⁹ Therefore, when there was an effort made to mark out the boundary between Italy's Colony of Eritrea on the Red Sea, and Italy's protectorate, Ethiopia, both Menelik and Italy claimed the same territory.

Here, then, we have the cause of the first misunderstanding between Menelik and his ally. Italy claimed that Article III of the "Additional Convention" was not in operation until ratified by Menelik, that is, February 25, 1890, and that all territory taken by Italy up to that time should belong to Italy. Menelik contended that the meaning of the Article was clear. It was intended to include in the Italian Colony all that Italy had taken in possession prior to October 1, 1889

⁷Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 457.

⁸See Article III, "Additional Convention".

⁹Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 28.

when the Convention had been signed by Crispi and Makonnen at Naples; that as far as Italy was concerned the treaty became operative upon being signed by Crispi. In the heat of this dispute, Menelik withdrew from the conference and, on March 22, 1890, all discussion was broken off with no settlement between them.¹⁰

To make matters worse, Menelik's announcements to the Powers of his coronation began to arrive in Europe. Their arrival brought consternation to Italy and certain of their replies produced astonishment and anger in Menelik. As early as February 9, 1890, Crispi informed Antonelli that he knew Menelik had violated Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali. The reader will recall that Article XVII was the very center of the treaty. Upon it Italy had staked much. In October Crispi had notified all the Powers that according to this Article Ethiopia must, in the future, be considered a protectorate of Italy. Now the native chieftain, Italy's protégé, had presumed to notify those very Powers of his own coronation just as any independent ruler might have done, without even asking his *protector* whether or not he might do so. Such evidence of incorrigibility must not be overlooked. Therefore, Crispi declared when he had seen the letter Menelik had sent to the Kaiser,

We know, because we have seen it with our own eyes, that Menelik has violated Article seventeen of the treaty of 2 May 1889 when he communicated direct with the European Powers. In the letter addressed to the Emperor of Germany, after he had praised his glo-

¹⁰Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 28.

rious predecessor, Johannes, he announced his own coronation, lamented his isolation and hoped for an opening upon the sea for the importation of arms.¹¹

To stir Crispi's blood to a boiling point, in less than a week from the day he had seen with his own eyes the Kaiser's copy of Menelik's invitation, he was informed that France had received a similar invitation.¹²

All this was bad enough, but worse still, on February 25, 1890, the very day that Menelik was ratifying the "Additional Convention", the *Corriere di Napoli* published a telegram from London in which it was claimed that Menelik had disowned the Italian protectorate and stated that the source of information did not permit a doubt of its exactness.¹³ The matter was now public. What should Italy do? She had published her protectorate to all the Powers. Now they, as well as the Italian public, knew that Menelik had ignored Italy's claims. Although Crispi was thus excited, his excitement was not caused wholly by disappointment. The very tone of his communications indicates that he welcomed the situation. He wrote Antonelli after knowing that Menelik had gone directly to the Kaiser of Germany and to President Carnot of France, "Although such an attitude (Menelik's) makes possible our liberty of action, before making resolutions we will await precise information from you".¹⁴ It is clear from this that Crispi welcomed a cause for anticipated aggression against Menelik. This

¹¹Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 76; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, p. 3, doc. 1.

¹²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, p. 3, doc. 2; Francesco Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 221.

¹³Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 75.

¹⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, p. 3, doc. 2.

hint from Crispi does not coincide well with King Umberto's letter of only a few days before, calling down the blessing of Heaven upon Menelik.

To these two communications from Crispi, Antonelli replied (February 12) that at his first opportunity he had administered lively reproofs to Menelik as he had already done to Makonnen, who, he claimed, was greatly disappointed that he had not better served his king while he was in Italy as an ambassador.¹⁵ Antonelli then proceeded to blame Menelik's repudiation of the Treaty of Uccialli upon intriguers who were profiting by Menelik's inexperience and good faith. The names of these intriguers he would have spelled in the French fashion, as he did in other communications.

Meanwhile Menelik was receiving replies from Europe to the announcement of his coronation. The contents of some of them surprised and angered him. These replies informed him that since Ethiopia was a protectorate of Italy the government from which they came could not treat with him directly but that any communication he might wish to make to any European state should be made through the government of Italy, as Article XVII of the Treaty of Uccialli provided and as Crispi acting for the Italian Government had informed them last October.¹⁶ These letters were exceedingly humiliating to Menelik. He refers to those of Queen Victoria and Kaiser Wilhelm, Emperor of Germany. As Antonelli quoted him, he said Victoria's

¹⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, p. 4, doc. 11.

¹⁶*Journal Officiel, Chambre des Députés*, Session 1894, Annexe No. 653, p. 55; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 89.

letter was *cortese*, but that of the Kaiser was *pungente*.¹⁷ Both, however, were humiliating. The Queen could not treat with him as an independent sovereign and the Kaiser had not even addressed him with the title of Negus Negasti but simply "Your Highness". Menelik considered himself as an independent sovereign, conqueror and ruler of a state equal to the area of most European states and greater than many of them and he expected to be treated as such. Herein lies one of the great causes of misunderstanding between the European and the Ethiopian. Europeans can not seem to appreciate that a man of Ethiopia of Menelik's type of character and ability is worthy of the same respect and fair treatment that should be accorded a European of similar character and ability. Moreover, the Ethiopian "Meneliks" expect to receive that honor and respect. Hence Menelik expected to be addressed by his title of Negus Negasti and not simply as "Highness" (*Altezza*) and to be treated as an independent sovereign as he considered himself. Not to receive this treatment and recognition of his station was humiliating. This humiliation he could not endure.

Thus disturbed by these responses and troubled by an unfinished dispute with Antonelli's mission for settling the boundary in Tigré, Menelik dispatched a letter direct to Umberto, King of Italy.¹⁸ In this letter he referred to these humiliating replies to his announcements. Since receiving them, he had re-examined Ar-

¹⁷Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, pp. 88, 90.

¹⁸*Journal Officiel, Chambre des Députés* 1894, Annexe No. 653, p. 55; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-1891) part 2, p. 10, doc. 2; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 78.

ticle XVII and had discovered that the terms written in Amharic and the Italian translation did not agree. He wrote,

When I made that treaty of friendship with Italy, in order that our secrets be guarded and that our undertaking should not be spoiled, I said that because of friendship, our affairs in Europe might be carried on with the aid of the Sovereign of Italy, but I have not made any treaty which obliges me to do so, and to-day, I am not the man to accept it. That one independent power does not seek the aid of another to carry on its affairs your Majesty understands very well.

He then directed Umberto to Article XIX of this same Treaty of Ucciali, which stipulated that for interpretation, the two texts (Amharic and Italian) were of equal authority.¹⁹ That Menelik was sincere in this letter is fully indicated by the fact that immediately after writing it, he ceased to use the loan of 4,000,000 lire, which he had contracted with the National Bank of Italy, with the guarantee of the State, in keeping with the Additional Convention of October 1889. Instead he began to pay back the part of it he had already used, refusing to take the balance put at his disposal.²⁰

Thus Italy and Ethiopia came to a complete *impasse* over the questions of boundary and the interpretation of Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali. This was in 1890. For the next three years the matter was fought out diplomatically between Menelik and Italy, with Italy bringing all her powers to bear upon Menelik to induce him to accept the Italian translation, but with Menelik stubbornly determined not to do so.

¹⁹Article XIX of the Treaty of May 2, 1889, stipulated that both Italian and Amharic texts of the treaty were to be considered official, and of the same authority.

²⁰*Comité de l'Afrique française, Bulletin*, Numero de septembre 1891, p. 20.

Crispi ignored Menelik's protest and sought to have him acknowledge Italy as his sponsor in a roundabout way. The Brussels Conference, in which matters affecting Africa were to be discussed, was about to meet.²¹ Crispi, therefore, had Antonelli impress upon Menelik the necessity for him to have Italy represent Ethiopia there.²² To this Menelik consented.²³ For the time being this action permitted Crispi to appear before the European States as Ethiopia's protector and thus save the situation.²⁴

However, as interested spectators of the Italo-Ethiopian situation, other European nations were not wholly satisfied to let the matter remain quiet. When Crispi's notification of an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia was presented to the French Chamber of Deputies, there was considerable questioning as to what Italy meant by "Ethiopia". What was the extent of the African territory over which Italy thus proposed to claim protection?²⁵ M. Deloncle, a deputy in the French Chamber, sent a communication to Menelik in which he informed that Monarch of Italy's interpretation, and to prove his claim, he accompanied his communication with a copy of the Italian *Green Book* of

²¹*Brussels Act, 1890-1892; Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, Third Edition, Vol. II, pp. 458-528; Crispi, La Prima Guerra d'Africa, p. 221.*

²²*Documenti Diplomatici, No. XVII, p. 5, doc. 5.*

²³*Ibid., p. 5, doc. 5.*

²⁴At the Conference of Brussels certain European Powers objected to the use of "Emperor of Ethiopia" in referring to Menelik since Italy had notified them of Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali.

²⁵*Journal Officiel, 3 Avril 1890; Rossetti, Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia, p. 62; Crispi, La Prima Guerra d'Africa, p. 163f.*

May 26, 1890, which contained Italy's version of Article XVII of the Treaty of May 2, 1889.²⁶

Italy herself had taken up with Germany the discussion of the matter of her military occupation of more Ethiopian territory, in the hope that this show of force would convince Menelik of the wisdom of accepting Italy's interpretation of Article XVII. Crispi believed, too, that England would welcome another Power as a neighbor on the Egyptian border.²⁷ Count Hatzfeldt, who was then Germany's ambassador to London, disagreed with this view, declaring that any *civilized* government on the border of Egypt would not be enjoyed by England since she wanted only *uncivilized* neighbors, who could be controlled more easily by a show of force.²⁸ Chancellor Caprivi, however, in spite of this interpretation of the English attitude, perhaps because of it, directed his representative at Rome to advise Italy that Germany wished her "all possible success in the Abyssinian field", but he hoped that Italy would be careful not to come into actual conflict with England. Caprivi believed that England was aiming to weaken the Sudanese by famine, tribal strife, *et cetera*, so as to make annexation easier later on. To put a stop to this British scheme, he suggested Italian expansion to the

²⁶Rouard de Card, *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, p. 62. Note: Rouard de Card claims this was the first intimation that Menelik had of the matter, but Menelik claims to have learned it first from the letters of Queen Victoria and of the Kaiser in reply to his announcement of his coronation. (*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91)—part 3, p. 56, doc. III.) Then, too, Antonelli and Menelik had discussed the matter before Deloncle had sent this information.

²⁷*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 343, No. 1972.

²⁸*Ibid.*

west into the Nile territory.²⁹ Italy coveted Kassala and disputed English claim to it, saying that in a treaty between England and Ethiopia, 1882, England had recognized the place as belonging to Ethiopia. Now, however, England claimed Kassala as part of Egypt and had warned Italy to respect it as such.³⁰ Italy had approached England by way of Berlin, asking England to give over Kassala to Italy. But Lord Salisbury had refused to think of giving it up, saying that "to do so would cause a storm against the Cabinet." This remark came to the Kaiser's attention, whereupon he wrote into the margin, "The most of them don't know where the stupid place is".³¹ Italy had made an effort at direct negotiation to mark out spheres of influence for each of them, but these negotiations had broken down on the question of Kassala. Now the Germans, for Italy, were sounding out Salisbury as to the possibility of renewing the effort. Salisbury had no objection to renewing the efforts at settlement, but Kassala must be ruled out of discussion. There was no objection to temporary occupation by the Italians but he would not permit permanent ownership. Here the Kaiser wrote, "Once they are in, the Italians can do as the British do with the occupation of Egypt which is also 'temporary'." Considering this claim, Menelik's uncertain position, and her own financial condition, Italy thought it not wise to attempt to take Kassala.³²

²⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 345, No. 1973.

³⁰Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 232 ff.

³¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 352, No. 1979; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 146.

³²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 374, No. 1974.

Germany believed in 1890 that the surest way to keep Italy from falling into the arms of France was to encourage her aspirations in Northern Africa, hence she supported Italy in that region in any move short of conflict with England.³³

Popular opinion in Italy was incensed at Crispi for not pursuing a more active colonial policy, and the government was disturbed at England's attitude. Lord Salisbury had promised that, as soon as England should have concluded a colonial treaty with Germany, he would immediately take up negotiations for a similar understanding with Italy. The German treaty had been signed in July and as yet (August 29) no move had been made to open negotiations with Italy.³⁴ Germany believed that England wished to keep Italy away from the Egyptian sphere of influence and thus narrow the colonial negotiations down to the coast of the Red Sea.³⁵

While these discussions were under way in Europe, matters in Ethiopia had remained much as they were when the discovery of the two versions of Article XVII had halted operations. Menelik had denied any intention of obliging himself to make use of the Italian government in dealing with other Powers and had written his letter to Umberto asking for revision of the Italian text. He now proceeded to write to each of the

³³*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 238, No. 1862. Note: A memorandum of Chancellor Caprivi, May 15, 1890, records "The surest way to prevent Italy from falling into the arms of France lies in nourishing her aspiration in North Africa. Massowah makes her still more sensitive about Biserta". *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 116.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 351, No. 1977.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 352, No. 1978.

Powers to rectify the Italian notification to them.³⁶ This threat was communicated to Italy by Nerazzini, the Italian Resident at Harrar, and Crispi replied at once that Italy must insist upon maintaining Article XVII and if Menelik wished any change he should wait until the expiration of five years as the treaty provided. To these instructions Crispi added, "Use all your influence that Menelik makes no complaint to others than us."³⁷ Instead of replying to Menelik's letter, Italy directed our famous negotiator, Count Antonelli, to return to Menelik's Court to carry on negotiations.³⁸

In order to understand why Italy sought to keep at least the appearance of a protectorate over Ethiopia in spite of the objection of Menelik, it must be remembered that by 1890 all the leading powers of Europe were making desperate efforts to carve out of Africa as many and as large spheres of influence as possible. Italy was caught in this rush. In her eagerness to have

³⁶*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91) part 2, p. 9, doc. 1.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 13, doc. 4.

³⁸*Comité de l'Afrique française*, Bulletin, Numero de janvier 1891, p. 14; Note: According to some French writers Antonelli concluded a new treaty with Menelik at this time (February 6, 1891) after which Italy withdrew her troops from Keren, Agordat, Asmara, and Adowa. (See de Card, *op. cit.*, p. 30). I have not been able to find this treaty in Italian documents. I am sure these writers are referring to one of the two treaties signed by Menelik and Antonelli on February 6, 1891, one of which Antonelli destroyed when he learned of its contents (see p. 123). Since Antonelli quitted Ethiopia at once after this affair, the other treaty of the same date was never ratified, hence came to nothing. It is this abortive treaty to which de Card, and some others refer no doubt. It is given in *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-1891) part 3, doc. VI, p. 101, and Antonelli reported from Aden on his way home that it was to come into force when Menelik should accept Article XVII. This Menelik never did, so this treaty of February 6, 1891 never became operative.

a "sphere" she had taken over Ethiopia in haste without having Menelik understand—perhaps not wishing him to understand—Article XVII, as Italy had written it. Now they could not bear the thought of giving up the *protectorate*. They were ready to make almost any sort of arrangements as to boundary that Menelik might wish, if only they might *protect* him. *Italy just must have somebody to protect*. All the others had, so must she have. Umberto wrote Menelik October 28, 1890, that Italy had acted in accordance with the treaty and Makonnen, Menelik's representative, had agreed to have the Powers notified of the import of Article XVII, Umberto had no doubts, that, when Menelik "understood the questions which agitate Europe in regard to the African situation" he would be agreed to accept Italy's protection.³⁹

To cause Menelik to understand the questions which agitated Europe in regard to the African situation in 1890, was then Antonelli's mission. But Europe had been so agitated that ripples from this agitation had preceded Antonelli to Africa. Upon reaching Massowah, (November 14) he reported back to Crispi that he had found many intelligent and active persons from *Francia* (Jibuti), who were jealous of the influence of Italy in Ethiopia, passing back and forth from Jibuti to Shoa.⁴⁰ These agents carried circulars, written in Amharic, in which were reproduced fragments of the *Libre Verde* "Etiopia" and comments upon Article XVII of

³⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 2, p. 14, doc. 5; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, pp. 82, 83.

⁴⁰Antonelli here refers to the French in Jibuti. Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 251.

the Treaty of Uccialli.⁴¹ Not only were French agents prejudicing Menelik's mind against Italy, but they were distributing these garbled fragments of the *Libre Verde* to the chief officers of the Emperor and causing great embarrassment to him. The French were representing themselves as *friends* who would save Ethiopia from an error which would compromise the independence of the Empire.⁴² To save Italy's influence, Antonelli recommended that Italy should return to Menelik some of the territory she claimed under the treaty of May 2, 1889.

To support Antonelli's contention that the French were dealing with Menelik to the detriment of Italy's influence, Count Salimbeni, who was then Italy's permanent representative at Menelik's Court, informed Crispi that M. Chefneux, accompanied by one of his relations, had recently arrived in Ethiopia with fifteen rapid fire cannon. These men claimed to be tourists but did not cease to be officers in the French artillery and to work indefatigably against Italy. M. Ilg, a Swiss with French sympathies and employed by Menelik as his interpreter and chief European adviser, was acting as mentor to M. Chefneux, while Grazmach Jusuf, the interpreter who had been used in the making of the Treaty of Uccialli and had accompanied Makonnen on his mission to Italy was now supporting the French representatives. All these and many of the natives, whom Italy had benefited, as well as the Armenians

⁴¹This was the Green Book, a copy of which Deloncle had sent to Menelik in May, 1890, now being distributed by the French in Ethiopia generally.

⁴²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 2, p. 16.

and Greeks, were continually misrepresenting Italy to Menelik in so much that they gave him no time for reflection. "From morning till night they repeat to his Majesty, 'You see we have reasons to warn you that you distrust the Italians'."⁴³ This conglomerate array of Europeans and natives under French influence, had caused Menelik to believe that the National Bank of Italy, had in an underhanded way, lost him large sums of money. They led him to believe that Pestalozza had gone to Aussa to take possession of that province and in every way possible had sought to inspire the Negus against Italy.⁴⁴

Such were the conditions as reported by Count Salimbeni, and, as noted in Antonelli's own observations, upon his return to Menelik's capital, Addis Ababa, December 17, 1890, to support Salimbeni at the Court of the King of Kings of Ethiopia.⁴⁵ It must be remembered here that Italy and England had now (1891) opened negotiations for delimitation of their respective spheres of influence in that part of Africa and, to present the strongest possible claims for Ethiopia in these negotiations, it was quite important that Italy should be able to show her sovereignty over it. Antonelli, therefore opened discussions with Menelik, with instructions

⁴³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91), part 3, p. 5, doc. 1.

⁴⁴Note: As a matter of fact less than a year before this, Crispi had announced to European Powers the Italian Protectorate over this very Aussa (see *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, bis. (1889-90), p. 38, doc. 52); and no doubt the French were right in their guess but Italy objected to their telling Menelik.

⁴⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1889-90), part 3, p. 56, doc. III.

from Rome to sacrifice Italy's demands as to boundary, if that was necessary, in order to maintain Ethiopia as a Protectorate.⁴⁶ His task was to convince Menelik that it was greatly to his advantage to come under the protection of Italy. Crispi had furnished Antonelli with astounding arguments for this purpose. Among them he related how a certain Russian, Mascoff by name, had taken Walde Selasse, an Ethiopian, to Russia and had abandoned him there; whereupon Italy had given the Ethiopian protection. This had been done because Ethiopia was Italy's protectorate. Italy had protected Ethiopians at her consulates at Cairo, Aden, and Jerusalem at considerable cost and had thus saved Menelik expense and annoyance. Without Article XVII, Menelik would have to maintain representatives at foreign governments but with that Article, Italy would do all this without expense to Menelik. "It is due to our diplomacy at Brussels that Menelik is able to get arms and the Monks of Ethiopia to get land in Jerusalem". Said he, "It is necessary that Menelik accept Article XVII explicitly. Insist upon this with all your influence, placing it as a condition, *sine quo non*, to any boundary adjustment."⁴⁷

All these arguments and many more, Antonelli presented to Menelik, assuring him that Pestalozza had gone to Aussa, not to take that province, as the French agents had reported, but to defend Ethiopia's rights in

⁴⁶*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1889-90), part 2, p. 19, doc. 8.

⁴⁷*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 2, p. 19, doc. 8; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatici, dell'Etiopia*, p. 84.

the regions menaced by Francia (French at Jibuti).⁴⁸ These rather weak arguments ought to have convinced nobody, and they failed with Menelik. Menelik had no intention of accepting Article XVII. He had carried out his threat to write to the other European states condemning the Italian translation of this Article. The English government had promptly forwarded the Queen's copy to Italy and, in a friendly manner, had added that the Queen had made no reply.⁴⁹ The copy received by France, however fared differently. President Carnot had taken the *trouble* to reply.

By this time there were three provisions of the Treaty of May 2, 1889, to which Menelik objected. They were: first, the boundary question between Ethiopia and Italian Eritrea; second, the offensive Article XVII; and third, the conditions of the loan made by Makonnen in the "Additional Convention" of October 1, 1889.⁵⁰ We have already called attention to the misunderstanding that had arisen about the meaning of the clause referring to boundaries in Makonnen's "Additional Convention." Italy claimed that the expression, declaring that each should retain any territory held in possession at the time of making the treaty, meant all taken before the date of ratification by Menelik, February 25, 1890, while Menelik insisted that it meant all in Italy's possession at the time of the signing of the treaty in Naples, October 1, 1889. This dispute

⁴⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 2, p. 21, doc. 12.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, part 3, p. 56 ff, doc. III.

was still unsettled. Menelik's agreement with Ras Mangasha in the meantime made it more difficult to settle. Now also, the 2,000,000 lire received from the National Bank of Italy in agreement with this "Additional Convention" had come to be looked upon by Menelik as a "great dishonor and a 'Nightmare'," says Antonelli.⁵¹

Though all three of these points were included in the discussions, only the second could not be agreed upon. Italy was determined that Ethiopia should become her protectorate at any cost; therefore, the Italian translation of Article XVII must be accepted. Menelik was just as determined that he would not admit the protection of Italy. Antonelli declared to Menelik in an audience at which the Empress was present, "Italy cannot notify the other Powers that she was mistaken in Article XVII, because she must maintain her dignity." Taitu, who, as a native of Tigré, was, if possible, more determined than the Emperor, joined in the conversation here with the reply, "We also have made known to the Powers that the said Article, as it is written in our language, has another meaning. As you, we also ought to respect our dignity. You wish Ethiopia to be represented before the other Powers as your protectorate, but this shall never be."⁵² Antonelli could not understand Taitu's opposition to Italy, though he sought to be enlightened by the Abuna.

The discussion centered always about the differ-

⁵¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 3, p. 56, doc. III.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 71, doc. IV.

ences in the two translations of this difficult Article XVII. The Italian version had it, "His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia, consents to avail himself of the Italian Government for any negotiations which he may enter into with the other Powers or Governments." Menelik's copy in the Amharic reads, "His Majesty, the King of Kings of Ethiopia, *may, if he desires to*, avail himself of the Italian Government for any negotiations he may enter into with the other Powers or Governments". By the Amharic, Menelik had the privilege to use the good offices of the Italian Government at any time he might wish to do so. According to the Italian translations he was obliged to make use of the Italian Government for every transaction with a third state. By the one he was independent; by the other he was dependent. The original was the Amharic and the Italian copy was a translation made by Jusuf, Menelik's interpreter.⁵³ That Antonelli had much to do with the translation, however, is evident from the fact that this translation from the Amharic agrees word for word with the proposed Article he brought from Italy. It is not at all likely that a translation made by an Ethiopian could agree in every respect with a copy prepared in Rome by Crispi's Government.

⁵³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91) part 3, p. 49 ff, doc. 1, Annesso. Note: As a matter of fact there seems to have been but one copy signed by both Menelik and Antonelli and that was the Amharic copy, which is herewith reproduced.

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የኢትዮጵያ ንጉሠ ነገሥት ገዢ ነገሥቱ ከጸረከጉት ጉዳይ ሁሉ በኢጣሊያ መንግሥት ከገዥነት መሳሪያ ሂደት ካቶታል

The controversy centered largely in the proper Italian translation of one or two Amharic words used in the original. The Amharic word corresponding to the *consente* in the Italian translation was ይቸግቱዋል፡ (ye-chee-a-la-choo-al) (Italian-iccialacciual).⁵⁴ The root form of this word is "ciale" (chee-a-la) which, according to Abbadie's Amharic dictionary, page 404, is translated with the Italian "put", "supporta", that is, can, may, to suffer with patience. If *consente* is really an effort to translate this Amharic word, then the Italians have taken the meaning, *to suffer with patience*, but in that case they should have used the Italian word *supporta*, which they did not do. That word came too nearly expressing the real situation with the numerous European protectorates over African chieftains—they *suffered with patience* that which they could not avoid. Menelik took it to mean "*It will be possible*", as it does mean in Amharic.⁵⁵ Then there was also the word ከገዢነት፡ (a-za-zhe-in-et), (Italian-*agaginet*) which means *stewardship or aid*.⁵⁶ The Italians might have translated this Article then, "His Majesty, the King of Kings of Ethiopia, supports or, suffers with patience the stewardship, or aid of the Italian Government for any negotiations which he may enter into with other Powers or Governments". Menelik wished it translated, "His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia may, if he desires, avail himself of the aid of the Italian Govern-

⁵⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91), part 3, p. 56, doc. III.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 77, doc. IV.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

ment for any negotiations which he may enter into with other Powers or Governments".⁵⁷ It is not necessary to assume that there was a mistake in translation. It seems better to assume that there was no translation. Since this Article in the Italian text is identical with that prepared in Rome before Antonelli left to secure the Treaty of Ucciali, it is more to the point to assume that in their anxiety to secure Ethiopia as a protectorate the Italians simply adopted the Article as they had prepared it, without reference to the Amharic copy.⁵⁸

All through January 1889, Antonelli and Menelik held discussions and exchanged notes over this question, with Antonelli always insisting that Menelik accept Italy's protection and Menelik stoutly refusing to do so. Antonelli closed his rather vigorous letters always with the request that Menelik pardon his boldness. Finally when Grazmach Jusuf had informed Menelik that Crispi had not notified the Powers of Italy's claim of protectorate over Ethiopia until after Makonnen had left Italy and therefore, Makonnen could not have approved the notification, Antonelli addressed a note to Menelik with the salutation "May God illuminate the Emperor",⁵⁹ and proceeded to do it *himself* by telling the Emperor that Jusuf had not told the truth, (and he had not) when he had reported to Menelik that Makonnen had

⁵⁷E. L. Bonnefon, *L'Afrique politique en 1900*, p. 444; Note: Such French historians as L. J. Morié do not hesitate to declare that the Italian text was a falsification by Crispi and Antonelli. See L. J. Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 425.

⁵⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 437, doc. 235, Annesso II. See Article XVI of the Proposed Treaty.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, No. XVII (1890-91) part 3, doc. IV, Annessi, pp. 78-84.

left Italy before Crispi's notification to the European Powers of Italy's Protectorate over Ethiopia.⁶⁰

Finally, Menelik issued an ultimatum containing three alternative propositions. He proposed: first, to abolish Article XVII entirely; second, to let Article XVII remain in the treaty just as it was in the Amharic; third, to let the two texts, (Italian and Amharic), remain as they were. In that case he (Menelik) would make no declaration in regard to it.⁶¹ This third proposition at first sight, seems to be without meaning, but it was intended to permit Italy to claim a protectorate over Ethiopia in the face of European states, with no expression of approval or disapproval from Menelik. At the same time, between Italy and Menelik, it was to be understood to have the Amharic meaning. This would permit Italy to maintain her dignity in Europe and Menelik to go his own way in Africa. After further discussion, it was agreed, according to Antonelli, that two treaties should be prepared, one dealing with the boundary and the other with Article XVII with the understanding that the article should remain as it was in the treaty.⁶² On February 6, 1891, Menelik called Antonelli to his Court to sign these documents. When Antonelli arrived he was given two copies of the first treaty, but apparently only one of the second and that

⁶⁰Crispi had notified the Powers October 11, 1889, and Makonnen left Naples on one of the first days of December, 1889. See *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, bis. (1889-90), p. 37, doc. 49, where December 4 is given as the date of his departure.

⁶¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 3, doc. IV, Annesso XIII, p. 87.

⁶²This is the one mentioned by Rouard de Card, in *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, p. 30.

in Amharic. Believing further efforts to get Menelik to accept Italy as his protector were useless, Antonelli decided to let matters remain as they were and to seek to have assurance from Menelik that, if Ethiopia could not become Italy's Protectorate, he would not permit it to become the protectorate of any other European state. Menelik was willing to make use of Italy when he wished to have aid, but refused to be *obliged* to do so. To close the matter up promptly, Antonelli signed the treaties. Later he had the Amharic text of his new treaty dealing with Article XVII translated, and to his astonishment he discovered that he had signed an agreement to *cancel* this troublesome Article instead of one to let it remain as it was in the original treaty as he claimed to have thought he had signed.⁶³ Angrily hastening back to Menelik he protested and demanded that Menelik's copy having his signature be returned at once. Menelik claimed that he could not return it as he had already sent it to Rome. Whereupon Antonelli in a rage tore up his copy and cast it from him, and declared to Menelik that he would leave Ethiopia for Rome at once.⁶⁴ Less than a week before, he had written to Rome expressing a desire to be recalled. He had said, "I do not wish to continue the discussions with a Government which denies today what it affirmed yesterday and which uses for diplomatic questions the

⁶³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91), part 2, p. 34, doc. 32; Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 252f.

⁶⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91), part 2, p. 34, doc. 32.

advice and suggestions of Armenian and Swiss joiners".⁶⁵

Having destroyed the treaty which called for the cancellation of Article XVII and having announced that he would depart for Rome, Antonelli withdrew from the King's presence. A few days later, Antonelli, Salimbeni and Traversi dispatched a letter to Menelik, "praying Omnipotence for the happiness of Menelik, his family and his army", then took the trail at once for Rome determined to bring anything but happiness upon Ethiopia.⁶⁶

There was much discussion as to whether Menelik and Antonelli had agreed to sign the first of Menelik's items in his ultimatum, which was to cancel Article XVII, and which was the one actually signed on February 6, or had Antonelli intended to sign the third of Menelik's propositions which would have permitted things to remain just as they were since the signing of Ucciali? This latter is what Antonelli claimed he thought he had signed but had not done so. It is impossible to determine which proposition was the one actually agreed upon by the two men prior to the day of signing. Menelik may have prepared treaties on all three of his propositions and have intended Antonelli should sign the third. It may be that Menelik purposely had him sign the one he did sign. If so Menelik showed quite a sense of humor. He had demonstrated to Italy that an Italian Count could sign some-

⁶⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 3, p. 78, doc. IV. Note: The Swiss to whom Antonelli refers was, no doubt, M. Ilg, who had strong French leanings and was then employed by Menelik.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, annesso XIII, p. 100.

thing he did not intend to sign, when it was written in a foreign language, just as Menelik had been led to sign the Treaty of Ucciali.

Whatever may have been the fact, Antonelli was greatly displeased. He left Addis Ababa in anger, but he knew by this time that if Italy wished to keep any sort of influence with Menelik, it would be necessary to recede from her present demands. On February 25, while on his way to the coast, he dispatched a communication to Rudini, Minister of Foreign Affairs, informing him that, if Italy wished for reasons of her own and at any cost, to maintain good relations with Menelik, it would always be necessary to accept Menelik's boundary proposal and to abrogate Article XVII of the Treaty of May 2, 1889.⁶⁷

Antonelli blamed the French for his failure to induce Menelik to accept Italy's protection. He reported in the same communication referred to above that Makonnen had informed him that the French Government had offered Menelik 40,000 rifles. Moreover a French representative had presented to Menelik a project for an investment at Lake Assal, where under the Ethiopian flag they would create a commercial establishment paying annual tribute to Menelik.⁶⁸

While Antonelli was thus returning to Rome, Menelik addressed a letter of explanation to Umberto, enclosing a copy of the treaty destroyed by Antonelli. He described the Count's actions and blamed him for

⁶⁷*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 2, p. 36, doc. 35.

⁶⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII (1890-91), part 2, p. 36, doc. 36.

the failure of the negotiations. In describing Antonelli's actions to King Umberto when Antonelli had declared his intentions to depart for Rome, Menelik wrote, "I desired him to remain until we could hear from you, but it is not the custom of a Christian Sovereign to retain by force, a representative of a friend, so I permitted him to depart".⁶⁹ He wrote Rudini, "I cannot think the friendship of so many years can be broken by a single error."⁷⁰ Nevertheless, he left a memorandum under his Imperial Seal showing that he had no intention to come to Italy's point of view, even at the cost of losing a friendship of many years.⁷¹

Antonelli, upon reaching Rome and being shown Menelik's charges against him, declared, in a communication to Rudini, that many of the statements in the letter were not true. He warned Rudini that the letter was not Menelik's own composition; that some outside influence had worked upon Menelik's mind causing him to entertain feelings against Italy. He warned Rudini that he should keep an eye on these outside influences.⁷²

Crispi's government, having now given way to that of Rudini, Italian tactics in dealing with Ethiopia took a new turn. Rudini's government considered it more important for Italy to have the consent of other European Powers for Italy's protectorate over Ethiopia than to secure Menelik's consent. With Antonelli's

⁶⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91), part 2, p. 41, doc. 43.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 44, doc. 44.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 44, doc. 45.

⁷²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVII, (1890-91), part 2, p. 45, doc. 47; Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 253.

withdrawal from Addis Ababa, therefore, renewed efforts were made to conclude the negotiations with England to secure her consent formally to Italian ambitions in this territory. Both Germany and England had already acknowledged to each other in the Anglo-German agreement of July 1, 1890, the right of Italian dominance in that neighborhood.⁷³ But Italy had not been a party to that agreement, and, therefore, had no assurance that these Powers would in the future respect Italy's claims should it suit the purposes of either to do otherwise. Because of the Triple Alliance, Italy had reason to believe that she had the support of Germany, but she knew that England had decided ambitions in the Ethiopian highlands. She had reason to suspect that France was already dreaming of a great North African Empire stretching from the French Congo on the Atlantic Ocean to French Somaliland and the Indian Ocean. Then, too, Italy was convinced that French agents, and even the French Government, had been active in encouraging Menelik stubbornly to resist the wooings and threats of Italian diplomacy. Being fairly confident, then, of German consent, and having no hope of ever securing French approval, she devoted her energies to coming to a definite understanding with England. It so happened, too, that England was desirous of securing uplands upon which to construct her Cape to Cairo railway above the swamps of the Nile Valley, and to control the waters of the Blue Nile. She also sought all possible means of obstructing French efforts to cut across English ambitions in Africa.

⁷³See *Chapter I*, p. 37.


Accordingly, on March 24, 1891, Marquis Dufferin and Ava, for England, and the Marquis de Rudini, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy, signed the first of three agreements whereby England and Italy defined their respective spheres of influence in Ethiopia.⁷⁴ In this Protocol Italy and England indicated the line of demarcation between their respective spheres of influence in East Africa. The line began at the point where the Juba river opens into the Indian Ocean. From this point it follows the mid-channel (thalweg) of that river up to the sixth degree of north latitude. It then followed the sixth parallel westward until that parallel intersects the 35th meridian east of Greenwich, which it followed to its intersection with the Blue Nile.⁷⁵ It will be observed that this line follows the same Juba river mentioned in the treaty of July 1, 1890, between England and Germany in which those two countries had already, very generously, reserved "Gallaland and Abyssinia" for Italy.⁷⁶ From the signing of these two treaties, both England and Germany recognized Italy's protectorate over Ethiopia.

Less than a month later (April 15) these same negotiators signed at Rome, another protocol further

⁷⁴*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XIII, quater, p. 279, appendix, doc. 116; *Ibid.*, No. XVII, Legis, XVII, 1st Sess. (1890-91), p. 5; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 948; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, Italy, No. 1, 1891 (C-6316); *Archives Diplomatiques*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 259, No. 6; *Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, raccolti per cura del ministero degli affari esteri*, Vol. dodicesimo (12), p. 521.

⁷⁵Article I of the Treaty.

⁷⁶See *Agreement of July 1, 1890, Article I*, British Sphere 2, Chap. I, p. 39.




delimiting their respective spheres in this neighborhood.⁷⁷ This additional arrangement completed the boundary between them from the Red Sea to the Blue Nile. Beginning at Ras Kaser, on the Red Sea, the line ran directly to the point of intersection of the 17th parallel north latitude, with the 37th meridian east of Greenwich. The line then followed this meridian south to sixteen degrees and thirty minutes north latitude. From this point to the village of Sabderat the line was drawn so as to leave that village to the east. From Sabderat it followed a direct line to the intersection with the Gash river, twenty English miles above Kassala. From thence it joined the Atbara at the ford indicated on Münsinger's map at fourteen degrees and fifty-two minutes north latitude.⁷⁸ The line then ascended the Atbara to the confluence of the Kor Kakamot, thence westward to the headwaters of the Kor Lemsén, which it descended to the confluence of the Rahad river. From this point it followed the Rahad down to the 35th meridian. From the point of intersection of the Rahad and the 35th meridian the line extended southward along this meridian to the Blue Nile.⁷⁹

As will be seen, these two protocols marked the

⁷⁷*State Papers*, Vol. 83, pp. 19, 20; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 949; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XVIII, Legis, (1890-91) 1st Sess. p. 6; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XVIII, pp. 176, 178, 737; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, Italy No. I, 1891 (C-6316); *Archives Diplomatiques*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 259, No. 6; *Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati raccolti per cura del ministero degli affari esteri*, Vol. dodicesimo (12), p. 526.

⁷⁸*Originalkarte von Nord Abessinien und den Landern am Mareb, Barca, und Auseba*, den 1864.

⁷⁹See Article I of the Protocol.



complete line of separation between the British and the Italian spheres, from the mouth of the Juba river on the Indian Ocean, to Ras Kasar on the Red Sea, by way of the Blue Nile and the 35th meridian. It assigned to England a free hand to the south and west of this line and to Italy all the territory north and east, except, of course, that already taken by France at Jibuti, and by England about Zeila, whose limits were later defined. By referring to the map the reader will see at once that these treaties recognized as an Italian "sphere of influence" an enormous stretch of territory comprising the whole of Eritrea, Abyssinia, the Harrar, and Oga-den, with Italian Somaliland. On the other hand it assigned to England all that territory between the 35th meridian and the Nile river. In other words, Italy agreed to permit England to secure a highland route for her Cape-to-Cairo railway and assurance that the waters of the Atbara should not be obstructed.⁸⁰ In exchange, Italy secured England's approval of the Italian grab of the balance of Ethiopia and permission to occupy, temporarily, Kassala when the necessities of her proposed military operations against Menelik should require it.⁸¹ If these agreements had stood, England and Italy would have erected an insuperable obstacle to French aspirations east of the Nile. Hence French determination to break them up.

Now, although Menelik had stubbornly refused to accept Italy's *protection*, Italy had secured England's written approval and she already had the good wishes

⁸⁰Article III of the *Treaty of April 15, 1891*.

⁸¹Article II of the *Treaty of April 15, 1891*.



of Germany and Austria. France's approval she had never hoped to secure, as she knew the ambitions of that state for herself in this territory and believed France was already supporting Menelik in his opposition to Italian pretensions. With this array of European backing, what did it matter whether an African ruler consented to *protection* or not? Italy could now proceed to force Menelik to accept her interpretation of Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali. During the remainder of the Rudini Government's control, Italy confined her efforts largely to diplomacy and intrigue with Ethiopian princes without consulting Menelik, especially showering Ras Mangasha and Ras Aloula with gifts and promises.⁸² Upon the return of Crispi to power, however, she proceeded to take by force the protectorate she had failed to secure by an ingenious mistranslation of Amharic.

Put in defiance by the false promises of Italy and nothing daunted by these formidable alliances against him and the integrity of his country, Menelik decided to denounce, not only Article XVII, but the entire Treaty of Ucciali. He, therefore, February 12, 1893, notified Umberto of his decision.⁸³ In this notification he called attention to all the complaints between the two governments, such as the Tigrian boundary, Italy's dealing directly with Menelik's enemies, and her efforts to raise up rebellion within his Empire, and to encourage attacks from the provinces about him. He

⁸²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 357, No. 1986; *Ibid.*, p. 356, No. 1985.

⁸³*Comité de l'Afrique française*, Bulletin, Numero de juillet, 1893, p. 8; *Ibid.*, Numero de juin, 1894, p. 63.

complained of Italy's mistreatment of Menelik's representative, Dedjazmach Machacha-Worke, "Whom you returned to me covered with injury and mistreatment in a fashion outrageous for my Empire". He closed by denouncing the entire Treaty of May 2, 1889, including Makonnen's "Additional Convention" of October 1, declaring "that treaty will come to an end the 25 Miaza 1886".⁸⁴ (Ethiopian Calendar).

Moreover he proceeded to notify the Powers of Europe also of his action. On February 27, 1893, he addressed a note to each one of them in which he not only notified them that Ethiopia must not be considered a protectorate of Italy, but he just as certainly warned them to keep hands off. He declared that his Empire was of sufficient importance to enable it to maintain an independent life; that she was not looking for any European protector.⁸⁵ "Ethiopia has need of no one; she stretches out her hand unto God".⁸⁶ Evidently the Lord helped her. Certainly France did as will be seen farther on in this volume.

In denouncing the Treaty of Ucciali, Menelik had invoked Article XVI of that treaty.⁸⁷ At once Italy denied that this Article authorized either party to *denounce* the treaty, maintaining that it referred only to *modification*. Italy was supported in this interpreta-

⁸⁴*Comité de l'Afrique française*, Bulletin, Numero de juin, 1894, p. 63; Note: The treaty had been made 25 Miaza 1881 (Ethiopian Calendar), hence Menelik was allowing for five years from date of making as provided by Article XV of the treaty.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, Numero de juillet 1893, p. 8.

⁸⁶Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie* (Title page) quotes Menelik.

⁸⁷Article XVI, provided that either party could ask for modification or changes in the treaty after five years from the date of making.

tion by Germany, England and Austria, and it is without doubt, possible to make such interpretation of it. But Menelik had no idea of being stopped by that interpretation even if Italy had the backing of the Powers.

More than a year passed following Menelik's denunciation of the Treaty of 1889, with Italy apparently withdrawing from Ethiopian frontiers and playing upon the feelings of northern chiefs with whom she had covenanted only a few months before. "Your enemies are my enemies and your friends are my friends". At the same time, she was making a last effort to buy Menelik's submission by furnishing him with munitions with which to subdue these very chiefs before whom she was posing as a friend. If the Italians believed they were exceedingly clever in this effort at duplicity, they must have been chagrined upon learning later that they were not the only ones making use of this device. At the very time when Ras Mangasha was negotiating with the Italians, he and Ras Aloula were making their peace with Menelik.⁸⁸ Mangasha had prostrated himself before Menelik with a stone hanging about his neck begging for forgiveness and for the crown of Tigré. Menelik's courtiers looked upon Mangasha as a traitor to his race. But Menelik, while not promising him the crown of Tigré, let him understand that he might earn it by service to Ethiopia against Italy. On the other hand Ras Aloula, who had never sworn allegiance to Italy except as a follower of Mangasha, was received by Menelik with enthusiasm.

⁸⁸Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 58f.

Therefore, while Italy was consolidating her African position in Europe, Menelik was just as certainly uniting the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians had incorporated into a song the refrain "Of a black snake's bite you may be cured, but from the bite of a white snake you will never recover".⁸⁹ They were being united against white intrigue to separate them.

A new restlessness among the Dervishes in eastern Sudan came to cause both England and Italy some concern. There was considerable discussion as to the need of cooperation between these two countries in a military movement against the Dervishes. Major San Miniatielli had been in Egypt studying the matter with Kitchener.⁹⁰ To be free from Dervish annoyance in case there should be "a raising of the shields of Ethiopia" in the latter part of 1894 or early in 1895 as the better informed Italians believed there would be, Italy had taken possession of Kassala, as had been permitted her in the Protocol of April 15, 1891.⁹¹ Whereupon she received the prompt and happy felicitations of England and Germany.⁹² Italian easy success here spurred the whole nation to a more aggressive attitude in Africa.⁹³ On the crest of this enthusiasm Crispi rode back to power. One of the first of his efforts was to complete the consolidation of Italy's position with Eng-

⁸⁹From Baratieri's *Memorie d'Africa*, cited by Berkeley in *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 61.

⁹⁰*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 360, Nos. 1988, 1989.

⁹¹Note: Baron Blanc, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, feared an Abyssinian attack prepared by French assistance, see, *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 373; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XIII, p. 45, doc. 16; *Ibid.*, p. 48, doc. 25.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 46, doc. 19; p. 47, doc. 21.

⁹³*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 374, No. 1996.


land. In the Protocols of March 24 and of April 15, 1891, Italy and England had fixed fairly satisfactorily the southern and western line of demarcation, but the territory in Somaliland remained unsettled.

Accordingly Sir Francis Clare-Ford, for England and Francesco Crispi for Italy, carrying on negotiations in Rome, concluded an agreement on May 5, 1894, defining their respective "Spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa".⁹⁴ In the published parts of this agreement there was nothing to disturb any European country, though of course on paper it, with the Protocols of March 24, and of April 15, 1891, completely obliterated Ethiopia. That country disappeared from the maps from 1894 to 1896. A striking proof of the completeness with which England recognized the validity of these three agreements is to be found in examining the first and second editions of Sir Edward Hertslet's *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, which were published in 1894 and 1896 respectively with the sanction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.⁹⁵ In these publications the "Italian Sphere" is colored green and extends right across Africa from Eritrea to the Indian Ocean, and the whole area is called *Italian Abyssinia*.

But the part of this agreement that disturbed European capitals was the unpublished part dealing

⁹⁴*State Papers*, Vol. 86, p. 55; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XIII, quater, p. 280, app. XIV, doc. 117; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 951; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XX, p. 803; *Trattati e convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia gli altri stati*, Vol. XIII, p. 337; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, Treaty Series, No. 17, May 1894 (C-7388).

⁹⁵Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 1894 Edition, Vol. I, p. 19 and 1896 Edition, Vol. I, p. 18.



with the region about Harrar. This part, it was agreed, should be kept secret. But like most secrets its existence soon became known. France knew of it as early as June 18, less than two months after its conclusion.⁹⁶ The knowledge of some secret arrangements here greatly disturbed France since she also had a curious treaty with England, concluded in 1888 and kept secret, dealing with this very territory. Then, too, France was now actively concerned in securing this whole block for herself. But her contention will be described more fully in later chapters. Germany also was informed of the existence of this secret treaty and knew rather accurately of its contents.⁹⁷

Italy now had England bound by treaty to her African policy, but still she could not get England's full co-operation in her undertakings there. She sought by every means to have England openly acknowledge their co-operation. Baron Blanc, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his colonial policy, sought to place England under obligation to Italy in Africa, so as to bind her to Italy and bring her into opposition to France. His sending an officer to Cairo to discuss Anglo-Italian co-operation against the Dervishes and his conducting of the negotiations in London leading to the Protocol of May 5, were, he said, "done with the direct object of tying England to Italy in such a fashion that France would no longer be able to separate them".⁹⁸ On De-

⁹⁶Lémonon, *L'Europe et le Politique Britannique*, (1910) Edition, p. 146.

⁹⁷*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 362, No. 1991.

⁹⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 360, No. 1988; *Ibid.*, p. 373, No. 1995.

ember 7, 1894, he proclaimed in the Italian Chamber of Deputies the political solidarity of Italy and England.⁹⁹

It was at this time that England was being bombarded by France and Germany to force the cancellation of parts of the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of May 12, 1894.¹⁰⁰ Then, too, Germany was not so sympathetic with Italy's efforts to keep on friendly terms with England as Italy wished her to be. Crispi deplored Germany's controversy with England over the Anglo-Congolese Treaty as it was a matter of life and death to Italy in the Mediterranean policy that England should be kept friendly to the Triple Alliance.¹⁰¹ But Von Marschall, Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Germany, warned Italy that England was using Italy for England's own benefit in Africa and reminded her that Germany expected Italy not to take part in any colonial policy against Germany.¹⁰²

It was Baron Blanc's purpose to have England consent to the publication of the secret article of the Treaty of May 5, 1894, that he might force an issue between England and France. He knew that there had been some part of the Anglo-French Treaty of 1888 kept secret and he believed that England was growing cold in her love for Italy and perhaps she was flirting with France.¹⁰³ But in spite of the fact that he had plead with her directly and also by way of Ger-

⁹⁹Lémonon, *L'Europe et la politique Britannique*, p. 212. ff.

¹⁰⁰See Chapter IV, p. 167.

¹⁰¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 463, No. 2063.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, p. 369, No. 1994.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 136, No. 1770.

many, England stoutly resisted publication of the secret article of the treaty. Finally annoyed, but yet wishing to continue Italy's relation with England over Ethiopia, Blanc, in a conversation with Bülow, declared, "I shall behave to England like the philosophic husband, who knows all about his wife's wanderings from the straight path, but ignores them before the world, in order to spare her reputation, hoping for better days".¹⁰⁴ Von Bülow, however, did not believe that Italy would be entirely satisfied with mere platonic protestations of affection on England's part.¹⁰⁵

Whether satisfied or not with England's attitude here, Italy was forced to tolerate it. The general European situation did not admit of any other course just then. In Italy it was believed that an alliance was forming among England and France and Russia.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore Italy was desirous of securing from England the right to occupy Zeila on the Gulf of Aden, in a campaign against Ethiopia on the Harrar border.¹⁰⁷ England had refused to admit an Italian agent to Zeila on the grounds that such action would lead to French demands for the same privilege, and this England must avoid.¹⁰⁸ But she was willing to permit the passage of Italian troops through Zeila, if that would aid Italy against Ethiopia.¹⁰⁹ Lord Salisbury had assured Italy that it gave His Majesty's Government great satisfac-

¹⁰⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 139, No. 1771.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 140, No. 1772.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 377, No. 2001.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 380, No. 2003.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 383, No. 2016.

¹⁰⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, bis. p. 397, doc. 515 ff.

tion to be able to offer this proof of friendship and sympathy to Italy. But he requested Italy to obtain French consent, or if Italy wished it, England would make an effort to secure French consent for Italy.¹¹⁰ Italy did not use Zeila. It was clear to her that there was some understanding between England and France in regard to the Harrar neighborhood and that England was not to go the whole way with Italy in Ethiopia. Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, had learned from Lord Kimberly, early in 1895, that England would ally herself with Italy in any *Mediterranean* crisis but would not support her aggressions in Africa.¹¹¹ Hatzfeldt believed that Italy could not depend upon English help in Ethiopia. England had no objection to Italy's designs upon Ethiopia. Rather she favored them. But she did not intend to fight Italy's battles for her. She intended to use Italy and not be used by her.

In the meantime Italy was hearing disturbing rumors of French activities in Ethiopia and of the arrival of a "Russian Scientific Expedition" there, which claimed to be interested in Ethiopian religious matters, but which was entirely too heavily armed to be concerned only with religion.¹¹² Then, too, Ras Mangasha, upon his return from his submission at Menelik's court, had raised a large army. Though he had offered to aid the Italians against the Dervishes, he was

¹¹⁰*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, bis., p. 303, doc. 536, (annesso II, p. 304).

¹¹¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 380, No. 2004.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 384, No. 2007; Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 50.

now suspected of hostile designs.¹¹³ Batha Agos, a local chief, said by Italians to have been influenced by a group of Lazzarists, an anti-Italian sect of French priests, had led a rebellion in which several Italians had been slain.¹¹⁴ These with other threatening movements among the Ethiopians had created considerable uneasiness in Rome.

Thus threatened in Ethiopia by the natives instigated by French and Russian intrigue, Italy had turned to her English friends for support, but found them only lukewarm. Early in 1895, she looked to the other members of the Triple Alliance, but about all she had thus far received from them in her African policy was good wishes with an occasional suggestion to England that Italy expected more support in her African policy than England had accorded her. Crispi especially became exasperated at this apparent desertion by those whom he had felt confident would not only give him a free hand in Ethiopia, but also, in case of need, would come to his aid with military forces. He had complained to the Central Powers that Italy's adherence to the Triple Alliance had cost her heavily and now when she needed aid none could be had. He informed Austria that for years France had let it be known openly that "Italy could have Abyssinia, Tripoli, and Heaven knows what else, if only she would desert the Triple Alliance". But Italy was too honorable to desert her friends. But now he declared, "Italy was being attacked in Abyssinia and was forced to stand by, power-

¹¹³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XIII, bis, p. 11, doc. 7.

¹¹⁴Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 63.

less, and see France proceeding brazenly and unhindered toward her chief goal, the establishment of a North African State".¹¹⁵ He complained so often and so bitterly of the lack of material support from Italy's allies that Baron Patti, the Austrian Ambassador at Rome, wrote his government, "I have already had to listen to Italian lamentings, in every key, that they have been the victims of the Triple Alliance."¹¹⁶

The Italians believed that they were drifting into war with Russia and France over Ethiopia, and toward the close of 1895, they had become so insistent upon assurance of their allies' support that Hohenlohe felt called upon to have Bülow warn Italy that a conflict with Russia and France over Abyssinia created no *casus foederis* for the Triple Alliance.¹¹⁷ "*Der Dreibund is ein pacte conservatoire, Keine Erwerbs-gesellschaft*", said he, and Italy must not expect Germany and Austria to join her in a war over Ethiopia.¹¹⁸ But Italy had already occupied Adowa, with great pomp and little resistance.¹¹⁹ She had put down several rebellions of the lesser chiefs. Reports from Omdurman announced that the Khalifa had dispatched a large force of Dervishes, accompanied by messengers from Menelik, to attack Kassala.¹²⁰ Ras Mangasha, who had already created suspicion of his intent toward Italy, had been called back to Menelik's Court and informed that

¹¹⁵Pribram, *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, Vol. II, p. 104.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹¹⁷*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 229, No. 2765.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 230, No. 2766.

¹¹⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 26, doc. 27.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 67, doc. 112.

he must openly resist Italian aggression. On his way back to Tigre he had crossed Italian territory. Whereupon the Italians had attacked and defeated him, and Baratieri had sent to Rome for reinforcements.¹²¹ In the meantime, Menelik had dispatched Ras Makonnen to aid Ras Mangasha, and in two battles they had driven the Italians behind the fortifications at Macallé where they were forced to capitulate, promising never again to take up arms against Ethiopia.¹²² Insistent reports had it that Menelik and Ras Aloula were advancing northward with large forces.¹²³ Thus Italy was already at war with Ethiopia. Hohenlohe's warning had come too late. Italy felt she must carry on alone.

In the fall of 1895, Italy had her hopes raised for one brief moment, when it was reported, through Mas-sowah, that Menelik had been paralyzed from a stroke of lightning.¹²⁴ But within a few days this report was denied and instead, another report had reached Italian quarters which asserted that the Ethiopians were advancing rapidly toward the Eritrean border.¹²⁵ War seemed inevitable, yet Ras Makonnen, who as the reader will recall had been in Italy and had concluded the Additional Convention of October 1, 1889, desired peace. Time after time he sent messages to the Italian

¹²¹Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, pp. 51-53.

¹²²*Ibid.* Ras Makonnen permitted the garrison to retire with full military honors upon taking this oath. In these battles the Ethiopians had used Hotchkiss, quick firing, long range guns furnished by the French through Jibuti, and they had been taught how to use them effectively by French and Russian officers.

¹²³*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 27, doc. 30.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 45, doc. 49.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 47, doc. 56.

authorities offering to treat for peace.¹²⁶ Ras Makonnen was so anxious that his country and Italy should not go to war and so often sought opportunity to treat for peace that some of his fellow-countrymen accused him of disloyalty to Menelik, but the records would not indicate any grounds for such an accusation.¹²⁷ It is true that time after time he sought peace and plead with the Italians not to force further bloodshed, but at each meeting with an Italian officer to negotiate peace terms, he insisted that, first of all, Italy must withdraw to Asmara and come to terms with Menelik¹²⁸ This, of course, was just what Italy did not intend to do. She intended to force Menelik to accept the Italian version of Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali. Failing this she would reduce Ethiopia to a mere Italian colony.

After several futile attempts of Ras Makonnen to secure agreement upon efforts of peace, Italy finally, January 18, 1896, submitted her terms of peace.¹²⁹

¹²⁶*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 50, doc. 63; p. 66, doc. 111.

¹²⁷There are many instances recorded of different Rases being in communication with Italian officials apparently ready to cast their lot with Italy, and Italians frequently believed them genuine. It is more likely, however, that they were acting with Menelik's knowledge and approval as part of his strategy. Among them Makonnen's efforts seem most sincere. He knew Italy and believed he had friends there. He had a sincere desire for peace. That he was not disloyal at all is shown in his last reply to Italy's effort when he broke off further communication adding, "Where the Emperor bids me, there will I, heroically shed my blood". (See Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 164).

¹²⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 73, doc. 132.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, doc. 202. Note: These terms of peace are so essential to an understanding of the situation that it seems well to attach the Document in full, with a translation, as an appendix to this chapter.

The principal provisions of these terms were the following. If a Negus Negasti should continue to exist, he and his Rases were to acknowledge Italian rule. All Ethiopia was to be an Italian protectorate. No concessions of lands, commerce, industry, railways, *et cetera* were to be granted to the subjects of other foreign nations without Italian approval. The investiture of all Rases was to be approved by Italy. The customs and duties would be regulated by her, and Ethiopian money coined at her mints. No loans should be contracted without Italy's consent but she would not be responsible for any previous debts of the Negus. Italians were to be permitted to buy land. All disputes were to be referred to Rome for settlement. The Negus and Rases would be obliged to join in defense of Italian territory in Africa with all their means and forces when called upon to do so.

These terms were, of course, such as no self-respecting people could accept. Out of eighteen separate conditions only one, the last, left Menelik anything. This provided him with a seat, and indeed, even this was not assured to Menelik. The condition rather indicated otherwise. It read, "The Italian Government will assure to Negus X and to his legitimate successors, the throne". Evidently Negus "X" was to be some other man than Menelik. These terms were to be presented to Menelik immediately after the first great Italian victory in battle. Since no such victory ever occurred, likely they were never presented. If they had been, they of course, would have been promptly rejected. A try of strength was evidently at hand, though

overtures of peace were continuing up to the very eve of the battle of Adowa, less than six weeks later.¹³⁰

In the lull before Adowa, Ras Mangasha took a last try at flirting with England and Italy. He wrote Queen Victoria his respects and requested English aid against Italy. He assured the Queen that he did not recognize Menelik's authority and that he and Teklé Haimonot, King of Gojam, were about to desert Menelik. From England he was informed that "The best proof that the Ras wishes to be friendly with England is that of his agreement with Italy, our friend and ally".¹³¹ Before England's reply could reach him, however, Ras Mangasha had broken into open revolt against Italy and apparently remained loyal to Menelik to the end.

Since there was no possibility that Menelik would accept the hard terms of peace offered him by Crispi, January 18, some new proposition had to be found. Crispi, finding himself without military support in Europe, and with Italian patience ebbing, rapidly weakened. Whereupon he informed Baratieri that he had been authorized by the Council of Ministers, February 8, 1896, to permit peace on Menelik's acceptance of the Treaty of Uccialli and his handing over to Italy

¹³⁰Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 215. Note: These peace overtures of the Ethiopians were thought not sincere by many Europeans but the efforts of Ras Makonnen and Menelik give all evidences of being sincere. The Italian documents reveal them so. Even the Italian negotiators report the sincerity of these men in wanting peace (See *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 100, doc. 206; *Ibid.*, p. 212, doc. 260). But they were not willing to have peace at any cost. Taitu, the Queen, was for war.

¹³¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 113, doc. 239; *Ibid.*, p. 144, doc. 324.

the territory she had occupied in August, 1895.¹³² But this was just what Menelik had refused to do back in 1890. He had not yet felt the necessity to change his mind and he countered this proposal by stipulating that Italy must give up all territory taken during this struggle and change radically the Treaty of Ucciali. To Menelik's counter proposal Baratieri moved his army up close to Adowa and replied February 13, 1896, that it "was impossible to accept his terms and he would not discuss them further."¹³³ The negotiations must be considered ended and each of us remains free in his action".¹³⁴

There followed several days more of inaction by Italy, during which time Menelik's forces were concentrating upon Adowa. The Italian Government, February 22, appointed General Baldissera to the command of the Italian forces, though they did not so inform Baratieri then in command. This delay gave time for Italian scouts to get some idea of Menelik's forces, which they reported to consist of "probably eighty thousand rifles and an indefinite number of quadrupeds".¹³⁵ It also gave opportunity to Italy to make another last effort at peace. Baron Blanc now weakened further—much further—and proposed for peace negotiations that Italy should make but two demands: first, that Menelik should agree never to cede any ter-

¹³²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 122, doc. 262.

¹³³*Ibid.*, p. 122, doc. 264.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 126, doc. 275.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 125, doc. 271. In addition to the 80,000 rifles there were many men armed with spears and many without arms, who were to pick up the rifles of fallen comrades and "carry on"

ritory to any other Power and never permit any other Power to secure Ethiopia as a protectorate; second, that Italy still be permitted to represent Ethiopia in the Brussels Conference¹³⁶ It will be seen at once what a great weakening in demands on Italy's part had taken place since January 18. The explanations of this great change in about six weeks time are to be found in Italy's awakening consciousness of Menelik's strength and her own weakness and the desire to appear at Brussels as though she were still Ethiopia's protector and by all means to prevent any other European Power from taking over Ethiopia. If *she* could not *protect* Ethiopia neither should France nor Russia.

Apparently these terms were never offered to Menelik. At least nothing came of them and Italian inactivity with but small engagements usually ending in Italian defeat, continued. Finally, February 25, Crispi, exasperated with delay, telegraphed his General in charge of the Italian forces in Africa.

This is a military phthisis, not war . . . a waste of heroism, without any corresponding success . . . It is clear to me that there is no fundamental plan in this campaign, and I should like one to be formulated. We are ready for any sacrifice in order to save the honor of the army and the prestige of the Monarchy.¹³⁷

General Baratieri understood that Rome wished action. Though he probably opposed it himself, after calling a council of his officers, he came to a decision, February 29, to attack the Ethiopians.¹³⁸ Accordingly early the next morning, Saturday, March 1, 1896, the fate-

¹³⁶*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 141.

¹³⁷Berkeley, *The Campaign of Adowa*, p. 256.

¹³⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 147, doc. 330, and doc. 331.

ful battle of Adowa was begun.¹³⁹ From about 6 o'clock A. M. until 3 P. M. there was terrific fighting on both sides when what was left of the Italian army was thrown into headlong flight.

The results were utterly disastrous to Italian prestige in Africa and to Crispi's government in Italy. Fortunately for Italian control in Eritrea, the Ethiopians did not follow up their advantage. It was unfortunate also for the Ethiopians for by so doing they might have regained a much needed outlet to the sea. When news of the overwhelming defeat of the Italian army at the hands of Menelik reached Rome, consternation was everywhere evident. Excitement reigned throughout Italy. Hurried councils were called in Rome. By King's decree of March 3, General Baratieri was removed from the governorship of Eritrea, and General Baldissera, who had been named for the place some time before, took command in his stead.¹⁴⁰ Umberto proposed to reinforce his African forces by 40,000 men but he never did.¹⁴¹ Italy was in no mood to permit further sacrifice to this cause.

There were diplomatic discussions at the European capitals. Germany complained to England that England had not come to *Italy's aid in her predicament*.¹⁴² Salisbury replied that if the British Government should propose to lend Italy financial aid the English bankers would protest and any steps taken to aid her otherwise

¹³⁹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, p. 149, doc. 336.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 151, doc. 337.

¹⁴¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 234, No. 2769.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 239, No. 2774.

would provoke an Abyssinian attack on Zeila.¹⁴³ The Italian ambassador at London, Ferrero, in urging German diplomatic support from Hatzfeldt, declared that he expected no help from England, but he hoped the English would divert the Dervishes with an expedition in Egypt by which they could save Kassala.¹⁴⁴ In the hope that England would decide to move up the Nile, Ferrero informed London that Menelik and the Dervishes were both moving to Kassala.¹⁴⁵ In Cairo also, both Italian and German influence was brought to bear upon the English officials in Egypt. Count von Metternich, German Consul at Cairo, reported to Hohenlohe that he had discussed the "Job's news from Abyssinia" with Lord Cromer. "When he expressed regret at the Italian defeat, I told him without circumlocution that England ought to have given him help a long time ago (Here the Kaiser wrote 'Good'). His answer was evasive." Kitchener favored English support of Italy but feared the government at London would oppose it. To him Matternich replied,

With the brusque frankness, which is sometimes successful in ones dealing with Englishmen, that the British Article of faith, forbidding a man to help a friend in need under any circumstances, was carried so far apparently that an Englishman would rather suffer loss himself than go to the help of another.¹⁴⁶

But on March 12, Hatzfeldt could report to Berlin that England had decided to undertake an expedition to

¹⁴³*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 239, No. 2774.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 240, No. 2776.

¹⁴⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, ter p. 15, doc. 20.

¹⁴⁶*German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, pp. 426, 427.

Dongola to relieve the pressure upon the Italians in Eritrea.¹⁴⁷

To save the situation at home Crispi's cabinet met March 8, and directed General Baldissera to treat with Menelik for peace upon the best terms possible.¹⁴⁸ Baldissera replied a few days later that he would proceed to do so.

Two days after communicating its desires to Baldissera, March 10, Crispi's government fell and was succeeded by that of Marquis de Rudini.¹⁴⁹ The Rudini government felt the necessity of securing peace, to which they set themselves at once. These proceedings will be described in a later chapter dealing with the general settlements.

Thus Italy, having depended too much upon active military support from the other members of the Triple Alliance and England, found herself ill prepared to face alone the determined will to independence of Menelik and his warriors, supported by the French government, French munition makers, and individual Russians. Italy lost all hopes of securing the "Pawn" for herself at Adowa, March 1, 1896, and for the time being dropped out of the scene. Only France and England remained in the race to face each other in Ethiopia and the Nile valley. Their activities were carried on both from the east, through Ethiopia, and from the west by way of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. Between

¹⁴⁷*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 241, No. 2777; Sir George Arthur, *Life of Kitchener*, Vol. I, p. 186; Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 83.

¹⁴⁸*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, ter p. 8, doc. 9.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 14, doc. 18.

1896 and 1898 there are the two fields of activities to be observed. Let us turn first to the west to trace the course of events and then return to Ethiopia in an effort to pick up again the devious lines of European diplomacy in the struggle between England and France for dominant influence at the Court of "The Lion of the Tribe of Judah".

APPENDIX

CONDITIONS OF PEACE OFFERED BY ITALY
ON JANUARY 18, 1896

A telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the Governor of Eritrea.

Doc. Dip. XXIII, Legis. XIX, Primo Sess. (1895-96)
p. 98, doc. 202.

Condizioni De Pace

L'annunziati presenza di Menelik nel campo delle operazioni militari, obbliga a prevedere il caso in cui, per fatti di guerra o per negoziati, la continuazione dell'esistenza di un negus, sia esso Menelik o altri, si presenti come la soluzione piu practica, qualunque preferenza si possa avere in massima per una Etiopia subdivisa soto tanti ras, pari fra loro, e tutti egualmente a noi soggetti. In vista della eventualae opportunita di lasciar sussistere la campagne cosi detta imperiale, sono state preparate le seguenti basi per condizioni di pace da ottenersi in tutto o in parte.

Nel caso, invece, di accordi coi suoi soli ras, le condizioni stesse potranno trovare quelle applicazioni piu date ai dominii di ciascuno di essi, che rispondano il piu possibile allo spirito delle condizioni stesse.

Desideratum

1. Il negus e tutti i ras capi di provincie riconoscono l'intero Tigre come territorio italiano sottoposto alla sola diretta sovranità del Re d'Italia, e ciò fino ad Ascianghi e il corso del Tacazzé.

2. Il negus e tutti i ras riconoscono l'Etiopia, all'infuori del Tigré, e compreso l'Harrar e tutte le altre dipendenze come sottoposta al protettorato dell'Italia e all'alta sovranita del Re Umberto e suoi successori.

3. Il Governo italiano rappresentera l'Etiopia in

tutte le sue relazioni con l'estero. Il residente generale italiano sarà incaricato delle relazioni con gli agenti delle potenze estere. Ogni questione relativa a forestieri in Etiopia sarà trattata per suo mezzo. Agli agenti diplomatici o consolari del Re d'Italia all'estero sarà affidata la protezione dei sudditi e degli interessi dell'Etiopia.

4. Il negus ed i ras capi di provincie non potranno avere truppe senonché nel numero e della qualità che siano dall'Italia consentite.

5. Il negus ed i ras non potranno fare validamente concessioni di sorta a sudditi di altri Stati, né di proprietà territoriale, né di monopoli quali si siano, né di esercizio d'industrie o di commerci, né di servizi postali o telegrafici, né di ferrovie, né di miniere senza il consenso del Governo italiano.

6. Il re d'Italia avrà un residente generale stabile presso il negus e dei residenti presso quei ras capi di provincie dove lo ritenga conveniente. Questi residenti potranno avere una forza armata per loro scorta.

7. La nomine e investire dei ras capi di provincie dovranno essere approvate dell'Italia.

8. Il negus e i ras dovranno sempre sfrattare dai loro territori qualunque suddito estero, quando venga loro intimato di farlo dal Governo italiano.

9. L'Italia potrà sola regolare il regime doganale dell'Etiopia, sia di fronte agl'italiano e ai sudditi italiani della Colonia Eritrea, sia di fronte ai sudditi di terzi Stati.

10. Gl'italiani e i sudditi italiani della Colonia Eritrea come pure tutti gli altri forestieri abitanti o di passaggio dell'Etiopia dipendranno dalla sola giurisdizione civile e penale del residente generale italiano e dei suoi delegati.

11. Il negus ed i ras capi di provincie non potranno

contrarre alcun prestiti senza l'autorizzazione del Governo italiano.

12. Il negus potrà far coniare monete nella sola zecca italiana.

13. Il Governo italiano non assume alcuna responsabilità per effetto degli impegni debiti, o concessioni che il negus o i ras abbiano potuto sottoscrivere chicchessia prima della firma del presente atto.

14. Gl'italiani e i sudditi italiani della Colonia Eritrea potranno acquistare e possedere proprietà immobiliari in tutta l'Etiopia.

15. Il negus e i ras capi di provincie si obbligano e concorrere alla difesa della Colonia Eritrea con tutti i loro mezzi e tutte le loro forze quando ne vengano richiesti dal governatore.

16. Il Governo italiano promuoverà in Etiopia la viabilità, le comunicazioni telegrafiche, il commercio e l'agricoltura, l'educazione dei giovani notabili, l'organizzazione del sistema tributario e doganale, e tutto quanto possa contribuire allo sviluppo, economico e civile del paese.

17. Al Governo italiano verranno deferite tutte le contese tra il negus ed i ras, e tra i diversi ras e capi indigeni. Nel caso di conflitti armati che il Governo italiano riconosca inevitabili, e di ricorso all'aiuto del Governo dell'Eritrea, il concorso armato verrà dato per mezzo di truppe coloniali a spese del capo richiedente.

18. Il Governo italiano assicura al negus X e ai suoi legittimi successori il trono

(The Introduction to the Treaty, as you will see, was not translated but all the provisions of the treaty are here.)

1. The Emperor and all his Rases, his provincial heads, shall recognize the entire Tigré as an Italian

territory, under the sole sovereignty of the King of Italy and it shall extend as far as Ascianghi and the course of the river Tacazze.

2. The Emperor and all his Rases, his provincial heads, shall recognize Ethiopia outside Tigré as well as Harrar and all of its dependencies as under the protectorship of King Umberto of Italy and any of his successors.

3. The Italian government shall represent Ethiopia in its relations with other powers. The residing Italian general shall be responsible for relations with representatives of the foreign powers. Each question relative to foreigners in Ethiopia shall be treated through its power. To the diplomatic and consulatory agents of the king of Italy shall be intrusted the protection of the subjects and interests of Ethiopia in the foreign fields.

4. The Emperor and the Rases, his provincial heads, shall not have troops exceeding the number and quality that Italy shall designate.

5. The Emperor and the Rases, his provincial heads, shall not validly make any concessions whatever to the subjects of others states, neither of territorial concessions, nor of any monopoly whatever they may be, nor for the development of an industry, nor of commerce, nor of postal or telegraphic services, nor of railroads, nor of mines, without the consent of the Italian government.

6. The king of Italy shall have a permanent ambassador at the court of the Empire, and representatives to each of the Rases, the provincial heads, when necessary. These representatives may have an armed force for their protection.

7. The nomination and seating of the Rases, the provincial heads, shall be by the approval of Italy.

8. The Emperor and the Rases shall always expel

from their territory any foreigner when so desired by the Italian government.

9. Italy alone shall regulate the customs and tariffs of Ethiopia, be they of Italian, or of Italian subjects of the colony of Eritrea, or be they subjects of foreign states.

10. The Italians and subject Italians of the colony of Eritrea as well as other foreign subjects or tourists in Ethiopia shall depend only on the civil and penal jurisdiction of the residing Italian ambassador and of his delegate.

11. The Emperor and the Rases, his provincial heads, shall not contract any loans without the consent of the Italian government.

12. The Emperor shall coin money only in the Italian mint.

13. The Italian government shall not assume any responsibility through the effect of any entanglements, debts, and concessions that the Emperor and his provincial heads have already contracted with anyone whomsoever it may be before the signing of this pact.

14. The Italians and Italian subjects in the colony of Eritrea may acquire and possess non-moveable property in any part of Ethiopia.

15. The Emperor and his Rases, the provincial heads, shall be obliged to rally to the defense of the colony of Eritrea with all of their means and all of their troops when such a request is asked by the government.

16. The Italian government shall promote and protect in Ethiopia the communication by telegraph, commerce and agriculture, the education of the young notables, the organization of the taxing and tariff systems, and contribute everything possible toward the economic and civil development of the country.

17. The Italian government shall be informed of all disputes between the Emperor and the Rases, and between the Rases, the provincial heads, and the petty officers. In case of an armed combat that the Italian government sees inevitable, they shall ask aid of the governor of Eritrea, and the armed guard shall be given as a colonial troop, the expense shall be charged up to the one who called for them.

18. The Italian government insures to the Emperor "X" and his successors, the throne

CHAPTER IV

ENGLAND AND FRANCE AT CROSS PURPOSES—FASHODA

While England and Italy were thus disposing of Ethiopia between themselves, it must not be supposed that France was sitting idly by as merely an interested on-looker; far from it. As has been shown, France was already in possession of the Ethiopian port of Jibuti, just opposite Aden, in what has come to be known as French Somaliland. In 1889 Brazza, by stealing a march on Stanley, had claimed for France the territory which has come to be known as the French Congo on the west coast of Africa, just north of the Congo River. These two points, with Algeria on the Mediterranean, formed a triangle and provided points of departure from which France might proceed to gain an Empire in Northern Africa. Jibuti and the Congo especially offered opportunity for France to grasp the pawn in Ethiopia and at the same time to cut across Cecil Rhodes' Cape-to-Cairo scheme and thus stop the forward march of her most active rival in the race for the black man's country. Accordingly, she had become active in both east and west. When she discovered that Italy was to meet with opposition from Menelik, she proceeded to put all possible obstacles in the way of that country to prevent its seizure of Ethiopia and at the same time she sought to ingratiate herself with Menelik, in the hope that France might be substituted for Italy in control there.

In addition to her activities from the east, she

proceeded to extend her territory from the west. It will be recalled, that, in describing the surroundings of Ethiopia attention was called to the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of May 12, 1894.¹ This was an effort to show how, in exchange for certain territories along the west bank of the Upper White Nile, England had secured the lease of a corridor twenty-five kilometers wide, extending from the northern part of Lake Tanganyika to Lake Albert Edward, and also, the recognition, on the part of Leopold II, of the Anglo-German "Spheres of Influence" Treaty of 1890. The reader will also recall that the last treaty of partition of Ethiopia between Italy and England had been signed by these two countries May 5, 1894.² It is from the signing of these two treaties that France speeds up her activities in the west.

It is true that as early as 1890, De Brazza, the Governor of the French Congo, had ordered Liotard to occupy the country along the Ubanghi River and to the east with an open port on the Nile.³ Upon the initiation of M. Etienne in 1892 there was appropriated 300,000 francs to send a mission into the Upper Ubanghi, but, because of lack of interest in that region at that time, the credit had never been used.⁴ Since France was so much occupied with other pressing questions, from 1886 to 1892 there was a period of stag-

¹*State Papers*. Vol. 86, pp. 19-21; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, No. 163, p. 578ff; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, Treaty Series No. 15, May 1894 (C-7358); de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XX, p. 805.

²Chapter III, p. 138.

³Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique*, p. 72.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 71f.

nation in colonial expansion. In 1893, that he might revive the Egyptian question for further discussion with England, President Carnot had suggested that it would be necessary for France to occupy some point within Egyptian territory.⁵ Thus far, however, it seems clear that France had been thinking only in terms of extension of French territory in the Ubanghi country and in re-opening discussion over the old Egyptian question.

France was still smarting under the sting of self-reproach for having so ingloriously withdrawn from Egypt and thus having allowed England to appropriate that rich country, which their own Napoleon had called the most valuable on earth.⁶ But with the signing of the Anglo-Italian and the Anglo-Congolese treaties, both within one week, the French-African horizon began to expand with amazing rapidity.

Her colonial officers and functionaires were most enthusiastic, and would have liked to see the French flag floating over the whole of Africa; nor did the government at Paris allow any opposition to damp its spirit of enterprise.⁷

No doubt this quotation should be accepted as a bit of Italian exuberance prompted somewhat by Italy's own desires. There were probably some corners in Africa to which the fondest dreams of Frenchmen had not yet reached. However it is certain that the French, by this time, were making great claims for themselves in Africa.⁸

Early in 1895 there appeared a map of Africa,

⁵E. Velay, *Les rivalités franco-anglaises en Egypte*, p. 163, cited by M. G. Giffen, *Fashoda*, p. 14.

⁶Rose, *Life of Napoleon*, Vol. IX, p. 356, cited by Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, title page.

⁷*Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Vol. III, p. 68.

⁸A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, p. 71 ff.

which must have been prepared very soon after the signing of these two English treaties had become known in France. This map, called the *Carte generale des possessions francaises en Afrique au premier janvier, 1895*, was published by Augustin Challamel (Librarie Coloniale, 5 rue Jacob, Paris), by order of the Colonial office, and was intended for distribution among the members of the French Chamber of Deputies.⁹ It indicated the countries in Africa already under French control, in one shade of pink and those parts over which France intended to secure control, in another shade of pink. All the balance of Africa was in white. These two claims together included a great band of territory extending across Africa from east to west and including nearly all of the continent north of Lake Victoria except the coast line in spots. It included all of Ethiopia and the Upper Nile valley. Italy had good reason to be disturbed over this French claim, since she too, had designs upon the eastern part of this territory and claimed it as her very own protectorate. Seeing French purposes and remembering Tunis, the Italians hastened to assert their claims to the "protection" of Ethiopia.

It is with England and France, however, that we have to do in this western approach to Ethiopia. This extensive claim of France, of course, ran at right angles and directly counter to those of England, already proclaimed by such colonial imperialists as Cecil Rhodes in South Africa and Joseph Chamberlain and others in London, as well as to the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and 1894. It was for the very purpose of securing a

⁹*Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Vol. III, p. 71 ff.

right of way for the Cape-to-Cairo route through the Corridor in the Congo and over the uplands of Ethiopia and to secure for England assurance of control of the water supply of the whole Nile basin, that Great Britain had sought to conclude these recent treaties. The Belgian and English press on May 12 had published the terms of the Anglo-Congolese agreement, and it now became France's purpose to cut across this scheme.¹⁰

According to Englishmen, France was up to her old tricks in an effort to cut off a rival's hinterland.

It has been the systematic policy of France, when neighbors, equally energetic, have anticipated her in the acquisition of desirable portions of the Dark Continent to endeavor to cut off their hinterland and so to gain control of the rivers upon which the prosperity of the lower territories largely depends. Colonization by this dubious method was attempted to the prejudice of Great Britain in the case of Lagos, Gambia and the Gold Coast, to that of Spain in the case of Morocco, and to that of Italy in the case of Tripoli. In 1897 it was attempted by the same Power in relation to Egypt. No longer able, owing to her own want of decision and foresight, to enter the Nile region by the front door, France tried to enter from the rear; and she did this as part of a deliberate design of obtaining control of the Nile and the very source of Egypt's life.¹¹

In the same spirit, according to Frenchmen, England had staked out for herself a vast part of Africa which she had never seen and to which she had no just claim. To Frenchmen it was a case of "first come first served" and they proposed to be "first come". No doubt they were both right.

There were at least three possible points of attack to sever thus the English connections. They were to

¹⁰Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 73.

¹¹Ward and Gooch, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, p. 250.

secure control of Ethiopia, to take possession of the Upper Nile valley, and to prevent England from taking possession of the twenty-five kilometer corridor she had just secured from the Belgian Congo. France chose all three. She began to deal with Menelik to get his goodwill and to prevent Italy, then an ally with England, in her African policy, from securing control of Ethiopia; she sent expeditions into the Bahr-el-Ghazal country to explore and possess it as far as the Nile; and she began a determined diplomatic battle in Europe to force England and Leopold to cancel the Anglo-Congolese treaty of May 12, 1894. This last action was the most pressing.

Apparently it was not the purpose of France to possess for herself this corridor lying between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert Edward; she simply wished to compel England to return it to the Congo Free State. But, from her action later, it was evidently her purpose to take possession of the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Nile territory, which England had leased to Leopold in the deal of May 12.

Accordingly, the French diplomats set to work in Paris, with London and Brussels, to have the treaty of May 12, 1894, annulled, at least those parts of it which seemed to interfere with French aspirations. There were two articles in this treaty to which France objected strenuously. In Article II, England granted to the Belgian Congo a lease on the Bahr-el-Ghazal and a corridor twenty-five kilometers in width extending from Congo territory to Lake Albert Edward; and in Article III, Leopold had granted England a similar lease on

the inter-lake corridor described above. By the first, when read in connection with the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and 1894, France saw she was to be stopped completely from the Nile valley. Both this and the Italian treaties were condemned with an outburst of indignation in Paris. In the French Parliament, M. Etienne led the attack. On June 7, 1894, he declared,

Today we are submitting to affronts and encroachments of the Congo Free State; but, above all, we have been too long exposed to the opposition, the continual hostility of the British Government . . . We have built up, and we intend to preserve and develop, a colonial empire in order to insure the future of our country in the new continents, in order to reserve there, an outlet for our products (*un débouché à nos marchandises*) and to find there raw materials for our industries. But, if after the effort we have made, after the expenditure already made by us in men and treasure, we are to see all our efforts wasted one day, no, gentlemen, it would be better to renounce at once all colonial empire.¹²

The French Government took the position that the Congo Free State could not enter into any such agreement as that indicated by the Anglo-Congolese treaty of 1894. She contended that Article II of this treaty infringed upon the rights of the Sultan of Turkey and of the Khedive of Egypt.¹³ The provisions there were incompatible alike to *firmans* relating to Egypt and with international acts by which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been secured. Again, the Congo Free State as a neutral state, constituted by a conventional Act of the Powers, and confined within definite frontiers, could not of its own will extend be-

¹²Woolf, *Empire and Commerce*, p. 185, quotes Etienne, *Son Oeuvre Coloniale, Algerienne et Politique*.

¹³Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 75; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII Egypt 2 (1898) Appendix, doc. 1.

yond the boundaries fixed for it with other Powers, without the assent of the Powers. To do so would be contrary to the General Act of Berlin (1885), which was especially binding upon the Powers who were signers of this Act. France argued, too, that this treaty was in opposition to "African international law", which required that in order to establish a claim to any African territory there must be an *effective occupation* of the territory over which rights are claimed. Certainly England could not claim to have had any sort of effective occupation of the territory she had presumed to barter to the Congo Free State. With these and many other minor arguments, the French sought to break down English resistance to their demands that Article II should be withdrawn.¹⁴

As far as Article III was concerned, France was not so much affected except, that it provided a right of way for Cecil Rhodes' Cape-to-Cairo railway and brought Ethiopia and the Nile Basin that much nearer England's grasp. To it, however, the French objected on the grounds that its provisions were contrary to the principle of equal treatment set forth in Article V of the General Act of Berlin, and incompatible with the preferential right of France which had been recognized by the Congo State in an agreement of 1887.¹⁵ One week later Lord Kimberly demolished these arguments of M. Hanotaux to the complete satisfaction of English-

¹⁴*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII (1899), Egypt 2 (1898), pp. 13, 14.

¹⁵*Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Congo, 1884-1887*; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 567.

men. He informed the French that their elaborate arguments, when reduced to proper form, were but three and he proceeded to so reduce them. They were: first, that the Agreement (Anglo-Congolese) was in contravention of the rights of the Sultan and the Khedive in the provinces of the Upper Nile; second, that it was inconsistent with the Convention's limitations placed on the action of the Congo State as a neutral State under the Act of Berlin in 1885; and third, that it was beyond the competence of Great Britain to grant a lease to another Power, of territory which she herself had never effectively occupied.

Having thus stated the French arguments to suit himself, the Foreign Minister proceeded to meet them, and, one must agree, in a rather convincing way so far as the French were concerned. He declared that neither England nor the Congo State had any intention of ignoring the claims of the Sultan and the Khedive upon this territory. On the contrary, by exchange of notes on the day of signing the objectionable treaty, they had expressly stated the recognition of these claims.¹⁶ But if France wished to discuss in what way these rights might be further safeguarded, England was ready to discuss the matter with France as she had already done with Turkey. However, Hanotaux' allusion to the international guarantee of the Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Paris 1856) applied only to the Ottoman Empire as it was in 1856. It was not intended to include, in this guarantee of 1856, any new territory that the Turks

¹⁶*State Papers*, Vol. 86, pp. 19-21; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Vol. II, p. 580 f.

might acquire in the future. The Egyptian claim to the Upper Nile had been acquired since the international guarantee had been made, therefore, even if England and the Congo had not agreed to respect the claims of the Sultan and the Khedive, they would not have done violence to any international agreement. But England would waive this point. She was ready to give guarantees.

He denied the second point in the French contention. There was nothing in the Act of Berlin to prevent a neutral state from extending its territory, so long as it continued to fulfill the duties which neutrality required. He cited the agreement of April 29, 1887 between the Congo State and France by which the Congo had extended its territory considerably and nobody objected. Why should France object now if the Congo wished to extend its territory still farther by agreement with another state?

For the third objection Lord Kimberly did not understand what was meant by the expression "effective occupation". He claimed it was a vague and relative term. The question might be asked of any of the European states claiming territory in Africa. None of them had fully occupied their claims. Certainly France had not done so. He questioned whether the Congo State, as a neutral, had any right to grant France by treaty any right of preference as she had done in 1884. He further maintained that this preferential treatment treaty had been made with the International Association—the government of the Congo which had preceded the present Congo Free State—and, therefore,

was hardly binding upon any other states now.¹⁷

France now claimed that this new Anglo-Congolese treaty violated in most complete fashion the Franco-Congolese convention of 1887.¹⁸ She complained that by the agreement of 1890 England and Germany had reserved all the Nile valley to themselves and now proposed to ignore any other claims to a part of it.¹⁹ M. Hanotaux, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs, "exposed this double dealing with great force", says Darcy, when he declared, in the Chamber the same day in which M. Etienne delivered himself of the speech from which the quotation given above was taken, that, "This treaty placed the Free State in a position of conflict, I hope, peaceful, but certainly a position of conflict with the Powers who gave their signature to its creation; it is in formal contradiction with the public law of Africa".²⁰ That France might possess her rights, M. Hanotaux declared that if the Chamber would vote sufficient funds, an officer to command an expedition would leave France by the next boat. Upon request, the Chamber unanimously voted a credit of 1,800,000 francs in order to take the necessary steps on the Ubanghi and in the French Congo, and a large military expedition under Colonel Monteil was sent into the Ubanghi country with orders to proceed to the Nile.²¹ The next day the British press was greatly dis-

¹⁷*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898) ap., p. 15.

¹⁸Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 384.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 382.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 385; Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 76.

²¹White, *Expansion of Egypt*, p. 418 (note).

turbed. Lord Dufferin, the English Ambassador in Paris, hurried to the Quai d'Orsay and protested that such action amounted to an ultimatum.²²

To add to the consternation of the French Government on June 18, 1894, only a few weeks after the signing of the disturbing treaties, England proclaimed a protectorate over Uganda.²³ Thus France found herself face to face with a *fait accompli*. Now, on paper at least, England claimed control over the territory reaching from the Cape to the Mediterranean. This new development caused France to redouble her efforts.

To strengthen the French position, Germany joined with a protest against the Anglo-Congolese arrangement, claiming that the proposed lease of the corridor between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert Edward for the Cape to Cairo railway was in violation of the Congo treaty with Germany in 1884, as well as of the spirit of the Anglo-German agreement of 1890.²⁴ Then too, Germany feared being surrounded in her East African Protectorate by English territory which would not be desirable for trade.²⁵ She also threatened to reopen the Egyptian question should England refuse prompt withdrawal of the objectionable Article. Baron Von Marschall, of the German Foreign Office, June 15, directed Hatzfeldt in London to say to the British government that

²²*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898), ap. 2, p. 15, for British arguments.

²³*State Papers*, Vol. 86, p. 132; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. I, p. 395.

²⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 442 f, No. 2043; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XXI, p. 531 ff.

²⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 433, No. 2037.

Withdrawal of the Agreement of May 12, and without delay, is the only way to avoid complicating the European situation. England will learn that she cannot treat us as she chooses and it will give her reason to prefer our friendship to our ill-will. We are continuing to press King Leopold to withdraw from the treaty. If this fails because he is hoping that England will support him, we must refuse to be responsible if the Egyptian question is raised, and if a conference includes it in its program. Compensations will not remove the difficulty for us; what England would have to sacrifice would be very considerable.²⁶

Whereupon, at the request of Leopold II, England agreed to the withdrawal of the objectionable Article III. Thus England gave up the corridor across the Belgian Congo and no longer held claims to a complete right of way across the continent. She signed with Leopold, on June 22, 1894, the following withdrawal:

In compliance with the request made by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Sovereign of the Independent state of the Congo, that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty will consent to the withdrawal of Article III of the agreement of the 12th of May 1894, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, agree that the said article be withdrawn.²⁷

Article III was withdrawn. The discussion had been vigorous on both sides. Threats of war were in the air, sometimes verbose on the one side, sometimes constrained and embarrassed on the other, a cause of bad intent. Different methods and different languages gave trouble. Wrote Hanotaux,

²⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 454.

²⁷Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 584; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, Treaty Series No. 20, (1894) (c-7549); de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XX, p. 809; Note: The correspondence over this Article may be found in *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, Africa 5, pp. 1-8; *Deutscher Reichs-und Staats Anzeiger*, Juli 19, 1894; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XXI, pp. 531, 676.

C'est la catagoric verbal qui n'est pas la meme. Le negociateur anglais est solide d'aplomb et plein de sens il est extremement prudent et visiblement tenu de cour par la chaine du Foreign Office. La marche du negociateur francais est plus capricieuse, parce qu'il cherche les raisons generales. . . . Le negociateur francais veut convaincre, tandis que le negociateur anglais se contente di vaincre.²⁸

In spite of the heated discussion, one wonders why England withdrew so promptly. That is not her usual procedure. In colonial matters especially, Great Britain has usually come away with the earth. Why then did she give up this corridor between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert Edward after little more than a month of diplomatic discussion? There are several plausible reasons. First of all, France offered vigorous and determined resistance. War could have come from further discussion. The imperialistic group in France, led by such aggressive men as M. Etienne, Hanotaux, Deloncle, and Delcassé, were determined that England should withdraw. Then too, Germany had joined in the protest. Relations between England and Germany had been fairly friendly and the Triple Alliance had been careful to provide for good relations with England. Appended to the treaty of 1882, there was a stipulation that the provisions of the treaty were not directed against England. Again, in the renewal of the Alliance in 1891, the signers recorded the wish that England might join them.²⁹ However, the first of these occasions was during the ascendancy of Bismarck and before Germany had become interested in colonies. Now the Kaiser had taken things into his own hands and Ger-

²⁸Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 85.

²⁹Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, Vol. I, pp. 69, 161.

many had become active in expansion. Moreover, Germany was right in her demands, and when Leopold was won over to the German view England agreed to the withdrawal of the offending article. Then too, one must give England credit for seeing that this was the right thing to do as well as the expedient move at the time.

Elated, but not satisfied with this withdrawal, the French — Louis Napoleon-like at Ems — proceeded to follow up their gains, which were hailed in Paris as a great victory for French diplomacy. They attempted to secure the withdrawal of Article II as well. In this they were not completely successful. This was the article dealing with the Bahr-el-Ghazal country, which England had leased to Leopold in exchange for the Congo corridor. Here Germany was not concerned. She and England had provided for this territory in 1890. France, therefore, could not secure England's consent to the withdrawal of Article II. She did, however, proceed to nullify it, as she believed, in securing an agreement from Leopold, August, 1894, that he would never take possession, in any way, of the territory thus leased to him by England.³⁰

There was great rejoicing in Paris over the outcome of these efforts. Here the French Diplomats, by taking a firm stand, had scored heavily against France's greatest colonial rival and had checked her triumphant

³⁰Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 569 f; *Documents Diplomatiques* (1881-1898) Affairs du Congo, No. 16, p. 175; *Journal officiel de la République française*, du 17 janvier 1896; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XX, p. 702, and t. XXI, p. 674.

march through Africa. The way to the Nile seemed open to the French. Now was the time to make good their claim to a great French Empire, extending right across Africa from east to west, from the Congo to Somaliland. M. Deloncle, speaking in the Chamber on February 28, 1895, expressed the French feeling when he declared that the French had thus opened for themselves access to the Nile, and that though, in deference to Egypt and Turkey, France should not establish herself there, she had forever shattered the English dream of possessing the whole of the Upper Nile.³¹

But the British now claimed that since Leopold had renounced all claim to the Bahr-el-Ghazal country that England had leased to him, it now naturally reverted to England; that Leopold's renunciation had in no way affected the position of France in western Africa.³² Prior to 1894, France had insisted that only the Sultan and the Khedive possessed right of sovereignty in the Sudan.³³ Now she abandoned that position and came more and more to look upon this territory as the prize of that state which should first possess it. This new position placed France as an avowed rival to England for this disputed territory. As long as France had little hope of getting it herself and England seemed bound to have it, France argued that it belonged to the Sultan and the Khedive, but when she saw an opportunity of possessing it, she argued and acted as though

³¹Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 388.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 396 (note). Although Leopold thus renounced this territory, he later laid claim to it but too late.

³³Ward and Gooch, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, p. 250; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CVII, Egypt 2 (1898) Appendix, Doc. 1.

it was the prize of the first European arrival. Darcy declares that August 14, 1894, was the high point in the history of English-French rivalry in the Upper Nile.³⁴ It was now clear to everybody that France and England had taken open positions face to face.

By the Franco-Congolese arrangement of August 14, 1894, Leopold II had agreed to renounce all occupation permitted him in the Anglo-Congolese trade of May 12 and to exercise in the future, no political influences in the Bahr-el-Ghazal and on the Upper Nile. Here, then, we have a peculiar situation. Leopold declared to France that he would have nothing to do with a bit of African territory, bartered to him by England, who never had owned it. The Bahr-el-Ghazal was territory which all concerned except the natives and Arabs had agreed belonged to the Ottoman Empire, but now it was actually under the control, if any one controlled it, of the Mahdists, who themselves were intruders. There had been all this bartering, this fiery diplomacy, and these war-like movements by three or four European states, over something to which not one of them, in any sense of the word, had a claim, with no thought of consulting the owners other than to give them a demonstration of the "culture of civilization".

Moreover, France did not stop with the success of getting Leopold to stay out and the mere hope of having upset forever England's dreams in the Upper Nile. She proceeded to take possession herself. Elated

³⁴Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 387. "*Dans l'histoire de la rivalité franco-anglaise sur le haut Nil, cette date du 14 aout 1894 est capitale.*"

by these two great successes within a few weeks, she now felt that, to take her proper place among the Powers, all she needed to do was to assert herself more fully. M. De Brazza, who had heard rumors of an English expedition under Colville coming north from Uganda, proposed that the French march upon the Nile. "If we wish the valley of the Nile", said he, "we have only to go there and take it; treaties, numerous though they be, change nothing."³⁵ M. Deloncle, in his discourse referred to above, declared that this was France's right colonial policy. "We have today upset forever the English dream of possessing the whole Upper Nile". But he must have been light-headed himself when he said that and dreaming too. Within but little over three years, France was so dizzy from her colonial policy that she herself was on the verge of being upset. A public declaration like that served notice on England. Nevertheless France actually believed it and set to work to occupy the field.

Since Monteil had been diverted from the Ubanghi to other pressing services on the Ivory Coast, in order to carry out French designs in the western section of her Cape Verde-to-Guardafui Empire, it would be necessary to make a new start. Accordingly, in September, 1894, M. Delcassé, who had recently become Minister for the colonies, dispatched M. Liotard to the Upper Ubanghi under government instructions to proceed to the Nile.³⁶ At the same time Lieutenant Mizon was

³⁵Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 396.

³⁶Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 79.

sent to Ethiopia with orders to make a "*voyage de reconnaissance*", and Captain Clochette was dispatched from Jibuti through Ethiopia to the Nile. By July 1895 Liotard had advanced some 250 miles beyond the "Confluence of the Bomu and the Welle, but still on the western side of the low Nile-Congo watershed."³⁷

While France was thus excitedly, but secretly, going about these movements, rumors disquieting to the Englishmen, were floating about London as to French purposes in the Sudan and Ethiopia. Early in 1895 these had gained importance enough to become a matter of interrogation in the House of Commons. On several occasions the Government had been asked to explain the situation there and rather animated debates were indulged in by the members.³⁸ On one of the occasions, March 28, 1895, Sir Edward Grey, then under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied by recalling the conventions which England had had with Germany and Italy to determine the spheres of influence of each. He then stated that the Foreign Office had no reason to believe that the French intended to enter the Upper Nile. He added, however, the declaration which later became known as "Grey's warning" to France to keep her hands off. He declared,

The advance of a French expedition under secret instructions right from the other side of Africa, into a territory over which our claims have been known for so long, would not merely be an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must be perfectly well known to the

³⁷M. B. Giffen, *Fashoda*, p. 15; Count Gleichen, *Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, Vol. I, p. 271.

³⁸*Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, Vol. XXXII, p. 388 ff; pp. 350, 352, 394.

French Government that it would be an unfriendly act and would be so viewed by England.³⁹

Grey, in his *Twenty-five Years*, says that this statement produced a furror in Paris the next day and divided opinions in Downing Street. The French Government replied with a diplomatic protest.⁴⁰

The Grey declaration aroused anger and astonishment in French official circles. In the first place the Monteil mission had been diverted many months earlier from the Nile to the Ivory Coast and no fresh decision as to a mission to the Upper Nile had been taken. Secondly, it warned France off a vast district which belonged not to Great Britain, but to the Sultan of Turkey, in which France had as much, or as little right as any one else. And thirdly, it accompanied a legally defensible claim by a threat of war.⁴¹

M. de Courcel, the French Ambassador in London, informed Lord Kimberly that the declaration was very much out of order. He declared that while negotiations were in progress, England had thus taken a position that would admit no question as to her rights in that territory.⁴² Kimberly replied that if a French expedition had entered this territory while negotiations were in progress, England had the right to complain and he hoped M. de Courcel would assure him that the rumors of such French action were unfounded. The ambassador replied that no news of an expedition had been received and complained that Grey had claimed the

³⁹*Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, Vol. XXXII, pp. 405, 406; Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, Vol. 1, p. 18; Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 91; Ward and Gooch, *Cambridge History of the British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, p. 252; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898) appendix 3.

⁴⁰*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898), appendix, p. 20.

⁴¹Gooch, *History of Modern Europe*, p. 275.

⁴²Note: France and England were at that time carrying on negotiations with a view of delimiting their respective spheres of influence.

whole Upper Nile. Kimberly replied that if Egypt should reoccupy the Sudan, England would recognize her right of possession.⁴³ M. de Courcel's report of the conversation shows that Kimberly rather softened down the meaning and force of his under-Secretary's declaration, declaring that Grey meant to associate Egypt in the statement and that anyway they were but words of "*un simple sous-secretaire d'etat*", and the question was still open for discussion.⁴⁴

Then, too, M. Hanotaux, Minister of Foreign Affairs, denounced it in an address before the French Senate April 5, 1895. He denied the right of the English Government to lay claim, on paper, to vast undefined regions of Africa. He declared this to be "one of those annexations on paper which an enterprising diplomacy afterwards cultivates as germs of a future claim and title".⁴⁵ He declared Grey's statement an unfriendly gesture, thus to attempt to close the door against discussion. He called this declaration "*une sorte de doctrine de Monroe appliquée a une partie considerable de l'Afrique*".⁴⁶ "Would it not be better," he asked

to abstain from public declarations which are only statements of the arguments of one of the parties, and which might frustrate an agreement by stultifying the discussions in advance? When I think of the immense extent of the territories involved, and of the absolute

⁴³*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898) ap. p. 20.

⁴⁴Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 398.

⁴⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898) ap. p. 20.

⁴⁶Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 92; Bismarck used similar reference to the Monroe Doctrine when objecting to English Methods in South Africa. See Chapter I, p. 29.

lack of information as to what is going on there, I ask myself whether it is not premature to attempt to settle the whole question beforehand by a proper delimitation. While defending definite rights, founded on indisputable titles, I should for myself consider it a very unfriendly proceeding to enclose the discussion beforehand in a narrow circle from which it could not escape. Between two powers, which respect each other and whose relations are always courteous, there can be no question of aggression or injunction where complex problems are concerned, for which so many different solutions may be usefully considered. No one can look upon these first delimitations, vaguely sketched on imperfect maps as possessing the immutable character given by long usage to the frontiers of European States. Nor can anyone claim to hamper the enterprise of the courageous men who go forth to explore these new countries. But when the time comes for settling finally the fate of these distant countries, I think that, by providing that the rights of the Sultan and the Khedive are respected, and by assigning to each party concerned what is due to it according to its works, two great nations will be able to arrive at an agreement which will reconcile their interests and satisfy their common aspirations toward civilization and progress.⁴⁷

It was a good speech. M. Hanotaux politely but firmly refused to recognize England's prior claims and advanced the proposition "first come first served." Let us settle the matter later when the need arises. Sir Edward himself said that he had associated Egypt with England in his thinking when he had made the declaration, but unfortunately as reported it was wholly an English claim.⁴⁸ Here the matter stood for several months with England considering it a closed question and France claiming it was open for discussion.

The period of inactivity following the Grey declaration has been variously explained. The French historians for the most part criticize severely their gov-

⁴⁷*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXIII, Egypt 2, (1898) p. 20; Gooch, *History of Modern Europe*, p. 277; Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 95, (resumé).

⁴⁸Grey, *Twenty-five Years*, Vol. I, p. 20.

ernment for this hesitation and, no doubt justly, if one is thinking only of material advantages in occupation. There was no sense in setting up such vigorous claims to African territory and then doing nothing to make good such claims. The English have liked to look upon this hesitation as an effect of Grey's warning. There is little, however, to support this interpretation. After we shall have examined the activities from the Ethiopian quarter we may have some idea as to this situation.

From the French Government's point of view, there was not complete paralysis. Near the close of 1895 they had planned the Marchand mission, but upon Lord Salisbury's proposal for settlement of the question being declined they took two months to study the matter before deciding definitely to undertake the mission.⁴⁹ It was finally decided to send Marchand from the west coast of Africa to the Nile as far as Fashoda, and his commission was signed by M. Guieysse, Minister of the colonies in the Bourgeois Cabinet, February 24, 1896.⁵⁰ Because France believed that Germany, England and Italy had some agreement among themselves in regard to the Nile question, these countries were not notified of French intention to dispatch the Marchand mission, but notice was sent to Constantinople, to Russia and to Menelik in Ethiopia.⁵¹ The mission left France in three sections on April 25, May 10, and May 15. Marchand, himself, did not

⁴⁹Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 106; Andre Lebon, *La Mission Marchand et Le Cabinet Meline*, in *Revue des deux mondes*, March 1900, Vol. 158, p. 278.

⁵⁰Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, pp. 69, 106, cites Lebon, *La politique de la France, in Afrique*, p. 3.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 106.

leave until June 25, 1896, sailing from Marseilles.⁵² His mission was a revival of that of Monteil and included a plan that he himself had submitted to the Government in September 1895. He arrived at Loango on the west coast on July 23, where he was delayed for sometime because of illness and native rebellion along his route.⁵³ When the way was opened up "Like the Diver in the poem, Marchand plunged into the depths of the dark unknown, and outside of France, no one knew when or where he would return to the surface."⁵⁴ He reappeared about eighteen months later at Fashoda on the Nile some 500 miles south of Khartum.⁵⁵ Lost in this unknown region, struggling through the jungles and disease-infested swamps of this equatorial Africa, he must be left while attention is turned elsewhere in the race for Ethiopia.


While Marchand and his small company were thus secretly finding their way up the Ubanghi and down the Bahr-el-Ghazal, important decisions were being made and decisive conflicts were being waged elsewhere in the effort of European powers to beat each other to

⁵²It will be noticed that no part of Marchand's mission had left France until more than a month after the Italian defeat at Adowa March 1, 1896. Marchand's attempt evidently depended upon the outcome in Ethiopia.

⁵³Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 421.

⁵⁴Ward and Gooch, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 251. On page 251 they record that four years after Marchand had plunged into the unknown he reappeared at Fashoda. This is a mistake. It arises no doubt from the fact that they assumed that he started in 1894 which is not the case.

⁵⁵Sir William Garstin gives exact measurements here to be 752 kilometers. Garstin was employed by the English government to make a survey. No doubt his figures are correct rather than those of writers who estimate the distance to be about 300 miles. See Parliamentary Papers in *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. CXII (1899) Egypt 5, p. 11.



the control of that part of Ethiopian Africa not yet subdued in 1896. Just six days after Marchand received his commission and more than a month before he could get on his way, the Italian forces had met their crushing defeat at Adowa, at the hands of Menelik and his liberty-loving tribesmen in Ethiopia.⁵⁶ Sufficient detailed accounts of this disaster to Italian arms and Anglo-Italian aspirations, to permit its meaning to be understood, had reached Europe early in March and on March 12, in spite of the fact that about four months previously, November 15, 1895, the government in England had informed Lord Cromer, the English Consul General at Cairo, of its purpose to postpone indefinitely the question of reoccupying the Sudan, London now telegraphed him that it had been decided to re-occupy Dongala and the Sudan.⁵⁷ Of course it had been contemplated for some time in Downing Street that some day this would be undertaken; but there was no indication of early action prior to March 1, 1896, when Italy suffered her defeat at Adowa. Back in 1890, Count Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, wrote his Chancellor, Caprivi,

Count Tornielli (Italian Ambassador in London) told me in strict secrecy and under an absolute promise not to mention his name, that Lord Salisbury . . . had indicated to him in conversation privately . . . that the reconquest of the lost provinces of Egypt (Sudan) was contemplated here.⁵⁸

To this the Kaiser in one of his marginal notes added, "At last, if he does not want it done by the Italian

⁵⁶See Chapter III, p. 151.

⁵⁷Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, pp. 81-110; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII (1895-96), p. 18, doc. 27.

⁵⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 149f, No. 1778.

Army".⁵⁹ Hatzfeldt himself thought that this hint of Salisbury to the Italian representative was England's way of bolting the door, in time against Italian yearning after the Sudan, and probably he was right. At that time Italy was expected to succeed in her Ethiopian efforts and no doubt England was preparing the way to stop Italy short of her interfering with English plans in Western Ethiopia and the Sudan. Then during the latter part of 1895, Salisbury had informed the French ambassador confidentially that the time had come to put *le coup de grace* on the Mahdist and that England would dispatch an expedition to Dongola. He added, no doubt to allay French apprehensions, if it were necessary for England to go farther than Dongola, she would not do anything without consulting France.⁶⁰ And even as far back as 1877, Gladstone in opposing expansion, had prophesied "England's first site in Egypt, be it by larceny or be it by eruption, will be the almost certain egg of a North African Empire".⁶¹ However it was not intended to undertake this at once. For eleven years, ever since Gordon's tragic death at Khartum in 1885, the reconquest of the Sudan had been anticipated but it had waited all these years. There was no special reason why it should not wait longer and thus permit Egypt to proceed with internal improvement, much needed and now under way. Lord Cromer writes,

When I received this communication (the one of

⁵⁹Italy was then preparing to make good her claim to a protectorate over Abyssinia and Germany as a member of the Triple Alliance was backing her cause diplomatically.

⁶⁰Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 400f; Andre Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, p. 43.

⁶¹Morely, *Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, Vol. III, p. 73.

November 15, 1895 stating occupation of Sudan postponed), I thought that the question of reconquering the Sudan had been definitely postponed for some years to come. I was wrong. I was about to receive another object-lesson on the danger of indulging in political prophecy. The utterances of the Oracle at Dodona depended on the breeze which stirred the branches of the speaking oaks around the temple of Zeus. Those of the London oracle are scarcely less uncertain. They depend on the ephemeral indications of the political barometer. When I propounded of whether the construction of the reservoir was to be preferred to Soudan reconquest, a steady breeze of caution was blowing amongst the political oaks of London. The oracle pronounced, in no uncertain language, in favor of the reservoir. But a sharp squall was about to come up from an opposite direction with the results that in the twinkling of an eye the decision was reversed.⁶²

Gladstone and Granville both had disclaimed any English responsibility for Egyptian activities and aspirations in reconquering the Sudan.⁶³ Even General Gordon, in spite of the fact that he had advocated "smashing the Mahdi", recorded in his Journal, "I do not advocate the keeping of the Soudan by us, it is a useless possession and we could not govern it, neither could Egypt."⁶⁴

However, feeling in England toward imperialism had changed in 1896. Many things had aided in bringing about this change, but perhaps the fall of Khartum in 1885 had done most to accomplish it. No doubt the death of General Gordon at that time did much to arouse the imagination of Englishmen, but actions, wholly the result from sentiment, do not wait eleven years for accomplishment and then suddenly flame into action. W. S. Churchill in "The Fashoda Inci-

⁶²Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 82.

⁶³*British and Foreign State Papers* (1883-84), Vol. LXXV, p. 682, Granville to Cartwright.

⁶⁴C. G. Gordon, *Journal at Khartoum*, pp. 125 f, 235.

dent" states that there were various motives for the reconquest of the Sudan. He says,

The diplomatist said, 'It is to forestall the French'.
The politicians said, 'It is to score over the Radicals'.
The ridiculous person said, 'It is to restore the Khedive's rule in the Sudan'. But the man in the streets said, 'It is to avenge General Gordon'.⁶⁵

"The idea of revenge", he says, "ever attractive to the human heart, appeared to receive the consecration of religion." If these were the motives, then Englishmen must have thought that by far the greatest number of people belong in Mr. Churchill's group of "ridiculous persons" since in most of the arguments presented by the English, they were careful to include the claims of Egypt as a motive for the conquest and retention of the Sudan.

It was, however, not the "ridiculous persons" but the politicians and diplomats who were running things in England at this time, and one must believe that it was they who precipitated the advance on Dongola and for the very purposes that Mr. Churchill assigns. There can be no other explanation of this sudden change. Lord Cromer attributes it somewhat to the "rapid growth of the imperialistic spirit, which about this time took place in England." He admits however, that the Italian disaster at Adowa was the real, immediate cause, and suggests that it is difficult to believe that the imperialistic spirit could have grown quite so rapidly as to cause the British people to realize, in the short space of four months, that the national honor could no longer be balked of the salve for which it yearned, and to cause

⁶⁵W. S. Churchill, "The Fashoda Incident," *North American Review*, CLXVII, p. 736.

this sudden and complete reversal of policy "in the twinkling of an eye".⁶⁶ There can be no satisfactory explanation of this sudden decision to move on Dongola in the early days of March 1896, aside from the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and 1894, and the Italian defeat of March 1 at Adowa.⁶⁷ These in connection with what the English knew would be the effect upon French activities in Ethiopia and their hopes in the Nile Valley, sent Kitchener up the Nile. Hanotaux describes the Marchand mission as connected with the Egyptian question and as a direct reply to the Dongola expedition.⁶⁸ If Italy had won at Adowa, there would hardly have been any "Fashoda Incident" and certainly no such hasty movements of British and Egyptian troops at Dongola.⁶⁹ In the beginning of 1896, Europe was waiting upon the outcome in Ethiopia to determine the next move.

Not only in England were there hasty decisions and rapid execution of them. The French at once hastened to revive their plans of converging expeditions through Ethiopia and from the west, upon the Nile, which they had abandoned—at least hesitated to carry through—in 1894.⁷⁰

⁶⁶Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 81 ff.

⁶⁷*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, ter, p. 18, doc. 27; *Ibid.*, p. 27, doc. 45.

⁶⁸Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 104.

⁶⁹Note: Though France was aiming for a port on the Nile, had it not been for the Italian defeat at Adowa, she, no doubt, would have sought it through diplomacy and gradual expansion from the west rather than by rapid semi-military methods. Not until she was certain of the outcome in Ethiopia did France sanction Marchand's plan. Since hesitating in 1894, no bold move had been undertaken by France until she was certain of Menelik's success at Adowa.

⁷⁰Henry Dehrain, "La succession de l'Egypte." *Revue des deux mondes*, CXXIII, (1894) p. 312.

Since Italy, England's accomplice in the plot, was not to have control in Ethiopia, it was clear to the government of her Britannic Majesty that the whole eastern part, if not the whole Nile valley, was exposed to the avarice of other European Powers, none of whom, at that time could be looked upon as England's friend. This, of course, would endanger the Cape-to-Cairo dreams and threaten the water supply to the Nile valley. Salisbury's government evidently thought that the time had come to comply with the demands of the London Chamber of Commerce to "take adequate measures with a view to assuring the control of England over the whole valley of the Nile from Uganda to Fashoda".⁷¹ At any rate, such measures were now taken. Thus was dispatched, March 12, 1896, the telegram to Lord Cromer, in Cairo, informing him that the British government had decided to reoccupy Dongola in the Sudan.

The decision to reoccupy the Sudan came with such suddenness that no adequate provision had been made. Mr. Rennell Rodd claims that the movement was initiated four or five years before they were ready for it in Egypt; that necessary public works, then in construction, had to be postponed in favor of military expenditure.⁷² The matter of providing the necessary funds to carry on such an expedition, at once became an item of greatest importance. It was not the intention of the British Government that England should bear the expense. This was an *Egyptian* war (though

⁷¹Woolf, *Empire and Commerce*, p. 190.

⁷²Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, 2nd Series, pp. 86-87.

Egypt was surprised to know it) and, therefore, Egypt should pay the bill. Apparently in the hurry, however, England had overlooked the fact that neither England nor Egypt had control of Egypt's purse strings, but that the Commission of Debt created by the Decree of the Khedive May 2, 1876, must be consulted.⁷³ Originally this Commission was composed of an international group of representatives, one each from Austria, England, France and Italy, to which were added, in 1885, a German and a Russian member. This brought the total number of Commissioners to six.⁷⁴

When the situation dawned upon the English, the Egyptian government made application to the Commission of Debt for a grant of LE500,000 to take care of the expedition.⁷⁵ Whereupon the matter became a general European question. Apparently regretting their own withdrawal from Egypt, which permitted England to get control, the French had never lost an opportunity to insist upon the general European character of the Egyptian question.⁷⁶ M. Leon Bourgeois, who had succeeded Berthelot as Minister of Foreign Affairs in April, declared that France could not remain indifferent to any enterprise that tended to prolong *sine die* the execution of England's promises to evacuate Egypt.⁷⁷ France, then was determined that none of Egypt's money which had been devoted to paying

⁷³Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. 1, p. 12; Vol. II, p. 86f.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 304.

⁷⁵LE 500,000. LE refers to Egyptian money. Egyptian pounds.

⁷⁶See Chapter I.

⁷⁷Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 103.

Egypt's debts, many of whose bonds were held by Frenchmen, should be used for any such purpose as to prolong England's stay in Egypt and to aid her rival in reaching the Upper Nile. At this time also Russia and France were working hand in hand; so it was perfectly well known how Russia would vote on a question involving her ally's welfare.

There were but six votes on the Commission, it will be recalled. Everything, therefore depended upon Germany's attitude. In 1890 Count Münster, who was then representing Germany at Paris, had written his Chancellor, Caprivi that his conviction that France would not agree to the conversion of the Egyptian debt was confirmed. On the margin of this communication the Kaiser had written "*Gut*" and Münster had continued, "No concession on England's part on the Egyptian question is to be expected", to which the Kaiser appended, "So much the better". "And" wrote Münster, "the Minister and the official world here (Paris) are embittered against England. According to the utterances of the British Embassy the same seems to be the case in London against the French." Here the Kaiser observed, "May they both remain long in the same condition."⁷⁸ It is clear that what the Kaiser, at least, had wished to see back in 1890 was a quarrel between France and England. There was more reason now, from Germany's point of view, that there should be lack of harmony between the two countries. However, Germany had sanctioned the Sudan Expedition;

⁷⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 152, No. 1780.

partly because she believed it would lend aid to her ally, Italy, so much in need just then, and partly that she hoped it would widen the breach between France and England. After much discussion the Commission approved the grant by a vote of four to two, the French and Russian representatives voting against permitting the money to be used for such a purpose. The German representatives voted in favor of the proposition.

This vote did not settle the matter, however. On the grounds that in order to be legal the vote must be unanimous the French holders of Egyptian bonds brought suit in the Mixed Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo, against the Egyptian Government to restrain it from paying the bill. They won their suit. The case was appealed to a higher court sitting at Alexandria, which upheld the action of the lower court, and the Egyptian Government was ordered to return the money to its original purpose.⁷⁹ It is interesting to notice here the lineup of the European States for and against this expenditure of Egyptian money for the expedition to the Sudan. Evidently France with her Russian ally sought to obstruct action and thus embarrass her rival and win a doubtful advantage over her. But it is just as evident that England was supported by Germany and her allies with no high moral purpose, and likely with less justice, in an undertaking to beat France to the control of the Nile valley, which was the property of neither group.

⁷⁹Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, pp. 107, 108; Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 91 f.

Beaten in the courts, England had to look elsewhere for funds to carry on the expedition or withdraw from the undertaking. She looked elsewhere. She let Egypt know that Egypt wished to borrow the money from England. Whereupon the Egyptian Government borrowed £798,802 from the British treasury at 2.75 per cent interest.⁸⁰ This grant was never repaid, a fact which indicates whose expedition it really was. On June 27, 1898, Sir M. Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, moved in Parliament, "That it is expedient that the grant in aid of £798,802 to the Government of the Khedive of Egypt should not be repaid."⁸¹ After long and spirited debate the vote was taken on the question and carried 155 to 81. This was a rather clever English way of turning the tables on France for her having objected to spending Egyptian money for the expedition to the Sudan. England now, having furnished part of the cash, could lay claim to interests in the Sudan, and France had lost a trump card in this shuffle.⁸²

With means thus assured Kitchener, who was in command of the Anglo-Egyptian forces and who understood thoroughly desert transportation and desert warfare, moved southward with his army, and by fall

⁸⁰Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 92; Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, p. 108. The original amount applied for in Egypt was LE800,000 but the actual amount borrowed from England was 798,802 pounds. Lord Cromer says he had anticipated the Court's action in refusing this grant from the Commission of Debt and had secured assurance from England that it could be had there.

⁸¹*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. LX, pp. 242, 281. See motion; *Ibid.*, Vol. XLV, p. 1439.

⁸²*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. XLV, p. 1444.

of that same year had retaken the Dongola province. Here, according to Lord Salisbury's assurance to the French ambassador in 1895, that should it be found necessary to proceed beyond Dongola, England would do nothing without consulting France, he should have stopped until London and Paris had held a "pow-wow" to determine the next move, if any. France was not consulted; neither did Kitchener stop with Dongola. We can find no explanation for such omission. Perhaps Salisbury could say they were to consult France only if there was a *necessity* for going farther. There was not found a necessity however, they just proceeded without raising the question of necessity. Perhaps Downing Street was offended at French action on the Commission of Debt and no longer felt obliged to consult. Most likely, however England proceeded as Mr. Churchill suggested strong nations sometimes do. "Great nations justify their actions before God—not men—a convenient theory for a strong nation to adhere to and one which after the recent war between Spain and America, we could not claim any originality in adopting."⁸³ Whatever the reason, nobody believed that Kitchener would stop with Dongola. The English believed, and most likely correctly, from their knowledge of French activities in Ethiopia and the Bahr-el-Ghazal that, if Great Britain did not now possess the Upper Nile, France would. It was a case of "now or never", said Mr. Churchill. They chose now.

The events connected with the movement of this

⁸³Churchill, "The Fashoda Incident," *North American Review*, CLXVII (1898), p. 444.

expedition to Dongola have been described frequently and it is not our purpose, here, to describe these in detail. Kitchener had not waited upon the decision of the courts to get under way. On March 20, 1896, his troops occupied Akasha, and on June 7, they took over Firket, some sixteen miles south of Akasha. Here they halted for three months because of weather conditions and cholera among the troops. After a sharp conflict with the Dervishes at Hafir and considerable labor in building roads, they reached Dongola, September 23, which was occupied with little difficulty. The Egyptian farthest outpost was fixed at Merowi or Meroë, the ancient capital of the Ethiopian Queens of the Candace dynasty, at the foot of the Fourth Cataract.⁸⁴ Here England hesitated for no real reason, Lord Cromer thinks. While it had not been publicly and officially announced that England would go farther, nobody believed, that having started, she would stop short of Khartum. Sir M. Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared in debate in Parliament, February 5, 1897, that Egypt could never be held to be permanently secure so long as a hostile power was in occupation of the Nile valley up to Khartum.⁸⁵ It was at this session of Parliament that the "Grant in Aid" of the Expedition to Dongola was debated and voted upon. There was a divided opinion as to what England should do, but the vote and the spirit of the debate show very

⁸⁴Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 91.

⁸⁵*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. XLV, p. 1446; G. W. Steevens in his *With Kitchener to Khartum* gives this date as February 6, but evidently his is in error. Parliament did not meet that day.

clearly that nobody in England expected Kitchener to stop with Dongola. Many even felt it was the *duty* of England to give the final blow to the Khalifa's power. Why then this hesitation at Dongola?

It must be remembered that these were stirring, feverish years in Europe. France was not the only European country with which England had to reckon, nor were Egypt and Ethiopia the only spots outside of that continent to arouse the avarice of Europe. In Germany, since the Kaiser had dismissed Bismarck and taken things into his own hands, England had been losing confidence. The Kaiser and Lord Salisbury had mutually irritated each other upon the occasion of the Kaiser's visit to England in the summer of 1895, when Salisbury had raised the question of a division of European Turkey and the Kaiser had resolutely rejected it. According to a memorandum in the Foreign Office in Berlin, this incident had influence upon the relationships between Germany and England during the following years.⁸⁶ Then in 1896, by his notorious telegram of congratulations to Paul Kruger, President of the Boer Republic in South Africa, in connection with the Jameson raid, he had stirred up in England an outburst of indignation.⁸⁷ This telegram aroused bitter discussion in the press of both countries. Hatzfeldt urged Lord Salisbury to put a check on English newspapers, especially in their attacks upon His Majesty.⁸⁸ The Kaiser himself was exasperated at what he called

⁸⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVII, p. 84, No. 5019.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. XI, p. 31, No. 2610.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. XI, p. 40, No. 2640.

the British *Expektorationen* in his direction.⁸⁹ From the sending of this telegram, at every occurrence no matter how trivial, the two countries were ready to accuse each other of bad faith.

When a strike occurred in Hamburg, the cause of it was laid at England's door and a denial demanded with so little reason that Lord Salisbury replied that "The imputation is so devoid of foundation that an official denial would be received (at home) with ridicule".⁹⁰ With these many irritations between Germany and England, matters seemed to be going from bad to worse, when Germany suddenly changed her tactics. She saw in South Africa an opportunity to come to some understanding with England. Since Germany did not possess sufficient navy to cope with England here, it would be better to bargain with her and the Portuguese possessions offered the stage. If England should seize Delagoa Bay, then Germany could object, but propose that she and England divide up the Portuguese possessions between them.⁹¹ Accordingly Hatzfeldt was instructed by telegram on May 2, 1897, by Hohenlohe, with the Kaiser's full approval, to approach Salisbury upon the matter of a general understanding.⁹² Hatzfeldt proceeded to do so very diplomatically. He suggested that back in the days of good Anglo-German relations, African matters had gone well. He showed Salisbury an article in an English paper unfriendly to Germany, feigning to be greatly hurt by it and denying

⁸⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIII, p. 4, No. 3396.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 9, No. 3400.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, p. 16, No. 3404.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 21, No. 3405.

that Germany had any unfriendly feeling toward England. From this the conversation got around to the presence of the English fleet in Delagoa Bay. Salisbury admitted its presence there but denied that England contemplated any advantage because of that. The conversation concluded with Hatzfeldt hoping that better relations had been initiated and Lord Salisbury promising nothing.⁹³ When the Kaiser read the report, he wrote, "Yes, the result is what I expected; we get nothing voluntarily which we do not take with mailed fist." The negotiations dragged on through that summer and autumn, but nothing came of the effort, unless it be that it permitted England to become more active on the Nile.

Then too, England could not be sure of Russia. It would seem that from all the evidence we can find Russia was not greatly interested in Africa. Outside her rather minor efforts in Ethiopia, which will be described later, she had taken no part in the scramble for Africa. But she was at this time England's rival in Asia and in position there to do her damage in support of her ally who was England's antagonist in Africa. This England had to take into account and at times to "beware of the Bear that walks like a man". There were two geographical spheres in which their interests clashed. Russia felt aggrieved at England in the Near Eastern questions. She felt England had been the chief stumbling block in the way of Russia's ambitions about Constantinople, and her spokesmen were rather outspoken about it. Even the Czar expressed himself a

⁹³*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIII, p. 23, No. 3407.

bit later that he hoped to live to see the day when England should be turned out of Egypt, and as has been shown Russia opposed the proposition that Egypt should finance the Sudan expedition.⁹⁴ There was also now the very irritating question of Port Arthur in the Far East. All in all Russia looked upon England as her chief adversary, and she stood ready to oppose British pretensions whenever possible.⁹⁵

Though upon the fall of the Bourgeois government, in April 1896, and Hanotaux' return to the Foreign Office, French attitude had toned down a bit, there was in this nothing to encourage England to move without caution. True, Hanotaux had issued new orders for Marchand and dispatched them to Liotard, who was now Governor of the Ubanghi country, and Marchand's superior. These new instructions defined Marchand's mission as a peaceful penetration. "The mission in charge of Captain Marchand is not a military enterprise", he said, "there is no thought of a conquest. The policy which you have pursued for two years and of which our establishment in the Nile valley should be the crown, must be strictly followed".⁹⁶ We do not know that these instructions ever reached Marchand. Certainly his warlike activities in repulsing the Dervishes at Fashoda and his correspondence with Kitchener would make it seem that he, at least, thought he was at the head of a military expedition. No doubt

⁹⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIII, p. 82, No. 3444.

⁹⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIII, p. 89, No. 3451.

⁹⁶Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique-Fashoda*, p. 108; Lebon "La mission Marchand et le Cabinet Meline," *Revue des deux mondes* (March 1900), CLVII, p. 281.

these instructions were issued for European consumption. Marchand was not recalled. The purpose of the mission remained the same. France still desired and purposed that "our establishment in the Nile valley should be the crown" of the Marchand mission whether it traveled under the name of a military expedition or a peaceful penetration. Nobody in Europe believed that the French activities, here and in Ethiopia, were being carried on in the interest of science or that they were pleasure jaunts; least of all England.

It was in 1897, also that France sought to come to an understanding with Germany. Hanotaux was very sympathetic when the German Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, came to Paris to visit his dentist that year, and in July they reached a happy settlement of the Dahomey-Togoland boundaries.⁹⁷ It was possible for France even to make some headway in winning over Italy to more friendly relationships. One of the results of Italy's defeat at Adowa had been the fall of Crispi's government. Crispi was followed by Rudini who was friendly toward France. Just about three months before he became the Foreign Minister, Delcassé had visited Rome and while there had consulted M. Barrere, the recently appointed French Ambassador to Italy. He also had an interview with Rudini and the Marquis Visconti-Venosto, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Italian Government. He had found them both ready to discuss a change in their mutual Mediterranean policy. "There is plenty of room for

⁹⁷Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 661.

both of us on the Mediterranean," he told them, "the same thing which has separated us is able to unite us".⁹⁸ Then too, Italy felt that England had not given her full support in Ethiopia and Italy was therefore somewhat in the mood to be courted by England's rival. Rudini promptly recognized France's position in Tunis, gave up the Capitulation, and arranged with France a commercial Treaty.⁹⁹ In return France showed appreciation of this friendly gesture by accrediting to the Italian Court M. Camille Barrere, one of her most accomplished diplomats.

Furthermore France and England had also been carrying on negotiations in the hope of coming to some agreement over their respective spheres of influence in western Africa. The Grey declaration had caused an interruption in these proceedings, that the officials of the two countries might discuss the meaning of this declaration but no settlement had followed. Now however, conversations had been renewed and were proceeding favorably toward a settlement of the Niger question when Sir E. Monson thought it necessary, in settling the areas about Lake Chad, to renew England's claim to the Nile valley. He therefore informed Hanotaux in December 1897 that,

The other point to which it is necessary to avert is the proposed recognition of French claims to the northern and eastern shores of Lake Chad. If other questions are adjusted Her Majesty's Government will make no difficulty about this condition. But in doing so they cannot forget that the possession of this territory may, in the future, open up a road to the Nile, and they must not be understood to admit that any other European

⁹⁸Graham H. Stuart, *French Foreign Policy*, p. 8 (Mr. Stuart cites Regnald, *L'oeuvre de M. Delcassé*.

⁹⁹*Archives Diplomatiques*, Vol. 68, p. 333.

Power than Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of the Nile. The views of the British Government upon this matter were plainly stated in Parliament by Sir Edward Grey some years ago during the administration of the Earl of Rosebery and were formally communicated to the French Government at that time. Her Majesty's present Government entirely adhere to the language that was on this occasion employed by their predecessors.¹⁰⁰

To mention the claims to the Nile Valley and Grey's declaration of 1895, was to a Frenchman like waving a red rag in front of an enraged bull. This was a delicate subject to both England and France and had better be kept under cover if friendly relations were to be exhibited in other matters, but it would not down. It was England's ardent purpose to have France recognize Great Britain's claim to this basin, while it was just as evidently France's stubborn purpose not to admit these claims, and to display irritation at their being presented out of order and before the necessity of their being settled.

To Monson's representations M. Hanotaux made a spirited reply. He discussed the question before them at some length but before closing took notice of the English statement in regard to the Nile. He declared that the French Government could not, under present circumstances, refrain from repeating the reservations which it had never failed to express every time the questions relating to the Nile Valley have been brought forward. Thus in particular, the declaration of Sir Edward Grey, to which the British Government had referred, had given rise to an immediate protest by the French Ambassador in London, the terms of which he

¹⁰⁰*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, 1899, Egypt 2 (1898) p. 1.

repeated and developed in the further conversations he had had at the Foreign Office on the subject.

I, myself, had occasion, in the sitting of Senate on the 5th April 1895, to make in the name of the Government declarations to which I consider that I am all the more justified in referring from the fact that they have called forth, no reply from the British Government.¹⁰¹

He closed by declaring that the Nile question was not connected with the Niger and the present questions to be settled. Thus the matter rested once again with no settlement arrived at and each country maintaining its original position.

Thus these international situations may have caused England to hesitate at Dongola. But England also had reasons of her own. England's connection with Italy's abortive attempt to subdue Menelik was well known, and upon Italy's defeat at Adowa and the subsequent treaty of peace whereby Italy recognized the full and complete independence of that country, in the autumn of 1896 there was a rush of diplomatic missions to Addis Ababa. Knowing that France and Russia were in a position to have great influence there, and not wishing to encounter the active resistance of Menelik's warriors, England had sent Rennell Rodd to the Court of the Lion of the Tribe of Judah, seeking influence and concessions, in an effort to strengthen her stakes there that she might widen her borders in the Upper Nile.¹⁰²

Remembering also the unfortunate plight of General Gordon at Khartum in 1885, Kitchener wished to

¹⁰¹*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, 1899, Egypt 2 (1898), pp. 2, 3.

¹⁰²See *Chapter V*, p. 255

make sure to keep open connections with civilization before he moved into the Mahdists trapping grounds of former years. Accordingly, immediately after Dongola he had begun the construction of a railway across the wide curve made by the Nile river from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed, and by August 1897, he had completed two-thirds of the construction.¹⁰³ Without waiting for the completion of the road to Abu Hamed, he moved his army to that place and captured it. It was during this time that Lord Cromer was fearful that some vagabond European might have found his way among the Dervishes and would advise them to make raids across this uncompleted railway to the north of Kitchener's army and thus cut off its source of supply and connection with Cairo.¹⁰⁴ The danger was very real, but apparently no such European appeared and the Dervishes did not know enough to realize the value of such military tactics.

With the partial success of the Rodd mission to Menelik, a rather more favorable international situation in Europe, and the local conditions put into proper shape for advance, Kitchener, having heard the Dervishes were advancing with a large force upon Berber, telegraphed January 1, 1898, for additional English troops to be sent to Egypt.¹⁰⁵ He believed the fight for the Sudan would occur there. The Mahdists, however, turned aside and proceeded up the Atbara river some thirty-five miles from its confluence with the Nile. Here, on Good Friday, April 8, they were attacked by

¹⁰³Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 94.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 96.

Kitchener's force and defeated.¹⁰⁶ The Sirdar then proceeded up the Nile toward Omdurman, the headquarters of Mahdist forces. Just before arriving at Omdurman, Kitchener dispatched a rather vitriolic letter to the Khalifa telling him of his sins and of the punishments about to be visited upon him and warning him to remove the women and children, as he intended to bombard Omdurman unless the Khalifa surrendered.¹⁰⁷ There was no reply and at dawn, September 2, 1898, there began a most terrific battle between unequal forces, unequally armed. The Kaiser has pronounced this battle of equal importance with Waterloo.¹⁰⁸ A participant, who has described it, gives praise to the English and Egyptian forces, but he adds,

And the Dervishes? The honor of the fight must still go with the men who died. Our men were perfect, but the Dervishes were superb — beyond perfection . . . not one rush, or two, or ten — rush on rush . . . a dusky line got up and stormed forward; it bent, broke up, fell apart, and disappeared. Before the smoke had cleared, another line was bending and storming forward in the same track.¹⁰⁹

There could be but one ending to this slaughter. The Dervishes were practically annihilated. Only the Khalifa with a small group of his followers escaped. For months Abdulla and his band wandered over the desert of Kordofan, of which, say the Arabs, "When Allah made the Sudan he laughed," and one can fairly hear the fiendish echoes of that laugh crackling over the

¹⁰⁶Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 102.

¹⁰⁷F. B. Rye and H. G. Groser, *Kitchener In His Own Words*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁸*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. LXXII, p. 487f, speech of E. Durning-Lawrence.

¹⁰⁹Steevens, *With Kitchener at Khartum*, p. 282.

blistering sand to this day.¹¹⁰ The Khalifa eluded his pursuers until the English forces under Sir Reginald Wingate, who had succeeded Kitchener, came up with him on November 24, 1899, when he was dispatched with all his principal Emirs, and his entire force surrendered.¹¹¹

The battle of Omdurman was, in many respects, the harbinger of good to Europeans and to many of the native Sudanese. We can find no record of any service the Mahdists rendered these people while in control there. M. Delcasse reported to the British ambassador in Paris that, in spite of the differences between the two governments about Egypt, he wished to congratulate the British Government upon the "success of British arms at Khartoum". He took this occasion also to inform Monson that it was probable that Kitchener would meet with Captain Marchand before long. He declared that Marchand had been enjoined to consider himself as an "emissary of civilization", without authority to decide upon questions of right, which must be a matter of discussion between France and England, and he requested that Kitchener be informed to take no steps which might lead to local conflict.¹¹² He expressed the hope and conviction that all questions of differences between the two governments could be settled amicably and peacefully by discussion. Monson accepted the *Congratulations* with thanks.

While cruising up river on September 7, the Eng-

¹¹⁰Steevens, *With Kitchener at Khartum*, p. 282.

¹¹¹Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 105.

¹¹²*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, 1899, Egypt 2 (1898), p. 4.

lish gunboats came across the Mahdist steamer "Tewfikieh", which had been one of General Gordon's boats taken by the Mahdists after the massacre of the English forces thirteen years before.¹¹³ When Kitchener's boats had picked up the prize, they learned from its crew that the "Tewfikieh" and a second boat called the "Safieh" had been ordered by the Khalifa at Omdurman to proceed up the Nile in search of much needed provisions. They had established their base at Renkh but the "Tewfikieh" had gone farther alone. As it was in the act of passing the old fortifications at Fashoda, it had been fired upon and forced to turn back. They were now on their way to report the matter to the Khalifa. They had been gone for several weeks and knew nothing of the slaughter at Omdurman until they drifted into the English trap. The item of most interest to the English, in this report of the prisoners on board the "Tewfikieh" was the statement that the officers in charge of the black forces who had fired upon them were white men. They could not tell whose white men they were but they were sure they were Europeans! That the guns that they had used were really European the English knew from the nickel-covered bullets they found embedded in the old "Tewfikieh", but they could not tell what European nationals had fired the bullets.¹¹⁴ From Lord Cromer's warning, Kitchener must have suspected whose bullets they were and no doubt anticipated a much more formidable force than was actually there. Salisbury had intimated

¹¹³Churchill, *River War*, p. 314 ff.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 315.

to Lord Cromer and Lord Cromer had informed the Sirdar, in his official instructions, that he might expect an encounter with French and Ethiopian forces somewhere on the Upper Nile.¹¹⁵ Though kept with the greatest secrecy, the activities of the French were quite well known in government circles in London. On October 22, 1897, in a communication to Lansdowne, Minister of War, Salisbury indicated that he expected to encounter some "French Explorer" in the Nile Valley.¹¹⁶ It would seem hardly possible therefore, that before overtaking the "Tewfikieh" Kitchener did not feel sure that he would have to do with a Franco-Ethiopian military expedition at Fashoda. However, after this capture he reported to Cairo, that the French flag had been hoisted at Fashoda and there seemed to be a force of eight European officers and eighty Senegalese troops.¹¹⁷

Though prior to Kitchener's arrival, English papers had been publishing the fact that Marchand was at Fashoda, apparently neither England nor France had officially announced it; but the Germans knew it.¹¹⁸ Herr Oberndorff, the German Consul General at Cairo, had telegraphed that information to Berlin, September 10, nine days before the meeting at Fashoda. The German government also knew of the British Macdonald Mission being brought from Uganda down the Nile

¹¹⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898), p. 3.

¹¹⁶Lord Newton, *Lord Lansdowne, A Biography*, p. 148.

¹¹⁷*Parliamentary Papers*, 1899, Vol. CXII, Egypt 2 (1898), p. 4.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 6f; Delcassé was annoyed at the British press for announcing it.

to effect a junction with Kitchener's army. This is evident from the Kaiser's marginal remark on the telegram from Cairo telling of Marchand's arrival. The Kaiser wrote on the margin, "*Nun wird die Lage interessant werden! Die Gallier sitzen zwischen Macdonald und Khartum.*"¹¹⁹ Evidently Kitchener must have informed Cairo of the "Tewfikieh" find of September 7, and from rumor the English press and German officials assumed that the Europeans referred to by the Arabs were Marchand's Mission.

Three days after learning from the prisoners taken on the "Tewfikieh" that there were Europeans at Fashoda, Kitchener left Omdurman for the South, taking with him five gunboats and a force of Highlanders and Sudanese. September 15, at Renkh he encountered some Dervishes whom he captured and by whom he was told of their encounter, August 25, with a small body of Europeans at Fashoda. The Dervishes had sent for reinforcements and had intended to return to Fashoda to capture the Europeans. Continuing his course up river, Kitchener arrived, September 18, at Babiui, about twelve miles north of Fashoda. From this point he dispatched a letter addressed to "The Chief of the European Expedition at Fashoda".¹²⁰ In this letter Kitchener informed the "Chief" of his activities, that he had destroyed the Khalifa's forces, *et cetera*, and

¹¹⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 371, No. 3884. A German note attached to this communication states that Macdonald was the English Brigadier Commnader at Omdurman. This is a mistake as Macdonald was leading a force from Uganda. Omdurman was then in the hands of the Khalifa.

¹²⁰*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII (1899) Egypt 3, pp. 2-4, (Kitchener's Report).

that he had been informed by Dervishes captured at Renkh that some Europeans were at Fashoda. Considering this report true, he felt it his duty to inform them of his coming to Fashoda.¹²¹

The next morning a little boat brought the reply. The "Chief" was very happy over the news of the destruction of the Khalifa's forces and congratulated Kitchener upon the success of his expedition. "Having fulfilled this agreeable duty", he proceeded to tell the Sirdar what *he* had done. He had occupied the Bahr-el-Ghazal—the Shilluk country on the left bank of the Nile as far as Fashoda, which he had reached July 10. He related the attack of the Dervishes, which he had repulsed August 25, and further, "I signed on September 3, a Treaty with Sultan Kour abd-el-Fadil, Grand Mek, placing the Shilluk country on the left bank of the White Nile under the protectorate of France, subject to ratification by my Government". From this he proceeded to say that he had sent copies of this treaty to Europe by way of Ethiopia and the Bahr-el-Ghazal, "where my steamer is now to get reinforcements. I offer you my best wishes on your arrival in the Upper Nile, and take note of your intention to come to Fashoda *where I shall be happy to welcome you in the name of France.*"¹²²

The "Chief" was Marchand. This intrepid explorer, who had dived into the unknown African jungle along the Ubanghi on the western coast, had reappeared some eighteen months later at Fashoda on the

¹²¹*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, (1899) Egypt 3, p. 5.

¹²²*Parliamentary Papers*, (*Accounts and Papers*), Vol. CXII, Egypt 3, 1899, p. 5. Translation p. 6. (*Italics mine*).

Nile. He had made a journey of some twenty-eight hundred miles through African jungle and sand and swamp. All Europe was prompt in praise of his accomplishment but all his efforts and hardships went for naught. True he had succeeded in planting the French flag upon the Upper Nile and could, as he said, be happy in extending to General Kitchener a welcome there in the name of France. But this happiness was soon to be turned to disappointment by having to hand over to England that same African jungle, and sand and swamp.

When Kitchener's boat arrived at Fashoda, Marchand came aboard. After congratulating Marchand upon his long and arduous journey, Kitchener protested French occupation of the place. Marchand replied that as a soldier he must obey the orders of his government, which were to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Fashoda; that having done so he must await the next order from Paris. The Sirdar called attention to the great differences in their respective forces and offered to convey Marchand north down the Nile. Marchand admitted English superiority in forces, and stated that if Kitchener felt obliged to attack him, he could but submit to the inevitable, which would mean that he and his companions would die at their posts.

Kitchener was rather diplomatic here and, instead of insisting that the French flag should come down and have the English flag hoisted in its place, he asked the Frenchman "Do I understand that you are authorized by the French Government to resist Egypt in putting up its flag and reasserting its authority in its former

possession—Fashoda?" Marchand hesitated and then replied that he could not resist the Egyptian flag's being raised.¹²³ Both countries had always pretended that their great concern for the Upper Nile was inspired by their great desire to have justice done the Egyptians. The hoisting of the Egyptian flag permitted both to pretend that they had upheld the honor of their country, and saved Marchand and his small company from going down to a water-soaked grave in the center of Africa and Kitchener was saved from having to perform the most distasteful task of firing upon a defenseless enemy friend. Accordingly, the Egyptian flag was hoisted at one o'clock in the afternoon, September 19,¹²⁴ with due ceremony in the presence of the British and Egyptian troops and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired.¹²⁵ Kitchener bears testimony to the politeness and courtesy of the French officers in this position.

It is impossible not to entertain the highest admiration for the courage, devotion and indomitable spirit displayed by M. Marchand's expedition, but our general impression was one of astonishment that an attempt should have been made to carry on a project of such magnitude and danger by the dispatch of so small and ill-equipped a force.¹²⁶

Everybody, even the English public and the Kaiser were loud in praise of the "intrepid explorer", but

¹²³*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, 1899, Egypt 3, pp. 2-4. Kitchener's Report to Cromer.

¹²⁴On page 254 in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Ward and Gooch say "Kitchener's instructions were to hoist the Egyptian and British flags . . . having done so he departed". Whether his instructions were to hoist both flags or not, only one was hoisted and that the Egyptian. No English flag seems to have been put up at this time nor was the French flag hauled down.

¹²⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, 1899, Egypt 3, p. 204, Kitchener's Report to Cromer.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

England still demanded his recall. Kitchener claimed that had he not arrived until two weeks later Marchand's forces would have been massacred by the Khalifa's forces. The French claims here would have been ludicrous except for the suffering. However, Marchand claimed that he was expecting reinforcements; that his whole fleet, at the very time of Kitchener's arrival, had gone up the Bahr-el-Ghazal for that very purpose and he was expecting the return of this boat in time to meet any attack that might have been approaching.

After hoisting the Egyptian flag at Fashoda, Kitchener left a gunboat in command of Major Jackson to look after British interests there, while he proceeded south. He sent part of his force up the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and with the other division he followed the Nile as far as the Sobat. From this point he returned north and the matter became a diplomatic battle back in Europe.

On the eve of Kitchener's arrival at Fashoda, September 18, the English Ambassador at Paris had an interview with Delcassé, who repeated that he had no knowledge of the position of Marchand, though Germany knew of his arrival and the English papers had been publishing it for several days.¹²⁷ But he added, "suppose he is at Fashoda,—is England going to say he has no right to be there?" Monson replied that that was just what England expected to say. England had a new and stronger argument now than she had had in 1895 and again in 1897. Monson claimed that all the territory and rights formerly held by the Khalifa now fell to England and Egypt by right of *conquest*.

¹²⁷*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CXII, 1899, Egypt 2, p. 6.

He declared that France had known that to send Marchand on this expedition would be looked upon by England as an "unfriendly act". Since France knew all this, Monson wished to know why she had sent Marchand to the Nile.

Delcassé responded that France had never recognized English claims there and had so told England frequently. They had protested Grey's declaration. M. de Courcel had protested to Lord Kimberly, and Delcassé added that "as a matter of fact there is no Marchand Mission," that Marchand was simply working under M. Liotard's direction in extending French occupation from the west.

To this Monson replied that, speaking frankly, the situation on the Upper Nile was very dangerous, that England never would consent to compromise on this point. It should not cause surprise to France if England should resent a step which she had cautioned France not to take. Delcassé replied that in advancing to the Nile, France was only imitating England, and that France did not seek a quarrel. Frank discussion of the matter would no doubt bring about a satisfactory settlement of the question. The French are strong on discussion and there we shall leave the matter of the western approach until we bring the approach up through Ethiopia.

To understand the failure of France to have a larger force on the Upper Nile at the time of Kitchen-er's arrival, one must look back to the failure of their plans in Ethiopia.¹²⁸ The expedition dispatched from

¹²⁸Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, Chapter X.

Jibuti should have reached the Nile before the arrival of Marchand and these were to have had considerable force. Two of these failed to arrive at all, and the third which had arrived, had returned to the highlands before July 10, when the small column from the west reached Fashoda.

The "Fashoda incident" is but an incident in the greater struggle of the Powers of Europe to grasp the last unappropriated part of Africa, the prize of which was Ethiopia.¹²⁹ By 1898 the race had narrowed down to two contestants, England and France. Each was approaching the prize from two directions. The English from the south by way of Uganda and from the north through Egypt; the French from the west by way of the Ubanghi and the Bahr-el-Ghazal and from the east by way of Jibuti. Having traced the French from the west and the English from the north to their meeting place at Fashoda which should have been the common meeting place had not plans failed, we now turn to the east to see what has been taking place in the mountains of Ethiopia.

¹²⁹Hanotaux, *Le partage de l'Afrique—Fashoda*, p. 70.

CHAPTER V

ENGLAND AND FRANCE AT MENELIK'S COURT

FRANCE FAILS TO CLASP HANDS ACROSS THE NILE

While Marchand was finding his way up the Ubanghi and down the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Kitchener was working his way up the Nile to meet him at Fashoda, other French agents were busily engaged in furthering French interests in Ethiopia itself. The utter defeat of Italy at Adowa, to which the French had contributed, had rendered that country impotent. With the fall of Crispi's government, Italy had sought to make peace with Menelik upon the best terms obtainable and thus had dropped out of the race for control in Ethiopia. There remained but two contestants. England and France stood face to face in the final effort to bring the last bit of Africa, under European control. Whose should it be? In Ethiopia, England had been *suspected* of having supported Italy in her effort to reduce Ethiopia to an Italian protectorate, whereas France was known to have contributed to Italy's failure in this undertaking. From this point of view, it would seem that France would have an advantage over England in the eyes of the Ethiopians, and she did. But, before relating the events of the struggle to be enacted here, we must return to Obock and discover, if possible, the route by which France had come to her position of 1896 in Ethiopia.

It will be recalled from Chapter I that in 1881

the French remembered that about twenty years before (1862) they had purchased Obock on the northern shore of the Gulf of Tajura. Though France had owned this territory by right of purchase all these years, she had made no effort at settlement and improvement. Not until the building of the Suez Canal did the place have any significance. But by the opening up of that water way to the east, France, like other European Powers, began to seek stations along this route. Obock appeared

As a stepping-stone on the route to the Far East; from that point of view its position at the exit of the Strait of Babel-Mandeb gave it a real strategic importance. At the same time it was possible to hope that it would become a centre of commerce with the Harrar and Shoa, that is to say with the south of Abyssinia.¹

With Obock's importance as a strategic point on the route to the Far East we are not concerned here, but because of the hope that it would become a port for the commerce of the south of Ethiopia, it came to play an important part in the European struggle for control in Ethiopia. Very shortly after French occupation of Obock and the environs of the Gulf of Tajura, the Italians had taken possession of Assab just a short distance to the north, and in 1884 England occupied Zeila just to the east of the Gulf. Thus France was wedged into very narrow limits between her rivals. Evidently she could not expand along the coast. Her only hope lay in the possibilities of the hinterland. It must be remembered, also, that at the very time that France was making sure her claims about the Gulf of Tajura, England was proceeding with the military occupation of

¹de la Jonquiere, *Les Italiens in Erythrée*, p. 42.

Egypt to the exclusion of France. As master of Egypt, England now had peculiar claims upon the regions of the Red Sea, claimed by Egypt, just as she had in the Sudan. The hinterland, upon which France proposed to expand from Obock, was a part of England's concern just because she now occupied Egypt. For the very same reason, England was determined that no European Power other than herself or a friend should come into control of Ethiopia and thus be able to interfere with Egypt's water supply.

Clearly, then every effort of France in the direction of Ethiopia would be viewed with alarm by England. The Gulf of Tajura is the natural outlet for the commerce from Harrar, which, before the building of the railway to Diré Dowa, was the center of trade for all southern Ethiopia. France, therefore, sought to control the caravan trade routes from Harrar to the sea in order to profit by Ethiopian trade through Obock. For the very same reason, England sought to deflect the trade through Zeila. Here then, as early as 1884, we have the occasion for the first Anglo-French struggle for Ethiopia from the east.

In 1885 France had placed M. Henry as French Consul at the English post of Zeila. M. Henry set to work at once to have the trade from Harrar come by way of Darmi into the hands of French traders at Tajura, near to Obock and a port on the French coast. M. Henry was aided in these efforts by one Emir Muhammad Abu-Bakr, lately created a Pasha by His Bankrupt Highness, Ismaïl, Khedive of Egypt. Being an Egyptian Pasha and a resident of Zeila, Emir Muham-

mad Abu Bakr should have interested himself on behalf of England, since that country was, at that time, protecting Egypt. But Pasha Emir Muhammad Abu Bakr chose rather to cast his lot with M. Henry and the French, with whom he worked unceasingly against Captain King, the English representative in Zeila.

It is likely that the Emir's dislike of the English was a reflection of his efforts against the Italians with Sultan Mohammed Anfari of Aussa. The Emir had written the Sultan of Aussa a letter condemning Europeans in general and Italians in particular. This letter had fallen into the hands of Antonelli, who had dispatched its contents to Rome. Rome had appealed to England to have England reprimand their Emir at Zeila. This England had done through Lord Cromer in Cairo, Captain King in Zeila having been the British officer to administer the reprimand. This no doubt explains in part at least the Pasha's support of France in the Harrar trade war.²

Now Tajura was on the northern shore of the Gulf and the caravan routes seemed to head up more easily and naturally at a place between Jibuti and Zeila called Dongarita. Both M. Henry and Captain King came to select this place as best suited as a terminus for the Harrar caravans. Having selected Dongarita as his terminus, M. Henry claimed it for France and forthwith hoisted the French flag there. Captain King as promptly claimed Dongarita as within the British sphere, and as often as M. Henry hoisted the Tricolor, Captain King pulled it down and hoisted in its stead

²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, pp. 158-167, docs. 77-81.

the Union Jack.³ This struggle continued until it led to bloodshed, whereupon the governments concerned recalled their respective representatives and in 1888 England and France signed a treaty delimiting their spheres of influence upon the coast of Somaliland and the French flag ceased to float over Dongarita.⁴

By that time it mattered little who controlled the trade from Harrar so far as any European country was concerned, especially England. Between 1881 and 1885 the Mahdi uprising had over-run the Sudan and, with the massacre of Khartum and the death of Gordon, the Anglo-Egyptian army had been forced to withdraw from that section. In the same year (1885) Kassala on the very border of Ethiopia, had fallen into the hands of Osman-Digna, one of the Mahdi's generals. These events had made it difficult for England, now Egypt's guardian, to hold the Harrar. Consequently the Egyptian garrison at Harrar had been withdrawn in 1896. At the time, therefore, that England and France settled their dispute over Dongarita, it looked as though not only the hinterland but Dongarita itself and perhaps the whole Somaliland coast might fall into the hands of the Dervishes.

This threat to all three European rivals for possession of Ethiopia, however, did not put a stop to their

³Philipp Paulitschke, *Harar, Forschungsreise nach den Somal-und Galla-Ländern Ostafrikas*, pp. 394-396, gives a careful account of these incidents. He was doing research work in this area at the time.

⁴Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 726; Pierre-Alype, *L'Ethiopie et les convoitises allemandes*, p. 135; *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 96, France No. 1 (1894) (C-7389); de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XX, p. 757.

efforts to outdo each other. Instead it tended to induce them to proceed along different lines. By the Mediterranean Pact of 1887, England and Italy had become virtual allies in these neighborhoods.⁵ From this point on, as they agreed in an exchange of notes, Italy supported England's position in Egypt, while England not only supported Italy in other North African projects but actually used her as a support in dealing with the Mahdist movement which had compelled her withdrawal from the Sudan and the Harrar. It was during this lull in the Anglo-French activities about Harrar that Italy had made her abortive Sacconi attempt to capture the trade from Emir Abdulla, left in charge at Harrar by the British when they had withdrawn.⁶

France was not long in sensing the situation. She believed that there had been some sort of secret understanding between England and Italy with reference to this territory. Accordingly, in the negotiations dealing with the demarcation of their respective "Spheres of Influence" in Somaliland, she sought to get England to agree not only to refrain from taking over the Harrar herself but also to oppose the efforts of any other Power to annex it. The efforts of France, on the one hand, to bring England to this point and those of England on the other hand, to keep from making any such declaration and yet to keep from admitting to France her real relationship with Italy, produced, in the secret Treaty of 1888, one of the most ingenious claus-

⁵Pribram, *Secret Treaties of Austria Hungary*, Vol. I, pp 95-97.

⁶See Chapter II, p. 65.

es ever included in a treaty between *intelligent* nations.

It will be recalled that the ostensible purpose of the Treaty of 1888 was to settle the dispute over the possession of Dongarita as a terminus for the caravan route from Harrar. This Treaty settled that question by including Dongarita within the British sphere and by granting to France the whole of the Gulf of Tajura, including the more desirable harbor of Jibuti. For the French then, Jibuti became the hope of future years. But Jibuti, with no control over the hinterland, would be but an empty possession. The Harrar constituted the natural hinterland for French exploitation. France, therefore, sought to prevent that territory from falling into the hands of Italy or England. She knew that there had been some sort of alliance between Menelik, King of Shoa,⁷ and Italy, though Abdulla had resisted Italian efforts to absorb his trade, was now encouraging Menelik and supplying him with arms to conquer Abdulla and annex the Harrar to Shoa.⁸ In 1888 then, there appeared to France three possible dispositions for the Harrar, any one of which would mean ruin to French hopes for Jibuti. They were: first, that the Harrar might be annexed by England herself; second, that it might be taken over by Italy with English approval just as Massowah on the Red Sea had been appropriated by Italy; third, that it might be conquered by Menelik, now an ally of Italy. In any case Jibuti would lose. France sought to prevent any such end to her own aspirations. Accordingly she undertook to

⁷Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 451.

⁸Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 15- (Note).

induce England, the key to all three of these possibilities for the Harrar, to write into the Treaty of 1888 a statement which would tend to quiet French nerves.

In their eagerness to secure this statement, the French were willing to withdraw from Dongarita and thus permit England to hold, without question, the point of dispute which had called for a treaty. Accordingly the curiously worded clause referred to above was written into the treaty of 1888. The wording of this clause is either so clever or so stupid, one is not sure which, that it must be seen in order that the reader may fully appreciate the situation. The negotiators of these two great nations declared, "The two Governments engage not to endeavor to annex Harrar, nor to place it under their Protectorate. In taking this engagement, the two Governments do not renounce the right of opposing attempts on the part of any other Power to acquire or assert any rights over Harrar."⁹

The former of the two sentences in this Anglo-French Agreement of February 2-9, 1888, is intelligible enough, but the second has no meaning. Since no one would think of accusing them of renouncing any right they ever possessed over the Harrar by their declaration in the first sentence, there was no point in adding the second sentence. Certainly, by declaring that they themselves would not annex the Harrar, they did not declare that they would approve of others taking it. Why then should they take the trouble to write

⁹See Clause IV of the *Anglo-French Agreement*, 2-9 Feb. 1888; de la Jonquiere, *Les Italiens en Erythrée*, p. 158; Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 376. Darcy says this treaty was "terriblement subtil".

this negative statement into a solemn treaty? It is evident that what France wished to have said in this second sentence was: in taking this engagement, *the two Governments declare their intention of opposing attempts on the part of any other Power* (meaning Italy or Shoa) *to acquire or assert any rights over the Harrar.*¹⁰ It is just as evident, too, that what France wished said here, was exactly what England did not intend to say, since she already had some understanding with Italy. Therefore, the meaningless expression contained in the second sentence of this clause was a compromise. It was more than England would have said and, though much less than France desired, she considered it better than nothing. By agreeing that England would never annex the Harrar, which she did not desire, Lord Salisbury had secured a similar promise from France and by a curious statement, in regard to other Powers, he avoided a declaration that England would resist Italy, should she attempt to take it. However, because France could and did read some hopeful meaning in this sentence England was not willing to have the treaty published and it was kept secret until 1894. England evidently did not want Italy, her Mediterranean ally, to know how perilously near England had come to agreeing with France to close the Harrar door against Italian aspirations.

Chuckling over her clever secret agreement of 1888 with France, England proceeded to come to terms with her ally, Italy. In a series of Protocols, March 24, and April 15, 1891, and that of May 5, 1894, de-

¹⁰de la Jonquiere, *Les Italiens en Erythrée*, p. 159.

scribed in Chapter III, she agreed to recognize as Italy's sphere of influence all the vast territory lying north and east of the Juba river and east of the 35th meridian, east of Greenwich, with the exception of the French territory about Jibuti and the English possession of Somaliland. This was assigned to Italy in exchange for Italian recognition of English claims to the west and south of this line, which ran well east of the Nile.¹¹ But this vast block of territory so generously handed over to Italy by England, included the Harrar about which England had the secret agreement with France in 1888. So long as Italy knew nothing of the secret treaty with France, England had not hesitated to deal with Italy as though the French agreement were non-existent.¹² But that France might not become aroused over these Anglo-Italian agreements, it was now necessary to keep certain parts of that of May 5, 1894, from coming to the knowledge of the French. A part of this agreement, therefore, was kept secret.¹³ In spite of this supposed secrecy, most of the provisions

¹¹*Comité de l'Afrique française*, Bulletin, numero de juin 1894, pp. 63-66; Bonnefon, *L'Afrique politique en 1900*, p. 445.

¹²Though England may not have known it, Italy knew of this secret article in the *Anglo-French treaty of 1888*. See, *Documenti Diplomatici*, XXIII bis, (1895-96), p. 307, doc. 539.

¹³Such historians as Ernest Lemonon and Jean Darcy declare that France did not know of the existence of the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 until the latter part of June 1894 (See Lemonon, *L'Europe et la Politique Britannique*, 1910, ed. p. 146; Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 373.) But as Leonard Woolf has shown (*Empire and Commerce*, p. 221), both of these Protocols had been published as usual by command of Her Majesty in both Houses of Parliament in May, 1891. It seems incredible that the French Government could have been ignorant of them. If France was ignorant of them it was not England's fault. The Agreement of May 5, 1894, however, had not been published before June, 1894.

of the Protocol of May 5, 1894, became known in Paris by June 18, only six weeks after the protocol had been signed in Rome. Even of the contents of the secret clause, the French and Germans seem to have had a more nearly accurate knowledge than some English writers of recent years.

"On June 18, 1894, we learned of the treaties of 1891 and of the public Protocol of May 5, 1894 and M. Hanotaux lodged a protest with the Foreign Office, invoking the Franco-British Treaty of 1888, which had delimited our colony of Djibuti and British Somaliland and affirmed the independence of Abyssinia",¹⁴ wrote M. Lemonon. In addition to the published protocol, there appeared to be another part kept secret. The French were suspicious of the part which they believed had not been made public and they had a surprisingly accurate knowledge of its meaning. M. Ernest Lavisse in an open letter to Sir Charles Dilke in regard to the secret declaration wrote,

In May, 1894, you recognized the Protectorate of Italy over all the territories of Menelik, including the Harrar, which, it is true, you did not dare to name in the published protocol, feeling that the affair was somewhat suspicious. But now look at this: to the published protocol you annexed a secret declaration in which it was stipulated that Italy would allow Great Britain to exercise a temporary intervention in the Harrar until she should be in a position herself effectively to establish her protectorate. In the published protocol you gave all the cake to Italy; in the secret declaration Italy passed back under the table the piece

¹⁴Ernest Lemonon, *L'Europe et la Politique Britannique*, 1910 ed., pp. 146 and 212. Note: Lemonon is mistaken about France learning of the Protocols of 1891 as Woolf has shown. These Protocols were discussed in the French Chamber May 29, 1894.

which you had promised us (Harrar by Treaty of 1888) never to touch.¹⁵

Apparently the Germans knew of this secret declaration as early as May 20, 1894. Bülow in his report to Chancellor Caprivi of that date stated that Baron Blanc, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had informed him that besides the Treaty of May 5, 1894, England had made a secret agreement with Italy about the Harrar by which England was granted the right to exercise her control in that province and to regard the Harrar as belonging to her sphere until Italy were prepared to extend her influence into that territory.¹⁶ If one compares this German version with the picture presented by Lavissee from the French suspicion one cannot but be impressed with the similarity. The French accused England of having given Italy all of Ethiopia and then receiving back from Italy "under the table" the Harrar. The German version includes all that with the added provision that Italy might at any time withdraw the Harrar cake underneath the table should her appetite demand it. Though the French had the secret fully, the German version is much more nearly accurate.

It is this secret declaration that Mr. Leonard Woolf attempts most splendidly to prove never existed in fact. No doubt he has been led into believing that the real declaration, as the French and Germans had it and the Italian documents prove correct, never existed, by discovering that the Anglo-Italian Agreement of May 5,

¹⁵M. E. Lavissee in France et Angleterre, *La Revue de Paris*, Feb. 1, 1899, p. 453-481. Several other French writers intimate the same, probably from the same source.

¹⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 362, No. 1991.

1894, as presented to Parliament on May 31, 1894,¹⁷ did not agree with that same protocol as published in Sir Edward Hertslet's *The Map of Africa by Treaty* in the 1894 edition.¹⁸ As presented in Parliament there were but three clauses to this treaty, but in this particular edition of Hertslet's work there was a fourth clause added.¹⁹ The fourth clause reads:

The delimitation starts from Gildessa because the Somali territories, which lie to the right of the line Lavadu-Bia-Catuba-Gildessa, up to the Frontier of the Harrar, were in 1888 left by England to France.

The Italian Sphere of Influence is formed by the Harrar, practically the whole of Ogaden, and the Mejertine peninsula of Guardafui.

In the English Sphere remain the tribes Issa, Gadaboursi, Abr Aoual, Abr Gheragus, Abr Folgela, Al Giableh, Uarsangueli and Dolbohanta.²⁰

No doubt in finding this clause, in addition to the clauses presented to Parliament, Mr. Woolf assumed that he had found the secret clause that had caused the suspicions of France. Indeed, with its reference to the Harrar and the Anglo-French Treaty of 1888, it was loaded with trouble. England and France by this treaty had disposed of the Harrar back in 1888 so far as they were concerned. Moreover the whole treaty was supposed to have been kept secret and here the Anglo-Italian treaty openly informs Italy that some sort of a deal had been made with France in 1888. But by find-

¹⁷*Parliamentary Papers*, Treaty Series No. 17, 1894.

¹⁸Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 1st ed., Vol. II, p. 669; *Parliamentary Papers*, Treaty Series, No. 17, 1894.

¹⁹The 1894 and 1896 Editions of the *Map of Africa by Treaty* seem to be the only editions to contain this extra clause. The copy on my desk, third edition (1909) silently omits it though it contains the three clauses (Vol. III, p. 951), apparently the editions of 1894 and 1896 published that which was not intended to be published.

²⁰Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 1st ed., Vol. II, p. 669.

ing the additional clause, though it was supposed to be kept secret, Mr. Woolf apparently did not find *all* the secret part of that treaty.

We have already referred to the French and German versions of the secret declaration. In addition to these there is a much more conclusive bit of evidence to be had from Italian sources. On the same day that they signed the original Protocol, May 5, 1894, Francesco Crispi and Francis Clare-Ford signed an additional declaration (marked "riservato") in which they state very clearly that, until Italy should be in position to exert her authority over Ethiopia, England should have the right to take temporary control of that territory, including the Harrar. No such temporary occupation, however, should deny the position of Italy as the protecting power in Ethiopia and her dependencies.²¹

There can be no doubt, therefore, that though the French historians are wrong in declaring that the Anglo-Italian protocols of March 24, and April 15, 1891, were kept secret, they are right in assuming that England wished to keep the provisions of her Treaty of 1888 with France, secret from her ally Italy. They were also right in their suspicions, which amounted almost to assurances, that England had a secret understanding with Italy in regard to that very Harrar country over which the curiously worded clause of the Anglo-French Treaty had been written.

The existence of these two conflicting, secret treaties was a source of diplomatic suspicion and conflict among the three countries. Both France and Italy

²¹Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 134.

sought to have explanations from England. France maintained that the curious second sentence in the secret Treaty of 1888 did have some meaning; that while it perhaps did not bind England to oppose an Italian protectorate over the Harrar, it did bind England not to promote such a protectorate. Now in the Protocol of May 5, 1894, England had actually promoted Italian claims and thus had broken her agreement with France. To this England replied evasively, as the French thought.²² The French did claim to see admission of faults in one of England's replies, when London assured Hanotaux that England would make reparations and that any action of hers based upon the agreement of the fifth of May could be limited carefully to such communications and measures as would be compatible with the arrangements between France and England, and would in no way affect the political situation in the Harrar.

The French were glad of this admission that there was some understanding with Italy. They were not satisfied with the situation, however. It was difficult for them to believe that the Anglo-Italian Agreements did not assign to Italy the Harrar. They could not understand why a semi-official English publication should contain a map of Africa indicating that the Italian sphere extended clear across Ethiopia from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, if there had been no agreement between England and Italy in regard to the matter. They believed that England had handed over to

²²Lémonon, *L'Europe et la Politique Britannique*, (ed. 1910), p. 14f.

Italy the very territory that she had agreed with France should remain independent. France believed that these agreements *did* affect the political situation in the Harrar.

The discussion over these Anglo-Italian protocols created a demand for the publication of the secret Anglo-French treaty of 1888. On May 30, 1894, *The Times* published what purported to be that treaty, whereupon Mr. Labuchere made inquiry in the House of Commons June 1, 1894 asking that this treaty be presented to Parliament.²³ To this inquiry, Sir Edward Grey replied that this agreement could be presented to Parliament at any time provided the French Government did not object.²⁴ There was no objection. Accordingly the Anglo-French Agreement was presented to Parliament that same month and thus became known to all.²⁵

With the publication of the Anglo-French Agreement, the Italian Government became insistent that England agree to the publication of the secret annex to the Anglo-Italian Protocol of May 5, 1894.²⁶ As we have shown in Chapter III the Italians, not too vigorously backed by the Central Powers, were exceedingly anxious that England acknowledge her engagement to Italy in order to bring her into open opposition to

²³*Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, Vol. XXV, p. 173.

²⁴*Ibid.* The French Government could hardly object because it had already distributed to the Chamber of Deputies copies of this agreement together with the copies of the Anglo-Italian agreements of 1891 and 1894, as Mr. Labouchere's inquiry implies.

²⁵*Parliamentary Papers*, France, No. 1, (1894) (C-7389).

²⁶*Documenti Diplomatici*, XXIII bis, p. 308, doc. 540.

France. This England persistently refused to do, and because of fear of completely alienating England when her moral support was so needed, Italy did not press the matter to the breaking point. England protested her friendship for Italy but resisted all efforts to have the secret clause made public. The Lord Chamberlain could declare publicly the solidarity of Italy and England in Africa, and Sir Clare-Ford could inform Italy that the British Government had no objection to having the secret made public, but, if that was done, then members of Parliament would demand that Salisbury should make public all Anglo-French correspondence over the Italian Treaty. This action would bring to light many French comments.²⁷ England felt it would be very much to Italy's advantage that these comments should not become public.²⁸ Thus both Italy and France had to be content with strong suspicions and little assurance of England's real position.

Though France could not bring Italy and England to withdraw the Anglo-Italian Agreements in regard to Ethiopian territory, as England and Leopold II had been induced to do with Article III of the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of May 12, 1894, events within Ethiopia were developing to favor the French contention.²⁹ In spite of the Treaty of Uccialli of 1889, whereby Italy claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia, and the Agree-

²⁷*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII bis., p. 310, doc. 544.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 311, doc. 547.

²⁹See Chapter IV, p. 174. No doubt one reason why France failed in the Anglo-Italo-French controversy here when she succeeded somewhat in the Anglo-Congo-French controversy was because in the former she lacked the German support which was so effective in the latter.

ments of 1891 and 1894 by which England had recognized the Italian claim, Menelik had gone on about the business of being nobody's Protectorate. He had denounced Article XVII of Italy's Treaty and had declared to the Powers that "Ethiopia has need of no one; she stretches forth her hands unto God". France, disturbed over the Anglo-Italian agreements and being desirous of including Ethiopia within her own African Empire, was quick to see this outstretched hand, and mistaking herself to be the one to whom it was stretched out, she hastened to fill it with many things of French manufacture. Menelik's determination to maintain his independence was France's opportunity to thwart Italian plans. Accordingly, just as Italy contrary to England's agreement with Johannes had furnished Menelik with munitions of war through Massowah, to aid Menelik to reach the throne that she might secure from him the fruits of his labors, so France now furnished Menelik with munitions of war, through Jibuti, to aid him to escape Italian control in the hope of substituting France for Italy in the affairs of Ethiopia. While Antonelli was more or less patiently carrying on his long negotiations in an effort to convince Menelik that he should accept Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali, the French were just as certainly and busily engaged in keeping him from doing so. In Chapter IV, we have shown how M. Deloncle had furnished Menelik with the Italian *Green Book* containing Italy's version of the disputed Article. Antonelli complained of French agents from Jibuti carrying garbled portions of the same publication to Menelik's off-

cers and men. Makonnen had told Antonelli of the French offer of arms and contracts to Menelik. Everywhere and in many ways the French had sought to defeat Italy's efforts in Ethiopia.

In her efforts here France was actually supported by Russia. Because of a similarity in Ethiopian and Russian religions, claimed by Russia, Russia had dispatched a semi-religious military mission to Ethiopia. But the activities of individuals in this mission were much more political and military than religious. Because of this religious affinity Russia had proposed to Menelik that Russia be given a Protectorate over Ethiopia that she might properly represent Ethiopia in Jerusalem and in the Red Sea area.³⁰

In 1888 the Cossack Atchinoff had made a short visit to Ethiopia and upon his report of this visit, the Russian government had returned him with several companions to Obock where he was later joined by Lieutenant Machkoff, who remained for several years in Ethiopia. Upon his return to Russia a much more important mission was organized by the *Russian Geographical Society* and dispatched (1894) to Ethiopia under command of Captain Leontieff, accompanied by the Monk Zaphraim. This mission became for a time very influential at the Ethiopian Court. As we shall see, it was to this Leontieff that Menelik assigned the government of the unknown and never to be found "Equatorial Provinces". From the efforts of this mission Russia also established diplomatic relations at Ad-

³⁰Lebon, *la Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Méline*, in *Revue des deux mondes*, Vol. 158, p. 287; Dubois et Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, p. 703.

dis Ababa and succeeded in placing several Russian officers in Menelik's army.³¹ It was generally believed that Russia's purpose here was to get Italy out of Ethiopia and herself in, that she might assist France to break the British route to India.³² Among the Powers represented at the Brussels Conference, Russia had been the most active in opposing the admission of Menelik and she had been especially determined to prevent Ethiopia from appearing as a protectorate of Italy.³³ In this same conference France also had made reservation. When Italy had notified the Powers that Menelik had accepted the finding of that conference, France still protested that she accepted the situation only in so far as this arrangement did not conflict with French rights and interests, which meant, of course, that she did not at all recognize the Italian claims.³⁴ Hohenlohe, Chancellor of Germany, believed that England knew that France and Russia were seeking to prevent England from getting a foothold there and for that reason she had encouraged Italy in her efforts.³⁵ The Kaiser warned England that she should have supported Italy more than she had, in view of the threat that Franco-Russian schemes in Ethiopia might offer to the British route to India. He scolded the Czar in regretting the friendship apparent between Russia and France. Russian *noblemen* ought not to associate with the bourgeois French. As "Willy", he addressed the Czar in writ-

³¹Dubois et Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, p. 704.

³²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 236, No. 2771; Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 369f.

³³Albert Billot, *La France et l'Italie*, Vol. I, p. 198.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 203.

³⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 235, No. 2770.

ing of the French, "Nicky, take my word on it, the curse of God has stricken that people forever! . . . Therefore take care that your Generals don't like the R. F. too much."³⁶

The French did not confine themselves to diplomatic discussions with England over the conflicting Anglo-French Treaty of 1888 and the Anglo-Italian Protocols of 1891 and 1894. They had high hopes of making some common action with Russia, which had dispatched to Somaliland the expeditions under Atchinnoff and Leontieff. In September, 1894, at the same time that Delcassé, Minister for the Colonies, had dispatched M. Liotard to the Upper Ubanghi in the west, Lieutenant Mizon was ordered to Ethiopia with instructions to make a *voyage de reconnaissance* to the Nile, and Captain Clochette, at the head of another group was to proceed from Jibuti to the Nile.³⁷

Even before these movements from the west had been inaugurated there had been French agents and sympathizers at work in Ethiopia. Upon denouncing Article XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali, Menelik had sent a mission to Paris with a letter to the President of the Republic. This mission was headed by one M. Chefneux, a Frenchman who had resided for some time at Menelik's court. M. Chefneux carried with him from Menelik presents and a decoration for the head of the French government.³⁸ The appearance of this

³⁶Isaac Don Levine, *Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar*, p. 21.

³⁷Dubois et Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, p. 704. See also Chapter IV, p. 180.

³⁸Billot, *La France et L'Italie*, Vol. II, p. 191f.

mission, following so closely upon Menelik's deunciation of Italian protection, caused suspicion and unfriendly comment in Italy. When one knows that some months later this gentleman arrived at Menelik's court with munitions of war among which were ten rapid fire cannon, he is not surprised at Italy's disturbance over this visit to Paris.³⁹ Then, when Menelik with a *girava la testa* had driven Antonelli in anger from his presence, he had addressed a note to the European Powers in which he had denounced Italy's interpretation of the Treaty of May 2, 1889.⁴⁰ Though England had recognized Italy's position in Ethiopia by replying to Menelik through Italy, and Germany and Austria had done the same, France had replied through her own Consul at Aden and Russia had made no reply so far as Italy knew.⁴¹ Neither France nor Russia had ever recognized Italy's protectorate over Ethiopia and neither now felt called upon to treat with Menelik by way of Rome.

Between 1894, when the first official mission from France was sent into Ethiopia with the purpose of blocking Italian aspirations there, and the battle of Adowa in 1896, Italian journals were blaming Frenchmen and the French government for many of their difficulties in making good their claims to a protectorate over Menelik's domain.⁴² Francesco Crispi wrote that the natural French aversion to everything Italian manifested

³⁹Francesco Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 252.

⁴⁰*Comité de l'Afrique française*, Bulletin, Numero de juillet 1893, p. 8.

⁴¹Billot, *La France et L'Italie*, Vol. II, pp. 191, 198.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 224-228.

itself at that time in every possible manner. Every Frenchman in Ethiopia felt it his patriotic duty to put every possible obstacle in the way of Italian undertakings of any sort. Even the government of the Republic did not omit the opportunity to create difficulties for Italy.⁴³ Crispi condemned both England and France for having made the Treaty of 1888 concerning the Harrar, when they knew that the Harrar had been annexed to Ethiopia by the conquest of Menelik in 1887 and, by virtue of Menelik's possession, it became a part of Italy's protectorate in March, 1889. Furthermore, by the Additional Convention of October 1, 1889, the very customs collected at Harrar were pledged as security for regular payment of the Italian loan made to Menelik. Both France and England had known all this before they had made public their agreements of 1888, and Crispi named several official French maps in which these claims had been recognized, even though the maps had been made after the Anglo-French agreement of 1888.

Italians are not the only observers to accuse the French of blocking the Italian efforts. The English Consul for the Red Sea area, A. B. Wylde, who was on the field at the time, in writing of the results at Adowa,

⁴³Crispi, *La Prima Guerra d'Africa*, p. 319; Note: When Italy came to insist upon her interpretation of Article XVII of the treaty of Ucciali, Menelik had written in March, 1895, the president of France in which Menelik had suggested that he proposed to make Jibuti his port of entry and asked for help against the Italians. On June 3, 1896, the President of the Republic replied that France accepted this and would cooperate with the understanding that Menelik should maintain his independence and Jibuti should become the port of entry. Du-bois et Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, p. 703.

declared, "There can be no doubt that had it not been for the French supplying Abyssinia through the port of Djibuti with unlimited quantities of arms and munitions, both as presents and by purchase of their merchants, that Menelik would never have been able to have gained (*sic*) the crushing victory of Adowa".⁴⁴ The Germans also were assured that the French had been active, and Hatzfeldt reported to his government in Berlin that the Ethiopians were armed with rifles by the French.⁴⁵ The Kaiser was concerned for Italy. He believed that France was making war against Italy in Ethiopia and he declared that as soon as Italy was driven out of Ethiopia, Russia intended to seize upon Mas-sowah and other positions so as to control the Red Sea route to India. He warned England of this in spite of the fact that the British *press* and certain British statesmen had treated him badly. He hoped that England would act upon his warning and give Italy more support.⁴⁶

From the beginning of the struggle for Ethiopia, French and Russian activities had been directed against England. In the western approach, where Russia was not active, the antagonists were clearly evident. But in the eastern theatre, England's opponents must reach their real antagonists through Italy, which England, at first, had been able to use as a buffer. Until March, 1896, therefore, the French and Russian intrigues with

⁴⁴Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 57.

⁴⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 272, No. 2772; p. 235, No. 2770.

⁴⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 235, No. 2770; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 422.

Menelik and their material aids to the Ethiopian army had been directed against Italy. The disaster to the army at Adowa, however, had cleared the field of Italian opposition and the way lay open for the French to reach the Nile through Ethiopia, where they hoped to join forces with their countrymen from the west and thus with a united front await their real opponents.

Even before Italy had been put out of the game, France had been scheming to reach the Nile through Ethiopia. It was not difficult for her to convince Menelik that both Italy and England were aiming at the destruction of his independence. All that was necessary to prove that fact was to exhibit the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and 1894. In the face of this threat, it was most natural for Menelik to turn to the French proffer of aid and comfort especially since France had assured him that she would not demand his territory as a protectorate.⁴⁷ In return for these French assurances Menelik promised to make the French port of Jibuti his official port for Ethiopia. Then, too, in March 1894, he granted a concession to M. Alfred Ilg, a Swiss engineer, long in Menelik's employ, for the construction of a railway from Jibuti, on the Gulf of Aden, to the White Nile, by way of Harrar, Entoto (Addis Ababa) and Kaffa.⁴⁸ Though M. Ilg was a Swiss, in this matter he proved to be a French Swiss. Upon receiving the concession he lost no time in as-

⁴⁷Lebon, *La Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Méline*, in *Revue des deux mondes*, Vol. 158, p. 287; Dubois et Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, p. 703.

⁴⁸Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 135; T. Lennox Gilmour, *Abyssinia; The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers*, (1906) (Copy in John Crear Library) Annex I, p. 63.

sociating with him, our friend, M. Chefneux, the Frenchman who had carried a letter and a decoration from Menelik to the President of France and who had returned to Ethiopia with rapid firing cannon to be used against the Italians. These gentlemen in turn handed over their concessions to a French company, the *Compagnie imperiale des chemins de fer ethiopiens*. The lease for this concession was to run for ninety-nine years and construction was to begin within two years from the date of its approval. Had the railroad been completed at the beginning of the final rush to the Nile, it would have been of greatest strategic importance to the French in their efforts to reach the Nile from Jibuti. Unfortunately for France it had not been begun when the Italian defeat at Adowa precipitated the movements from the four points of the compass into the upper Nile valley.

By the latter part of 1894, France appeared in good position to undertake the rounding out of her African Empire. She now had the concession for this strategic railway in French hands. She had an understanding with Menelik completed. French and Russian officers were well distributed throughout the Ethiopian army.⁴⁹ That army was well supplied with munitions of war of French manufacture. She had the backing of Russia and Turkey.⁵⁰ The French influence at Menelik's court was supreme. With all this and with her plans made to expand into the Bahr-el-Ghazal from the west, France was in position to permit her imagination of a

⁴⁹Morié, *Histoire de L'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 431.

⁵⁰Hanotaux, *Fashoda*, p. 105.

great African Empire to expand beyond measure. It was then that her imperialists had printed, for distribution among the Chamber of Deputies, the map showing French possessions as of the first of January 1895.⁵¹ French enthusiasm, in anticipation of their North African dream about to be realized, expressed itself in this map showing French possessions, and territory to be possessed, extending from almost the equator to the Mediterranean. In the Ethiopian territory, it obliterated all lines of demarcation set up by the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and 1894 and recognized only British Somaliland as defined by the Anglo-French treaty of 1888.

The stage was all set, from the French point of view, for vigorous forward movements, when suddenly a period of inaction set in and Monteil, who had been directed to occupy the upper Ubanghi was diverted to other enterprises in West Africa.⁵² The expedition under Lieutenant Mizon, which had been dispatched to Ethiopia, was recalled and that under Captain Clochette, which had reached Addis Ababa, was allowed to remain there for eighteen months without orders or resources.⁵³ Even the construction of the railway, for which France had secured concession from Menelik, was delayed, and for some unexplained reason France withdrew from action here just when action would have been most effective. If at any time the French idea of converging expeditions upon the Nile

⁵¹*Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, Vol. III, p. 71f. See Chapter IV, p. 165.

⁵²See Chapter IV.

⁵³Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, pp. 410, 411.

might have succeeded, one would think this should have been the time. But France vacillated between wordy and feverish action and timid inaction.

Englishmen believe that Sir Edward Grey's declaration of March 28, 1895, had much to do in causing the hesitation, but as has been shown above, Frenchmen pointed out that France had informed England that she did not accept Grey's declaration. French writers themselves throw the blame upon their own government, referring to this period of inaction as *cette néfaste période*.⁵⁴ But it would seem that the real reason for French hesitation here is to be found in the uncertainty as to the outcome of the contest between Italy and Ethiopia.

To have undertaken a military expedition across Ethiopia to the Nile, would have necessitated an open alliance between Menelik and France. This France was not ready to admit. France knew that Italy had the moral support of England and that she was in rather close alliance with the Central Powers and, while she felt safe in supplying Menelik with officers for his army and munitions of war with which to meet Italian attacks, she was not sure of the outcome when the decisive struggle between Menelik and Italy should come. For France, then, to undertake a military expedition through Ethiopia, under these conditions, would have been the height of folly. Suppose France had undertaken, successfully, such a movement and then Italy had won at Adowa, the Italian army, undoubtedly, under the circumstances, supported by other European

⁵⁴Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 413.

Powers, could easily have closed in upon the French from the rear and nothing but complete failure could have been expected by France. No one in 1894 and 1895 anticipated the abrupt and disastrous ending to the Italian fiasco in Ethiopia. France, no doubt, felt secure in awaiting a more favorable opportunity for carrying out her scheme of converging upon the Nile without having to admit openly that she was lending aid and comfort to an enemy of a friendly power (Italy) in time of peace. She evidently believed that time could be taken for building the railway and laying more completely her plans before undertaking anything more threatening to England and Italy than that which could be classed as "peaceful penetration".

Whatever the cause, all activity between the latter part of 1894 and the first quarter of 1896, consisted in watchful waiting in anticipation of any eventuality in Ethiopia. That eventuality was furnished when Italy sustained that utterly annihilating defeat at Adowa, after Baratieri, stung by Crispi's reproach of "military tuberculosis," had ordered an attack upon the Ethiopian army.

The Italian defeat was the signal for feverish activity by both England and France. The way to the Nile was now cleared of Italian incumbrances. For both England and France it was now or never. Both undertook to make it now. As has been shown in Chapter IV, the meaning of Adowa had hardly been understood in Europe when England dispatched the Egyptian expedition under Kitchener up the Nile, and France rushed Marchand to West Africa upon his per-

ilous undertaking from the west. In addition to these activities from the north and west both hastened to prepare other expeditions. The English became active in Kenya Colony and Uganda on the south in the hope of meeting with Kitchener on the Upper Nile, and the French in Ethiopia with the purpose of joining hands with Marchand across the Nile and thus to prevent the completion of English purposes.

The English efforts from the south seem to have borne but little fruit. In Uganda, Colonel J. R. L. Macdonald had been put in charge of a semi-exploring expedition with the intention of associating his movements here with the advance of the Egyptian expedition under Kitchener. His soldiers were selected from among the Sudanese troops brought into Uganda by Captain Lugard as a means of controlling the native Uganda population. These Sudanese soldiers had just returned from a long and arduous campaign and, upon being assigned to this new task, which would demand their being sent into distant regions, they knew not where, they objected strenuously. Their chief objection was the necessity of leaving their wives behind them. The number of their wives was legion, all of whom had been able heretofore to accompany their warriors to battle. After some persuasion they started with Macdonald though unwillingly. Not many days after, while on the way, however, the whole Sudanese force revolted and took French leave back into Uganda and to the dusky girls they had left behind them.⁵⁵

⁵⁵Sir Harry Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, Vol. I, p. 238ff.

Though the expedition was of sufficient importance to attract the Kaiser's attention it never arrived at Fashoda.⁵⁶ The other British effort from the south was organized in British East Africa and led by Cavendish. This mission was supposed to pass the borders of Ethiopia in the neighborhood of Lake Rudolph in a march upon the Nile. But a force of some 15,000 men accompanied by the Frenchman M. Léon Darragon, sent to intercept this expedition, seems to have failed to find Cavendish and he, too, failed to reach the Nile.⁵⁷

The victory of the Ethiopians at Adowa was also the occasion for a grand rush of representatives of European countries to Menelik's court. France at once transferred her governor at Jibuti, M. Léonce Legarde, to Addis Ababa.⁵⁸ England dispatched Sir Rennell Rodd at the head of a mission to Menelik.⁵⁹ The Sultan was represented by a mission bearing costly presents. The Czar sought to establish a Russian legation in Ethiopia. Even Italy returned to reestablish diplomatic relations in the person of Frederico Ciccodicola.⁶⁰ There was an undignified haste to enter into negotiations with "the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah".⁶¹ The nations of Europe came to present themselves before Menelik and Italy came also among them.⁶²

The two nations in Europe most concerned at

⁵⁶*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 371, No. 3884.

⁵⁷Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 450.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 443; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 222 (note).

⁵⁹Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 225.

⁶⁰Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, pp. 446-448.

⁶¹Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 61.

⁶²*Job* 1:6.

Menelik's court were, of course, France and England. With Italy out of the way the French dream of 1894, for a vast North African Empire, seemed possible of accomplishment. Accordingly at the same time (1896) that Marchand had been dispatched to the Bahr-el-Ghazal, directions were sent to Lagarde at Jibuti for him to proceed to Addis Ababa at once with instructions to pave the way for an alliance with Menelik that, with his aid, France might reach the Nile from the east and thus be able to join hands with Marchand across the Nile at Fashoda. For Lagarde's use a large sum of money had been set aside by the French government and his instructions contained a three point program towards the accomplishment of which he was admonished to use all possible diligence.⁶³ The three objects instructed to Lagarde were: first, to organize an exploring party which should proceed through Ethiopia to connect with Marchand on the Nile; second, to induce Menelik to occupy with Abyssinian forces all the territory traditionally belonging to Ethiopia and to which he had laid claim in his letter to the Powers (which of course meant all the territory east of the White Nile lying between the 5th and the 14th or 15th parallels north latitude);⁶⁴ and third, to form a close alliance between France and Menelik.⁶⁵ After all this was accomplished, it was the purpose of the French to have built two strong forts, one on each bank of the

⁶³Hanotaux, *Fashoda*, p. 133f.

⁶⁴Rene Ferry, "L'Ethiopie", *Annales des sciences politique*, XXV, p. 22.

⁶⁵Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 425.

Nile, in the neighborhood of Fashoda from which to extend Franco-Ethiopian influence.

Though the negotiations of both France and England at Menelik's court were shrouded in mystery and the result, therefore, somewhat uncertain because neither one has published the official documents fully, yet enough can be learned from other sources to permit us to be fairly certain of most of their efforts.⁶⁶ Lagarde succeeded with all three of these objects so far as arrangements on paper were concerned, but he was unable to have any one of them carried through to ultimate success.

It will be recalled that, in the premature efforts of 1894, France hastened to send Liotard into the Ubanghi territory with instructions to open up a French port on the Nile. At the same time Captain Clochette had been dispatched from Jibuti toward the Nile through Ethiopia. But for some unexplained reason France then hesitated and diverted Liotard to other less dangerous undertakings and left Captain Clochette stranded at Addis Ababa with no instructions. Though France was then aiding Ethiopia against the Italians, there was no formal alliance. Now, since Italy no longer stood in the way, and Captain Clochette was at hand with no mission, the first of Lagarde's undertakings, that of organizing an exploring party to connect with Marchand on the Nile, was put under the command of

⁶⁶Note: The French are now in the process of publishing the Documents Diplomatiques Français in three series. The particular volumes concerning this period have not yet appeared. It may be that when these are published a clearer view of these activities may be had.

Captain Clochette.⁶⁷ Associated with him were several other Frenchmen, among them were Bonvalot, Bonchamps, Faivre, and Potter.

Just before the arrival in 1897 of the English mission headed by Rennell Rodd, these Frenchmen had left Addis Ababa and were organizing their expedition under Mount Manangasha, some distance to the west of the capital city. In addition to these French officers the expedition consisted of some two hundred Ethiopians carrying with them two hundred thousand rounds of ammunition.⁶⁸ This expedition had instructions to proceed to the Nile and there to establish a French port on the left bank and an Ethiopian fort on the right bank of that river. That they might have the help of the Ethiopians against the English, the French were careful to have Menelik believe that they were aiding him to establish his claims to all the territory east of the Nile. To both England and France Menelik, since the defeat of Italy, seemed to be the key to the whole situation. Therefore, both were anxious to have him believe they were concerned about his welfare. In spite of this rather auspicious beginning, the expedition failed utterly in accomplishing its purpose. The death of Captain Clochette placed Bonchamps in command. Bonchamps got as far as Nasir on the Sobat river but he never reached the Nile.⁶⁹ Lack of boats and sickness forced him to return to Addis Ababa some six months before Marchand reached the Nile from the west.

⁶⁷Hanotaux, *France et Angleterre, Fashoda*, p. 133ff.

⁶⁸Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, Second Series, p. 159.

⁶⁹Hanotaux, *France et Angleterre, Fashoda*, p. 133 ff.

M. Lagarde's second object was to induce Menelik to occupy all the territory to which he had laid claim east of the Nile. For Menelik, as a direct ally of France to have done this would, of course, have brought him into conflict with England, since that very part of Ethiopia was the part most desired by England. Indeed it was the territory which had been assigned to England in the Anglo-Italian protocols of 1891. Menelik of course knew of these Anglo-Italian agreements. While he had been able to force Italy out of the contest and for the time being at least, he need not fear Italy, Menelik did fear England. Here, then, was an opportunity for him to occupy this claimed territory with the backing of France. It was, therefore, not so difficult to convince Menelik that he should undertake the occupation of this lowland territory.

Accordingly by the close of 1897, there were four Ethiopian columns moving toward the Nile. Ras Makonnen, who had played such a prominent part in the Italian war, led the northern army. Tessama, Menelik's relative, accompanied by some French officers advanced upon the Sobat. Farther south, Ras Wedda Ghiorgis moved westward, while still farther south Ras Habta Ghiorgis, accompanied by M. Daragon, the Frenchman, marched upon Lake Rudolph.⁷⁰ In spite of this formidable movement of troops into the disputed territory, little was actually accomplished. Menelik's tribesmen were highlanders. This territory into which they were being led is lowland. They were poorly equipped for crossing rivers and for overcom-

⁷⁰Hanotaux, *France et Angleterre, Fashoda*, p. 133ff.

ing climatic conditions. Disease and physical obstacles defeated their purpose. Then, too, a revolt in Tigré, which Hanotaux describes as "opportune", led by the notorious Ras Mangasha occupied Menelik's attention and the effective occupation of the eastern Sudan had to be abandoned.

In the third object of his mission, that of securing an alliance for France with Menelik, Lagarde was entirely successful.⁷¹ Because of hostilities between Menelik and Italy prior to Adowa, France had not risked an open alliance with Ethiopia. She had not hesitated to supply Menelik with arms and ammunitions and many Frenchmen were employed in Menelik's military service but that was incidental and informal. Now that Italy was out of the way, France sought formal alliance with Menelik. In this diplomatic undertaking, Lagarde had the advantage over his rival negotiator, Sir Rennell Rodd, since he represented the European country that had aided Menelik against Italy, while Rodd represented the one that had partitioned Ethiopia with Italy. Then, too, Lagarde was in position to offer Menelik future support in his ambitions to reach the Nile, while Rodd came asking for Menelik's aid against the Dervishes and, in addition, a large area of Ethiopian territory east of the Nile. To Menelik, it appeared that by France he was being offered, from a past friend, valuable aid for the future in exchange for an alliance. On the other hand by England he was being asked, by one whose past conduct had caused suspicion of friendship, for further aid and concession of territory.

⁷¹Hanotaux, *France et Angleterre, Fashoda*, p. 133ff.

Accordingly, on March 20, 1897, Menelik signed with Lagarde a Franco-Ethiopian agreement of Alliance.⁷² This treaty provided that Ethiopia should extend to the Nile between the 5th and the 14th parallels of north latitude. It anticipated common action as to commerce, public works, geographical expansion, and diplomacy. Its exact terms have never been published and this secrecy in itself would assure us that it provided for decided French advantages in the international situation then centered in Ethiopia.⁷³ But, if the very secrecy with which it was guarded is not sufficient proof of its meaning, the events of the year following the signing of this treaty demonstrate beyond question that the French were aiming at establishing French control in Ethiopia to the exclusion of the English.

In spite of the secrecy with which France guarded her activities in Ethiopia, England was aware of the gravity of the situation. In addition to sending Kitchener with the Egyptian expedition up the Nile to prevent the French from joining hands across that river, she dispatched an English mission headed by Rennell Rodd to Menelik's court to prevent, if possible, that monarch from supporting the French in their efforts to reach the Nile. The ostensible purpose of this mission was announced in Parliament, February 25, 1897, by Curzon, then Under Secretary of State for Foreign

⁷²Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 421; Hanotaux, *France et Angleterre, Fashoda*, p. 113ff.

⁷³Note: When France publishes the facts connected with this and Lagarde's entire mission, and England does the same in regard to the secret part of Sir Rennell Rodd's mission to Menelik, we shall have a clearer picture of just what their relative positions were in Ethiopia at that time.

Affairs. He declared England's purpose to have been to assure Menelik of England's friendly intention to endeavor to promote amicable political and commercial relations, and to settle certain questions which had arisen between the British authorities in the Somali coast protectorate and the Abyssinian Governor of the Harrar.⁷⁴

While these reasons were thus solemnly given publicly in answer to an inquiry in the House of Commons, nobody believed that these were the only reasons for dispatching the Rodd mission so hastily to Menelik's court. They were, indeed, not even the more important reasons for doing so.⁷⁵ Sir Rennell Rodd, himself, referring to this statement of purpose, declared, "There was however, more behind the surface than might appear from the official reply"⁷⁶ He then proceeded to relate some of the reasons why he was sent to Ethiopia. He declared that England feared that Menelik might join the Mahdists and she hoped to prevent that. She also had reason to believe that the Ethiopians suspected England of having furnished Italy with funds for Italy's attempted invasion of Ethiopia, and she wished to dissipate that belief. The government in London knew of the activities of the French at Menelik's court. They had heard of Lagarde's mission to Menelik. It was rumored that Bonvalot, who was in Ethiopia, had been instructed to study the question of French commercial possibilities in the Sudan and this in connection with

⁷⁴*Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, Vol. XLVI, p. 1143.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, Vol. LIII, p. 1579ff.

⁷⁶Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, Second Series, p. 112.

England's suspicions over the Marchand mission seemed threatening. Prince Henry of Orleans, though it was claimed he had gone on his own account, was making a journey through Ethiopia with the intention of joining Marchand from the east. The English believed the Prince had the support of the French Government in the undertaking and subsequent revelations indicate the accuracy of their surmises. They had heard that other French expeditions were in the process of being formed and that Russia, through supposed religious affinity, was becoming very influential with Menelik and that she was working in close cooperation with France. Thus far, since the elimination of Italy, France and Russia had had a clear field in Ethiopia and there was danger that neither of these would be disposed to report favorably upon England's intentions along the Nile.

All these considerations and more, Rodd admits, were back of his mission to Menelik. He says, "The real value of our work lay in having established cordial relations with a country where for various reasons our prestige had declined; in having removed certain misapprehensions which it had been the interest of others to foster; and in having assisted Menelik to understand that it might be disadvantageous for his kingdom to constitute the only break in a trans-African road from east to west which another country might eventually become ambitious to establish."⁷⁷ Further he relates, "To insure, if possible, that there would be no cooperation with the Khalifa and to obtain a more intimate knowledge of internal conditions were the essential ob-

⁷⁷Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, 2nd Series, p. 199.

jects of the mission.”⁷⁸ But he admits that, since the government thought it not wise to reveal the real purpose of the mission he feels he, too, should maintain mysterious silence. No doubt the real purpose of his mission to Menelik, Sir Rennell covers up in the “more intimate knowledge of internal conditions” and in the private conversation he had with Menelik just before he left Ethiopia for England.⁷⁹

If the published results of Rodd’s mission to Menelik are the only results, then his mission ended in complete failure. On May 14, 1897, he signed with Menelik a treaty fixing the boundary between British Somaliland and Ethiopia.⁸⁰ This treaty provided that the boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia should be moved back some distance into British territory. It granted England “most favored nation” treatment, and it proposed to keep open the caravan route between Zeila and Harrar. It permitted Ethiopian State material to pass through the English port of Zeila free of duty and bound Menelik to do all in his power to prevent the passage of arms and ammunition through his territory to the Mahdists whom he declared to be the enemies of his empire.

As far as this treaty indicates, the only real advantage resulting to England was the assurance that Menelik would not permit arms to pass through Ethi-

⁷⁸Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, 2nd Series, pp. 113, 114.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁸⁰*Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. CI, Treaty Series, No. 2, 1898 (C-8715); Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 432f; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2e série, Vol. XXVIII, p. 440-443; *State Papers*, Vol. 89, p. 31.

opia to the Dervishes. It did not settle the question of greatest moment to England. No mention was made of the western boundary to be fixed between Ethiopia and British aspirations in the Sudan east of the Nile. No assurances were made as to Menelik's attitude toward the British expedition then moving up the Nile. It may be that Rodd decided to take what he could get at that time and await a more favorable opportunity to deal with the question of the western boundary. Perhaps Menelik would prove to be more tractable after Kitchener had reached Khartum.

Menelik's experiences with the Italians over the treaty of Uccialli had taught him to be cautious. He was determined to permit no possibility of a misunderstanding with England arising out of a mistranslation of the Amharic text of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty. He, therefore, had a copy of the treaty prepared in French, which he submitted to Rodd with the request that should there arise, in the future, any question as to the meaning of any part of the treaty as written in English and Amharic, this French translation should serve as a witness between them. To this request Sir Rennell agreed and the work of his mission was closed.⁸¹

After completing this treaty with Menelik and arranging the details as to the Somali boundary with Ras Makonnen at Harrar, Rodd returned to Cairo, to the great satisfaction of the French. Both France and England had now completed agreements with Menelik. Much of both agreements is still shrouded in mystery,

⁸¹*Parliamentary Papers*, Treaty Series, No. 2, Ethiopia (1898). In *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. LIV; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. 28, p. 438.

but enough can be learned from subsequent events to assure us that Menelik had succeeded in having both England and France fairly well satisfied with their respective prospects, while he maintained for himself considerable independence of action.

The French, who were busy organizing their various expeditions provided for in the Franco-Ethiopian treaty of March 20 while Sir Rennell Rodd was concluding his agreement, now redoubled their efforts. They hastened to get under way the construction of the railway for which M. Ilg, the Swiss had secured a concession in 1894. Prior to the battle of Adowa no construction had been begun on this concession, but immediately after that event, on somewhat modified terms, construction was provided for and the concession handed over to a company which came to be known as the *Compagnie Impériale des Chemins de Fer Éthiopiens*. M. Chefneux, who had now become adviser to Menelik for "Railways, Roads, and Communications" in Ethiopia and was his Consul General for all Europe, having retained his interests in M. Ilg's concession, secured, in March 1897, an agreement from the French government for construction of the railway.

Work was begun at once and carried forward with vigor. Had France not hesitated back in 1894, she could have had this important road across Ethiopia to the Nile well under way when Italy abandoned Ethiopia. Now, haste was of greatest importance since England was already in motion. Occupation of western Ethiopia could not wait for the construction of a thousand miles of railway over the mountainous route from

Jibuti to the Nile. Marchand was already lost in his long dive from the Congo to the Nile and if any Frenchmen were to be there with whom Marchand might "clasp hands across the Nile" in the hope of holding that clasp for a brief moment before the arrival of Kitchener, it was necessary that he should get there some other way than to arrive by the first train over the Jibuti-Nile railway.

This necessity is the explanation for the many Franco-Ethiopian expeditions described above moving toward the Nile. In addition to those already described, led largely by Frenchmen, there were others with whom were associated certain Russians. One Count Leontieff especially had won the goodwill of Menelik. In 1897, at the same time that Menelik had created Lagarde "Duke of Entoto", he had appointed this Count Leontieff "Governor General of the Equatorial Provinces" and granted him extensive commercial and mining rights in these new lands, wherever they were.

It now seems quite impossible to locate exactly, the "Equatorial Provinces" over which Menelik had created Leontieff Governor General, but it is clear that they constituted the territory in the southwest of Ethiopia extending to the south beyond any claim hitherto set up by Menelik. Menelik was now undertaking to fulfill his threat that if Africa were about to be dismembered he proposed to get his share. Whatever the eastern and northern boundaries of the "Equatorial Provinces" were (presumably the Indian Ocean and the fifth parallel of north latitude respectively), their southern limit seems to have been the 2nd parallel of north lati-


tude, while to the west they extended to the Nile.⁸² This, as will be observed, took in a large part of what is now Kenya Colony and the Uganda Protectorate, both claimed by Great Britain.

Count Leontieff, Governor-General of the "Equatorial Provinces", seems never to have come into actual possession of his equatorial lands. Armed with extensive mining concessions and the right to hunt elephants as well as Englishmen, he collected a rather formidable expedition, among whom were several French officers and many Senegalese troops. As co-leader of the expedition, Leontieff had secured Prince Henry of Orleans. When all preparations were about completed and the final instructions in the use of European fire-arms were being given by Leontieff himself to some Ethiopian raw recruits, a Maxim gun was accidentally discharged into Leontieff's legs. Whereupon he and Prince Henry returned to Europe and it is doubtful if his expedition ever got started.⁸³ It is most likely that his officers and men were distributed among the other Franco-Ethiopian expeditions on the way to the Nile.

Had Leontieff succeeded in establishing himself in the regions north and east of Lake Victoria, he could have offered considerable opposition to English plans in this disputed area and he could have given some support to the French at Fashoda, but his efforts failed just

⁸²*Parliamentary Debates*, 4th Series, Vol. LIII, p. 1579ff.

⁸³Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, pp. 74, 75. Note: Writers differ as to the fate of Leontieff's expedition. I am following Wylde here. Mr. Wylde was in the neighborhood at the time the expedition was being organized and wrote shortly afterwards and therefore his record should be fairly accurate.



Map showing
Menelik's Equatorial
Province.

as many of these hastily prepared and poorly equipped Franco-Russian expeditions failed.

It will be recalled that about the middle of 1897, Darragon, the French explorer, had led a force of some 15,000 men into the neighborhood of Lake Rudolph for the purpose of cutting across the English column, under command of Mr. Cavendish, thought to be marching upon the Nile. (Cavendish, however, had turned back already because his expedition was not prepared for such an undertaking). Upon his return to Addis Ababa, Darragon induced Menelik to establish a military occupation over the territory through which he had travelled.⁸⁴ This Menelik did by sending the Russian Lieutenant Boulatowich to join one of Menelik's generals, Walda Ghiorgis, the governor of Kaffa. In March 1898, Menelik's general accompanied by Boulatowich and several French officers and some Cossacks, and a force of about 30,000 men, composed of Senegalese and Ethiopians, took possession of the region along the Kenya-Uganda borders. Boulatowich upon his return reported that they had come across an English armed force of about 500 men who were secretly proceeding northwest in order to reach the right bank of the Nile, which they would have reached in five or six days' march. His Franco-Russo-Ethiopian army attacked the English expedition which departed in headlong flight. Whereupon, the Franco-Russo-Ethiopian forces took possession of that whole territory as far south as the 3rd parallel north latitude.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 450.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 450-453.

One should observe that this territory is practically co-extensive with the western part of the "Equatorial Provinces" over which Menelik had made our ill-starred Leontieff, Governor General and chief elephant hunter. The intention of the French for both the Leontieff and the Boulatowich expeditions was that they should occupy this region between Lake Rudolph and Lake Victoria and thus shut off any attempts of the English to reach the Nile from the south and to serve as a protecting guard from that area for the converging expeditions of Marchand and Clochette-Bonchamps. Had they been successful, they would have placed Menelik in possession of a block of territory extending from the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria and the Nile and reaching to within one degree of the equator on the south.

It will be seen that this would have included a large part of British East Africa (Kenya) and all of Uganda east of the White Nile. It would have brought French influence from the east right up against the Bahr-el-Ghazal, whose control France was anticipating because of the Marchand expedition then nearing its goal at Fashoda. Thus France sought to round out her North African Empire pictured in the now lost map of 1895.⁸⁶ The Leontieff expedition failed because of the untimely discharge of a Maxim gun into Leontieff's

⁸⁶Though I have made a careful search for a copy of this map in both England and France and have had competent book firms in England attempt to locate one, none can now be found. One cannot doubt its existence in 1896, however, any more than one can now doubt the existence of the Ethiopian map showing Ualual, the scene of Italo-Ethiopian dispute, some 100 kilometers within Ethiopian territory. The Ualual map which hung in the press room of the League of Nations has been destroyed, if press reports are to be believed.

legs and the sudden return of this Russian count and his princely companion of Orleans to Europe. The present day proof, of its failure is to be seen in the fact that most of Leontieff's Equatorial Provinces are now a part of Kenya Colony and Uganda, wholly under British control, not French.

The Boulatowich scheme succeeded to the extent that today Ethiopia holds a part of the territory occupied at that time. They both failed in their main immediate purpose in protecting the Bonchamps effort to clasp hands with Marchand across the Nile at Fashoda. They failed in this not because of themselves alone but because the Bonchamps expedition itself failed miserably to carry out its purpose to a point where it needed protection from any one but the French themselves.

The Clochette-Bonchamps expedition, described above, was the main French effort in Ethiopia to effect a junction with Marchand. All these other various Franco-Russo-Ethiopian movements into the Nile territory, ostensibly to occupy for Menelik his claims to eastern Sudan, were simply supporting columns to French ambitions. It will be recalled that Clochette died while on the way and his command was taken by Bonchamps. Bonchamps reached the Sobat but was forced by climatic conditions and lack of proper equipment to return to Addis Ababa.

The main Ethiopian supporting column for Bonchamps' division was led by Dedjazmach Tessama, Menelik's cousin. With about 5,000 men he had followed up Bonchamps to the Sobat. From the Sobat

he continued straight away to the White Nile, arriving there just about the time Kitchener was capturing Omdurman.⁸⁷ Attached to his division were the French artillery officer, M. Faivre, his countryman, M. Potter, and Colonel Artomonov, a Russian. Tessama had two purposes. They were to occupy for Menelik the territory reaching from the Ethiopian plateau to the White Nile and to render aid to Marchand at Fashoda. He was to occupy the right bank of the White Nile from the confluence of the Sobat with that river at Fashoda. Among all the French efforts to reach the Nile, Tessama's was the only one that approached success. His expedition arrived at the south of the Sobat June 20, 1898. Here they raised the Ethiopian flag on the right bank of the Nile and M. Faivre swam to an island in mid-river, where he hoisted the French flag as a sign of French sovereignty there. But the mortality from fever among his troops was so great that Tessama had to withdraw to higher altitudes. His main object, that of affecting a junction with Marchand, had to be abandoned and he withdrew from the Nile less than two weeks before Marchand floated down the river passing the very spot upon which the French flag had been flown.⁸⁸

Thus when Marchand's little column reached Fashoda there was no friendly outstretched hand reaching across the Nile for him to clasp as he had expected. Nor did any arrive, although he waited for more than two months. The first Europeans to reach him could

⁸⁷Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, pp. 453-454.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 454, 455 .

not be considered friendly. When Kitchener, with his gunboats, reached Fashoda there was no Franco-Russo-Ethiopian supporting expedition on the right bank of the Nile. Therefore, that France must lose the Pawn was certain. France failed to establish her claim to Ethiopia and the Nile valley, her paper African empire, because her plans in Ethiopia had miscarried. Perhaps M. Lagarde was somewhat to blame for this failure as some French writers intimate. The rebellion of Ras Mangasha, which Hanotaux calls "opportune" and which Morié does not hesitate to attribute to British intrigues, removed the full force of Menelik's aid from the French at a most critical time.⁸⁹ The climatic conditions in the low country along the Nile interfered greatly with French undertaking. All these contributed to French failure but most of all the defeat of the Italians at Adowa precipitated such a race between the French and the English that the French had not time enough to prepare a properly equipped expedition for reaching the Nile through Ethiopia. On the other hand, for part of the way at least from Egypt to Fashoda, the British had the Nile and a fairly well equipped army ready to begin operations at once. Had the French been sure in 1894 of the outcome between Italy and Menelik when they first conceived the idea of a great French Empire extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, they could have had a two years' advantage in preparation. France had sent Liotard toward the Bahr-el-Ghazal. She had opportunity to begin the construction of a railway from Jibuti to the

⁸⁹Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 465.

Nile and her influence with Menelik was in the ascendancy, while that of her rival was at lowest ebb. But France hesitated. She was not certain. She considered the situation to be fraught with too much danger and thus permitted the opportune time to pass. By the time the way was cleared for safer action it was too late for successful action.

After Marchand was ordered to evacuate Fashoda and he had passed through Ethiopia in a triumphal march home by way of Jibuti, France withdrew as gracefully as possible from military activity in Ethiopia. The withdrawal of France left only England to deal directly with the Pawn. Though one after another of England's European rivals had been eliminated, Menelik still claimed the whole territory as far as the White Nile. The western bank of the Nile was wholly unsuited for railway construction. Enough highland territory east of the Nile for the construction of her long desired Cape-to-Cairo railway was essential to England. That she might have this and the control of the waters of the Blue Nile and the Atbara had been England's main purpose all along. Since all European opposition had been eliminated, she could not stop short of complete success with only Menelik in the way.

Therefore, England at once set to work to follow up her success by seeking to secure a settlement with Menelik whereby she might have a considerable strip of territory along the right bank of the Nile, extending from the Uganda protectorate to the borders of Egypt. To accomplish this diplomatic manoeuvre the British government sent to Menelik's court, in 1898, Colonel

John Lane-Harrington, who proved himself a most skillful diplomat.⁹⁰ Harrington did much toward removing from Menelik's mind deep seated suspicion of England. He was greatly aided in his efforts to win Menelik away from the French influence by the French themselves. In granting to M. Ilg a concession for the building of a railway through Ethiopia Menelik assumed that he was dealing with an individual. Later M. Ilg had transferred his concession to the French State.⁹¹ This put an entirely different construction upon the matter. Because of this diplomatic intrigue, Menelik was in the proper state of mind to listen to Harrington's proposals.

One must recognize that, in the devious road he had to travel among the European rivalries, several times, between 1885 and 1898, Menelik came dangerously near allying himself so closely to some one state that that state might come to look upon Ethiopia as its possession. But it is just as evident that at no time in Menelik's mind did he have the least intention of surrendering his sovereignty to any of them. When he understood, therefore, that France as a state intended to control the railway he was in the right attitude for Harrington to propose a treaty with England. Just as M. Deloncle had revealed to Menelik the Italian purposes in the treaty of Ucciali by sending him the Italian "Green Book" with Italy's interpretation of Article XVII explained, so now Sir John explained to

⁹⁰Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 450.

⁹¹The Anglo-Franco-Ethiopian difficulties that arose over the ownership and construction of this railway from Jibuti to Diré Dawa we shall discuss briefly in our next chapter.

Menelik the meaning of the transfer of the railway concession to France.

Upon his understanding of the situation, then, Menelik was ready to conclude a treaty with England delimiting his western boundary. Accordingly May 15, 1902, they signed a treaty permitting England to claim a generous slice of Ethiopian territory east of the Nile.⁹² If England had not secured the whole pawn, she, at least, did secure plenty of upland territory upon which to build her railway. In addition she secured the right to have something to say should the waters of the Blue Nile ever be subject to change.

Thus England and France, the final contestants for Ethiopia, had crossed swords at Menelik's court and France, though the court favorite, had lost. Germany, Italy, France and England had been possible contenders. In 1890 Germany had dropped out of the game in favor of England. Italy had tried and lost at Adowa. In 1894, France had donned her fighting togs but hesitated. From 1896 to 1898 she had made hasty heroic efforts from both the east and west to set the stage for a successful encounter with England, but too late. England at the close of 1898 stood alone facing Ethiopia and by 1902 she had practically reached her goal. There remains to be related the settlements concluded among them and this we shall describe in the following pages.

⁹²Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3rd Edition, Vol II, p. 431.

CHAPTER VI

THE PAWN ESCAPES

"THE LION OF THE TRIBE OF JUDAH HAS CONQUERED"

By admirable courage and ability Menelik, supported by the determined will of his dusky highlanders for their independence had escaped the fate of all other African chieftains. With consummate skill and shrewdness he had played one European power against another. One after another they had arisen to claim Ethiopia only to be outdone by the Ethiopians supported by one or more European rival. The rise and fall of each of these has been recorded. There remains to be related the settlements reached by the contestants as each withdrew from the field and the final agreement among themselves as to their future relations toward each other in regard to Ethiopia.

Upon Baratieri's crushing defeat at Adowa, March 1, 1896, there had been great excitement in Italy, as indeed, in England and France also. Even Germany and Austria were at least agitated. In Italy King Umberto and Crispi prepared to send 40,000 additional soldiers to Eritrea at once in order to wipe out the disgrace at Adowa and to establish Italy's authority over Ethiopia. But Umberto and Crispi were not the only Italians who were greatly agitated over Ethiopian affairs. There arose such a storm of protest from the Italian people that even Crispi's government reversed its first impulses and directed General Baldissera, who had been appointed to take the place of the defeated

General Baratieri, to conclude a peace with Ras Makonnen upon the best terms obtainable.¹ This sudden conversion of Crispi, however, came too late to convince the Chamber of Deputies of its sincerity and Crispi's government fell within a week following Adowa.

Crispi's government was followed by that of the Marquis de Rudini.² Rudini favored withdrawal from Ethiopia and conclusion of peace as early as possible. He claimed that Italian finances did not justify any other course. Neither did Italian spirit encourage any other just then. Though only two days after the battle of Adowa, Blanc, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had sent a long note of explanation to other European powers, there was no eager response.³ It is true that the Kaiser urged England to go to the Sudan as a matter of protection to the Italians, but Germany offered no material support of Italy herself.⁴ As we know, England did order Kitchener's expedition up the Nile at once, but we also know that this movement was not made in behalf of Italy, but for England herself. Menelik, too, was active in presenting Ethiopia's protest against Italy. He had written Russia, France and Switzerland.⁵ Already both France and Russia had been active in aiding Menelik before Adowa.⁶ They

¹*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XX *Raccolta degli Atti Stampati*, 1895-97; Bonnefon, *L'Afrique politique en 1900*, p. 459.

²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, ter. p. 14, doc. 18.

³*Ibid.*, bis (Legis XIX First session, 1895-96) p. 298ff, doc. 509.

⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 272, No. 2772.

⁵*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, ter (Legis XIX first session 1895-96) p. 60, doc. 69.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 18, doc. 28.

were quick to support him more actively now. Under these circumstances Italy speeded up her efforts in peace negotiations.

Accordingly, about the middle of March, 1896, Baldissera charged M. Salsa with the responsibility of treating with Ras Makonnen and Menelik. By March 19, Salsa had completed his mission and returned with Menelik's definite proposals of peace. They were: first, the treaty of Uccialli must be abrogated completely and a new one made; second, the frontiers between Eritrea and Ethiopia should be marked by the Mareb-Belessa-Mouna line; third, before signing a new treaty Italy must give up Adigrat, and all Italian soldiers not actually needed to control Eritrea should return to Italy; fourth, the Ethiopian soldiers should return home after the governor of Tigré had been named.⁷

One of the reasons for the speed with which Menelik's armies could move from place to place over the mountainous country of Ethiopia was the fact that they carried very little provision with them. That was the case about Adowa. Had the Italians delayed their attack some days longer, it is possible that many of Menelik's soldiers would have been forced to go in search of food. Then, too, the rainy season was approaching and the Ethiopians were anxious to get back to their homes. Therefore, shortly after Adowa, Menelik's army had gone back into Shoa taking many Italian prisoners with them.⁸

⁷*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XXIII, ter (Legis XIX First session 1895-96) p. 28, doc. 48. *Note*: The Italians were desirous of having Ras Makonnen named as governor of Tigré.

⁸Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, p. 212-215.

The Italians had feared that Menelik's warriors, flushed with their complete success at Adowa, would follow up the Italian retreat toward the coast. When this forward movement did not follow but instead the Ethiopians were returning to Shoa in great numbers, the Italian negotiators began to stiffen up their resistance to Menelik's peace demands. They began to look about for some European mediator to plead their cause with Menelik.⁹ The friends of Italian soldiers held as prisoners by the Ethiopians were especially insistent that some means be devised by which these prisoners should be returned to Italy.¹⁰ Had England had a better standing at Addis Ababa she would have been the logical mediator, but at that time England's stock in trade with Menelik was almost on a par with that of Italy herself. Bülow doubted England's availability. There was Russia. Russia stood well with Menelik, but the Central Powers believed that she had designs of her own in Ethiopia.¹¹ It had been her desire to get Italy out of the Red Sea area and herself in control there.¹² Once Russia had proposed that she become Ethiopia's protector because of a similarity in religions. If Russia had become the mediator between Italy and Ethiopia, it would have been dangerous for both Italy and England. However, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, perhaps with Russian prompting, sought to have Russia invited to act as the go-between.¹³ Apparently

⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 247, No. 2785.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*, No. 2772; *Ibid.*, p. 235, No. 2770.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 250, No. 2787.

Russia would have been acceptable to Menelik.¹⁴

The failure to find any political power that would be acceptable to both Italy and Menelik was followed by an attempt of the Pope to have Menelik release the Italian prisoners.¹⁵ Pope Leo XIII dispatched a letter dated San Pietro, May 11, 1896, to Menelik by one Macario. The pope addressed Menelik as *Potentissimo Negus Negasti* and pleaded that he return all Italian prisoners to their country and their families. Macario delivered the Pope's letter August 12. Because he wished to show high respect for the Czar of Russia, Menelik had already liberated fifty of these prisoners on the occasion of the coronation of the Czar.¹⁶ The prisoners had been brought to Jibuti by Count Leontieff, destined to become Governor General of the Equatorial Provinces and to receive a Maxim charge in his legs. The arrival of these prisoners at the coast had raised the hopes of the Italians for further liberations. Menelik indeed was highly pleased with the Pope's letter but, because the Feast of Assumption was then being celebrated, he asked Macario to return August 28. At this second meeting, Menelik proposed to release all prisoners, except the officers among them, within fifteen days. Since the prisoners were widely scattered among the native villages he arranged for two weeks in which to collect them all at Addis Ababa.

Unfortunately for these prisoners, on Sunday, September 5, just one week before they were to have

¹⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 260, No. 2793.

¹⁵Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 191 ff.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

been set at liberty, there arrived a runner from the coast bearing the news of the capture of the Dutch boat *Doelwijk* (or *Doelwick*). The *Doelwijk* was a Dutch boat loaded with arms and ammunition from Russia and consigned to Menelik. Just as it was nearing the French port of Jibuti, it had been cited by the Italian gunboat *Etna*, and captured as a neutral boat carrying contraband of war.¹⁷ The currier accompanied the news of the capture of the *Doelwijk* with extravagant reports of Italian intentions toward Ethiopia. Though only partially true, these reports had the same effect as they would have had had they been entirely true. They occasioned great excitement in Addis Ababa. Menelik was angered that right in the midst of peace negotiations, Italy should interfere with any sort of commerce he might wish to carry on with any other state.

Italy charged that for Menelik to attempt to import contraband of war during an armistice in which peace negotiations were being attempted was a breach of faith in an attempt to force his wishes. The matter became an international question. As the name indicates the captured vessel was a Dutch boat, but it had been chartered by *Carriere Sons and Co.*, a French company, and it was carrying Russian arms from Riga and Reval.¹⁸

¹⁷Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 192, 193; E. L. Bonnefon, *L'Afrique politique en 1900*, p. 463.

¹⁸Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 206f; de Martens, *Recueil de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 66-90. Note: The story of the *Doelwijk* is a very interesting one. After capture it was taken to Massowah and the captain of the *Etna* claimed it as a prize of war. Its case was not settled finally until after the Italo-Ethiopian peace had been signed December 15, 1896, when the prize commission rendered its decision. See de Martens, *Recueil de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. 28, p. 90.

Here were at least three European states, supposedly at peace with a fourth European state, in a deal attempting to sell arms to Menelik, an Ethiopian, at war with the fourth state (Italy). When one recalls that all these European states had solemnly promised "In the Name of Almighty God" in the Brussels Conference not to sell firearms to any Ethiopians, one is surprised to find so many of them so involved in one instance of flagrant disregard of that promise.¹⁹

When Menelik understood the significance of the Doelwijk case, no further steps toward releasing Italian prisoners were possible. On September 25, just ten days after they should have been released, M. Ilg, the French Swiss, in the name of the Negus, informed the Pope's messenger that no prisoners could be released to return to their country and their families as the Pope had requested. On October 1, Menelik called Macario to him and expressed great regret that an act of the Italian government had made it impossible for him to release the prisoners as he had fully purposed to do. With his regrets Menelik handed Macario a large Ethiopian cross and a letter to the Pope in which he repeated his regrets that after Italy had asked for peace the government, by its own act, in the Doelwijk matter had made it impossible for him to grant the Pope's request.²⁰ He could not sacrifice the only guarantee

¹⁹Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 488 ff.

²⁰This whole case is given in Rossetti's *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, pp. 191-206; also in de Martens *Recueil de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. 28, pp. 66-90; *Gazetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia*, No. 296, anno 1900.

for Italy's good behavior that he had in hand.²¹

Macario had been almost six months on his mission from the "Holy See" to the "Potentissimo Negus Negasti." Just as he was happy in anticipation of complete success in being able to bear the news of the restoration of far distant prisoners of war to their families, to learn that an act of his own countrymen had rendered their release impossible was the greatest of disappointments. He left Addis Ababa *con le lagrime agli occhi*.²² The Bishop's mission had failed through no fault of his own. Italy and Germany had hoped much from the Pope's influence but they had overrated its weight with Menelik. That monarch would not surrender the prisoners now until he had a satisfactory peace arrangement with Italy.²³

The negotiations for peace, being thus interrupted, failed to produce satisfactory results. Major Salsa's efforts were dropped and Major Cesare Nerazzini, an able diplomat, was appointed as a special envoy to Menelik's court with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace. Menelik and Nerazzini completed their task and signed at Addis Ababa a treaty of "perpetual peace and friendship," October 26, 1896.²⁴

This agreement provided for the complete annul-

²¹Bonnefon, *L'Afrique politique en 1900*, p. 463.

²²Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 194.

²³*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 260, No. 2793.

²⁴*Archives Diplomatiques*, 1897, t. LXIV, p. 19; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XXV, p. 59; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, pp. 458, 459; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. X, (Leg. XX primo. Sess. 1897) p. 1-4.

ment of the treaty of Ucciali of May 2, 1889.²⁵ By this treaty Italy recognized Ethiopia as a sovereign and independent state.²⁶ She agreed never to cede any of her African territory bordering upon Ethiopia to any other power and in case Italy should ever wish to abandon any of these possessions the territory thus abandoned should revert to Ethiopia.²⁷ They agreed upon certain commercial arrangements and provided that the treaty should be brought to the notice of the other Powers. As to the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea, they arranged to observe the *status quo ante* and in general agreed that the line should follow the rivers Mareb, Belessa and Mouna.²⁸ Menelik made sure this time that there should be no Italian mistranslation by providing that there should be no Italian text. The treaty was to be written in Amharic and in French, but not in Italian.

It will be seen that the terms of this final treaty followed very closely the first draft furnished to Salsa by Menelik.³⁰ Italy was in no position to make demands. She could get no material support from Europe. Germany and Austria had informed her that the Triple Alliance was a defensive instrument and must not be considered as an aggressive pact.³¹ England, Italy's Mediterranean ally, had moved up the

²⁵Article II of the Treaty.

²⁶Article III of the Treaty.

²⁷Article V of the Treaty.

²⁸Article IV of the Treaty.

²⁹Article IX of the Treaty.

³⁰See *supra*, p. 274.

³¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 230, No. 2766; *Ibid.*, p. 229, No. 2765.

Nile, ostensibly to save the Italians from an attack by the Mahdists and she was preparing the Rodd mission to Menelik, but there was no guarantee to support Italy in further aggression upon Ethiopia. Indeed, Lord Salisbury had informed Hatzfeldt, when Hatzfeldt was urging more English support for Italy, that he had always looked upon Italy's aggression in Ethiopia as a mistaken policy.³² England's main purpose in the Kitchener expedition as well as in the Rodd mission was not to aid Italy but to forestall France. Her interest in Italy's Ethiopian affairs was lost with Adowa. Italy had proven a broken reed. England well knew that now alone she must deal with France. Germany also knew it and was glad. The Kaiser was so stirred by the prospects that, when informed of the situation by Count Münster, from Paris, he expressed his joy by writing "Hurrah" into the margin of Münster's note.³³ England stood ready to aid Italy in the Mediterranean, but she did not propose to aid her further in Ethiopia. From Rome von Bülow informed the German Foreign Office that Italy was forced to accept hard terms of peace in order to secure the release of the Italian soldiers held as prisoners of war by Menelik, and to escape future attacks in Eritrea with the likelihood of losing that colony along with her claims upon Ethiopia.³⁴ Then, too, there were threatening conditions within Italy herself and it was thought the speedy settlement of the whole Ethiopian question would tend to

³²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. VIII, p. 380, No. 2004; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 161.

³³*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 151, No. 2696; *German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 423.

³⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 623, No. 2795.

consolidate the internal affairs at home.³⁵ It was necessary for Italy to conclude as quickly as possible a treaty of peace containing the best terms obtainable and to withdraw from Ethiopia as gracefully as she could. Menelik's one great mistake in concluding this treaty was that he did not demand an Ethiopian port on the Red Sea with a corridor leading to it. Had he done so then, there can hardly be a doubt that he could have had it. Now it is so badly needed and Italy will not be disposed to grant it.

To the treaty of peace of October 26, 1896, was appended a supplementary convention, concluded the same day, providing for the return of the Italians held by Menelik as prisoners of war.³⁶ Thus ended the long contest through which Italy sought to make good her claim to a protectorate over Ethiopia. By aiding Menelik to dominate Ethiopia, she had secured his signature to a treaty whose Italian translation had provided an excuse by which Italy had claimed that protectorate. From 1889 to 1896 Italy had sought to force upon Menelik the acceptance of this protection, which had never existed in fact. During all this time Menelik, with the encouragement of France and Russia, had stoutly resisted acceptance of any such interpretation of the treaty of May 2, 1889. At Adowa his efforts had been crowned with complete success. Italy now withdrew from all pretensions in Ethiopia and recog-

³⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XI, p. 623, No. 2795.

³⁶*Archives Diplomatiques*, 1897, t. LXIV, p. 20; de Martens, *Recueil de traités*, 2^e série, t. XXV, p. 61; Bonnefon, *L'Afrique politique en 1900*, p. 459; *Documenti Diplomatici*, No. X, Legis XX, primo sess. 1897, pp. 1-4; Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 200.

nized without reserve her independence as complete and absolute. The details of boundaries between Ethiopia and the Italian colony of Eritrea were later established by a convention along the lines agreed upon in the treaty of peace.³⁷

With Italy put out of the struggle by this settlement, there remained the position of England and France. Through the aid to Menelik in his struggle with Italy, France was in position to slip into Italy's place in her claims upon Ethiopia. Having concluded peace with Italy, Menelik addressed a letter to Umberto, the King of Italy, expressing his great satisfaction at having good relations re-established with that country.³⁸ At the same time he wrote M. Felix Faure, president of France, expressing his joy and the assurance that his *friends* would wish to rejoice with him. To this letter M. Faure responded at once expressing his joy, and that of France "as a neighbor and friend." France was a neighbor, at least, in French Somaliland.³⁹ England apparently received no letter but she lost no time in dispatching the Rodd mission to assure Menelik of her good intentions toward Ethiopia and to conclude a treaty with him.

Both France and England had hastened to Menelik's court when France by the aid of M. Lagarde, had completed the Franco-Ethiopian treaty of March 20, 1897, and England, through the diplomacy of Sir Rennell Rodd, had negotiated the Anglo-Ethiopian

³⁷*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, (Legis XXI, 2d sess. 1902) p. 8.

³⁸Morié, *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 435.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 436.

agreement of May 14, 1897. At the same time France had hurried Marchand to the West coast to connect with the Ethiopian frontiers from the west, while England had sent Kitchener up the Nile to prevent this junction. The French Ethiopian expeditions had failed and for France matters had come to an unfortunate head at Fashoda in September, 1898.

Even while these activities were being carried on, the French and English had been making efforts to define their respective spheres of influence in the west. On June 14, 1898, just about a month before the arrival of Marchand at Fashoda, they had completed arrangements in regard to their boundary west of the Niger and were in the process of having the agreement ratified, when all negotiations were disturbed by the meeting of Marchand and Kitchener at Fashoda in September, 1898.⁴⁰

As we have seen in Chapters IV and V, France was forced to withdraw from Fashoda largely because of the failure of her Ethiopian plans to join hands with Marchand across the Nile and because of the general European situation at that time, which did not assure France of even Russia's active support.⁴¹ She had also lost much of her influence at Menelik's court. But the recall of Marchand, while it released the tension for the moment, did not settle the issues finally. The French government had conceded nothing more than the evacuation of Fashoda. There remained the settle-

⁴⁰*Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series*, No. 15, 1899; *Ibid.*, Africa, No. 4, 1898; *Documents Diplomatiques* 1899, p. 33; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 785-790.

⁴¹A. Yarmolinsky, *Memoirs of Count Witte*, pp. 77, 78.

ment of their respective spheres in the west and the general situation in Ethiopia.

When Marchand should leave Fashoda to what point should he withdraw? England had never placed a limit upon her pretension. That he might avoid retracing his steps by returning westward and at the same time might not be forced to accept British transport down the Nile, Marchand returned to France by way of Ethiopia and thus avoided having to acknowledge English claims upon any particular point in the Bahr-el-Ghazal. While the French demanded to know just what the English did want, there was decided difference of opinion among the members of the British government as to the exact reply. Lord Salisbury favored making some concessions to the French, but Chamberlain especially, who had no faith in the French, wished to demand the utmost.⁴²

In Parliament, too, there was a minority that opposed colonial imperialism under any circumstances.⁴³ Labouchere, a member of Parliament, now demanded that England should negotiate with France upon the basis of the Wolff Convention.⁴⁴ But there were more voices heard in Parliament demanding an aggressive

⁴²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 405, No. 3925; p. 244, No. 3801; p. 388, No. 3908; *British Documents*, Vol I, p. 129, No. 154. *Note*: Upon being informed by Hatzfeldt, that the French believed that Lord Salisbury favored certain compensations to the French the Kaiser remarked "Der alte Gallische Fuchs." *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 403, No. 3923 (Margin). To Lord Salisbury, Chamberlain was a "Durchgänger" according to Hatzfeldt.

⁴³*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. LX, p. 265; *Ibid.*, Vol. LXVI, p. 1455; *Ibid.*, Vol. LXVII, p. 461.

⁴⁴*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. LXVII, p. 505. *Note*: the Wolff Convention provided for England's evacuation of Egypt. Labouchere wished the Sudan handed over to Egypt.

policy.⁴⁵ They argued that England should control other "races unfit for free institutions."⁴⁶ Some claimed that control of these races was inevitable and that England had been forced by her competitors into her present position.⁴⁷

Moreover the imagination of public opinion in England had become so aroused in favor of vigorous action that any government which should have weakened in following up British advantage after the withdrawal of Marchand would have fallen immediately. The English tourists no longer visited France as formerly. They went to the Italian Riviera instead. Those who did visit France engaged hotels only on condition of no war with England.⁴⁸ They argued that British claims were based upon her present relationship to Egypt. The Sudan had been a part of Egypt and therefore England as Egypt's protector had claims over the Sudan. But suppose the Mahdists had conquered the Sudan from Egypt and therefore Egypt's rights had elapsed, in that case England had conquered the Mahdists and, therefore, by right of conquest the Sudan should belong to England. The most impressive argument of all, however, was the one having to do with Cecil Rhodes' railway. With the western part of the Nile Valley in British control the English would be in position to negotiate with Menelik for sufficient highland territory east of the Nile upon which to build this railway. Moreover, should the French be forced

⁴⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 390, No. 3909.

⁴⁶*Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. LXVII, p. 481.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 490-497.

⁴⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 408, No. 3926.

to withdraw from the Nile they must soon be weakened in their influence in Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, France was at a great disadvantage. There were many internal affairs that had disturbed the government. The Dreyfus case had just been reopened. There were rumors of plots against the government. She stood in fear of Germany. She had reason to doubt the loyalty of her ally, Russia.⁴⁹

Her people, by their lack of enthusiastic support, had permitted their government to withdraw from Fashoda without a struggle.⁵⁰ Herr Münster, the German ambassador in Paris, informed his government in Berlin that France was *Cronisch sehr Krank*. She thought no more of *glorie*. She hated the Jews, worshipped the golden calf and was fearful of war.⁵¹ To all of which the Kaiser recorded *richtig* in the margin.

Both countries must have anticipated the final results. Marchand had been in an impossible position.⁵² France had some good arguments, if there can be good arguments why any one European country rather than another should control a part of Africa. Frenchmen thought their cause so just and their right so incontestable that to question these rights would indicate bad faith on the part of the British.⁵³ But the matter had passed beyond arguments now. Facts had to be considered. After the successful Egyptian expedition England

⁴⁹A. Yarmolinsky, *Memoirs of Count Witte*, pp. 77, 78; Barclay, *Thirty Years of Anglo-French Reminiscences*, pp. 148, 149; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 254, note.

⁵⁰Hanotaux, *Le Partage de l'Afrique*, Fashoda, p. 147.

⁵¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIII, p. 315, No. 3618.

⁵²*Parliamentary Papers, Egypt* 2, 1898, pp. 8, 9. (Accounts and papers Vol. CXII).

⁵³Lemonon, *L'Europe et la Politique Britannique*, p. 150f.

could reach Fashoda from Egypt with gunboats within a few weeks. Marchand had demonstrated that it would take years for a French force of any size to reach the same spot from the west coast. But even if the French could have reached Fashoda easily from the west coast of Africa, that still would not have given her an equal chance with England. In case of war the British navy, which was far superior to that of France, could have prevented France from transporting any soldiers or munitions of war from France to the Congo. Then, too, the French efforts to reach the Nile through Ethiopia had failed. Considering all these conditions there seemed to be no good reason for prolonging the discussion, but neither one would suggest a plan for settlement. France felt there was no need for her to initiate negotiations.⁵⁴ England, as the victor in the Fashoda incident, was in position to take the lead, but the state of mind of the English people made it unlikely that any British government could safely propose a compromise with France.⁵⁵

Fortunately for both countries, the government in Paris realized the whole situation and set to work quietly to bring about a change in Franco-English relations. M. Cambon was made ambassador to London and this able negotiator did his work so well and so quietly that even the watchful German and Russian representatives did not at first realize fully what was taking place.⁵⁶

⁵⁴*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 413, No. 3929.

⁵⁵*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 388, No. 3908; Hanotaux, *La partage de l'Afrique*, Fashoda, p. 177.

⁵⁶*British Documents*, Vol. L, p. 197, No. 240; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 414, No. 3930; *Ibid.*, p. 415, No. 3932; *Ibid.*, p. 413, No. 3929.

Cambon realized the futility of insisting further upon any territory for France in the Bahr-el-Ghazal.⁵⁷ He asked only for a port on the Nile. This Salisbury was willing to concede provided it did not carry with it any political right or territorial title to the port and a route thither.⁵⁸


Upon this basis, therefore, Cambon and Salisbury opened negotiations, January 21, 1899, by which the two countries delimited their respective spheres of influence in the west of Africa.⁵⁹ The idea of a port on the Nile with a road thither, upon the conditions England would permit, was soon lost sight of. It had served its purpose by providing an opening for negotiations. Such a port was useless to France and, even if it could have been used by the French, it would have served only to the advantage of English commerce on the Nile. The negotiations, therefore, were very soon limited to the line of demarcation to be fixed between the French and the English spheres.

Accordingly, Lord Salisbury invited M. Cambon to propose some line upon which they could proceed. Whereupon M. Cambon proposed that the Nile-Congo watershed should be taken as a starting point and that the line continue northward along the eastern boundary of Wadai. By fixing the boundary at this line France would be renouncing claims she might have had to the

⁵⁷*Documents Diplomatiques Correspondence* . . . la déclaration additionnelle, No. 1, Jan. 12, 1899.

⁵⁸*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 416, No. 3933.

⁵⁹*Parliamentary Papers*, Egypt, No. 2, 1899 (C-9134) Treaty series No. 15. Accounts and Papers, Vol. 112; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, Vol. XXIX, p. 387 and Vol. XXX, p. 264; *State Papers*, Vol. 91, p. 55f.



Bahr-el-Ghazal district but would be given undisputed control to the territory north and east of Lake Chad.⁶⁰

Within two months of this beginning of negotiations, Cambon and Salisbury had arrived at an agreement.⁶¹ This agreement followed very closely the principle suggested by M. Cambon. It provided for a commission to be charged with the duty of delimiting, on the spot, the line which should constitute the boundary between them.⁶² In general this line should begin where the Franco-Congolese boundary meets the Nile-Congo watershed. From that point it should continue northward following this watershed to the eleventh parallel of north latitude. From the eleventh parallel to the fifteenth parallel it was to follow the boundary established in 1882, thus running between Wadai on the west and Darfur to the east. But it was to be drawn somewhere between the 21st and the 23rd meridians east of Greenwich. From that date forward the French were to acquire neither territory nor political influence to the east of that line. Likewise the British government promised to acquire neither territory nor political influence to the west of that line.⁶³ North of the 15th parallel of north latitude the line was to follow the

⁶⁰*Documents Diplomatiques* Correspondence Concernant la déclaration additionnelle du, 21 mars, 1899, No. 3 Cambon to Delcassé, Jan. 21, 1899; *British Documents*, Vol. I, p. 201, No. 244.

⁶¹The very fact that negotiations had been begun had a quieting effect upon both nations. In March Queen Victoria risked making a visit to Nice where she was received respectfully and with military honors though no cheers were indulged in for her long life. *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 420, No. 3940.

⁶²See Section 4 of the Declaration.

⁶³See Section 1 and 2 of the Declaration.

Darfur boundary, which was yet to be determined, until its intersection with the 24th meridian east of Greenwich. Thence it was to follow this meridian until it intersected a line drawn directly southeast from the intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th meridian east of Greenwich.⁶⁴ This declaration was made a part of the Article IV of the unfinished Convention of June 14, 1898 and the whole agreement was ratified in Paris June 13, 1899.⁶⁵

Both countries seemed satisfied with this arrangement. Delcassé especially expressed relief and satisfaction over the results. He declared it just to both sides and said that it should leave no bitter feeling. In a speech before the senate he was in an unusually happy mood. He declared that now France was possessed of vast stretches of sand in which the Gallic cock could scratch at will and England had plenty of swamp and immense marshes in which the British duck could swim at liberty. But in more serious strains he recognized the futility of France making further effort to the claims upon this territory with a country which was already in control of the Nile, whose Cape-to-Cairo railway had come through from the south and whose navy was "mistress of the seas."⁶⁶

Although both England and France seemed satisfied with this way out of their difficulties, Italy was not. Neither was the Sultan at Constantinople, and the

⁶⁴See Section 3 of the Declaration.

⁶⁵de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XXIX, p. 387; t. XXX, p. 264; *Parliamentary Papers*, Treaty Series No. 115, Egypt 2, 1899 (C-9134) in *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 112.

⁶⁶Stuart, *French Foreign Policy*, p. 31. (He quotes from *Annales du Senat*, Vol. LIV, p. 830.)

Kaiser seemed disappointed to have missed witnessing a war between his rivals.⁶⁷ In the scramble for African territory, Italy, arriving late in the game, had been "chased from pillar to post" and it looked to her now as though France and England were planning to pull out the post. Cheated out of Tunis at the Berlin Conference, she had gone to Ethiopia with the approval of England and the Triple Alliance. In her extremity and desperate need she had been left to her fate at Adowa. Reviving from this wound, she had been consoling herself in anticipation of prosperity in her future possession of Tripoli. By this Anglo-French agreement of 1899, it seemed to Italy that England had deserted her in assigning to France the hinterland of Tripoli. In the Mediterranean Pact (1887) England had promised Italy, in exchange for Italian support in Egyptian questions, to support Italy anywhere else in Northern Africa.⁶⁸ Now England was withdrawing from the whole matter and leaving Italy unsupported to face France in the matter of Tripoli.

Just how much of Tripoli was included in the Anglo-French agreement no one knew. The treaty provided for a dividing line between the French and the English spheres from the Congo State to the Tropic of Cancer. It was not known whether or not the southern boundary of Tripoli extended beyond the Tropic. Whether it did or not it seemed to Italy that

⁶⁷Note: When Delcassé had expressed his belief that by this agreement England and France had removed a constant cause of dissension the Kaiser remarked, "Harmloser Mann. der Kennt John Bull nicht." *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 425, No. 3944.

⁶⁸Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, Vol. I, p. 157.

England, by assigning the Tripolitan hinterland to France, intended to offer no objection should France decide to take Tripoli. At any rate it put a limit to Italian expansion southward when Italy should have acquired Tripoli which she intended to seize.

Believing themselves to have been "double-crossed" by England, the Italians appealed to Germany for help. The Italian government still wanted to keep on good terms with England but feared that that might be impossible. Carnevaro, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to Germany that England had assigned the Tripolitan area to France as a compensation for Fashoda; and that by doing so she had dealt Italy a sensitive blow in the face. Italy had always been England's faithful friend. England had agreed to maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean area and now she was disturbing the whole situation. In his wordy complaint against England the Minister calmed down somewhat by saying that England could yet square herself with Italy provided she would agree to a secret treaty with Italy whereby England would guarantee Italy's possession of Tripoli. He closed by asking Germany what Germany, as a member of the Triple Alliance, proposed to do about it.⁶⁹

In reply to this excited rehearsal, Germany did nothing except to deliver a note to the British government reserving all *German* rights in Africa. But to have Carnevaro believe he had some friends yet, Germany permitted him to state in the Italian Parliament that the other members of the Triple Alliance approved

⁶⁹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, pp. 429-431, Nos. 3946-3948.

of the attitude of the Italian government in the matter.

Failing to get the active support of her allies in preventing the operation of the Anglo-French treaty, Italy carried on some correspondence with France in regard to its meaning. France assured Italy that she need not have any fear that France would put anything in the way of Italian expansion in the hinterland of Tripoli. But, when Italy insisted that France put that assurance in writing, France replied that she could not do that. If France should record her assurance in writing, it would appear as though France approved of Italy's taking a part of the Turkish Empire. Though France could not give this public approval, she assured Italy that Delcassé would favor Italy some other way yet to be found.⁷⁰ With these efforts and this vague assurance on the part of France, Italy subsided.

One would think that by this time the Turks would have become so accustomed to having portions of their belongings sliced off that the operation no longer would have produced any pain. But that was not the case. Some one must have told the Sultan that England and France had been making gestures as though they intended to slice off Tripoli, his last African appendix. Aroused by this information the Turk made reservations in both London and Paris. It must be remembered that the Sultan still claimed all Northern Africa. One after the other he had lost it all but Tripoli. Though at each new loss he had made angry protest, nobody paid much attention to his claims. To the protests, of Tewfik Pasha, the Sultan's foreign minister,

⁷⁰*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 435, No. 3953.

France now replied rather promptly, stating that the lands that had been assigned to France by the Anglo-French agreement were unoccupied lands and, therefore, had not been any one's possession. Tewfik was not satisfied with this reply and he, too, appealed to Germany in the hope that Germany would be interested because of her possessions about Lake Chad.⁷¹

Later the British reply to Tewfik's demands arrived. It informed the Sultan that Italy and France were entering into negotiations in regard to the whole question of Tripoli and its hinterland. This provoked great indignation *at the Porte*. Even a Turk wondered why France and Italy, two European powers should be entering into any negotiations between themselves about Tripoli, since they had no claim upon its territory, while he believed that Tripoli was still a Turkish possession.⁷² Lord Salisbury later, wishing to correct the impression his former communication had created in Turkey, informed the Porte that since England had expressly assumed, by the Franco-English treaty of 1899, the obligation to keep out of the hinterland of Tripoli, England was no longer concerned with the question and Turkey should direct her complaints to France.⁷³ With this passing of the problem over to France, England dismissed the Turk and he in turn subsided as Italy had felt obliged to do some days earlier.

Since no one thought of asking the natives what they might think of the Anglo-French arrangement for

⁷¹*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, p. 431, No. 3949; *British Documents*, Vol. I, p. 208, No. 253.

⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 433, No. 3951.

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 437, No. 3957.

their territory and since the different European States had offered their objections with no results, the agreement was accepted and the line thus established became the dividing line between England and France. From the west it completely shut France away from Ethiopia. There was now a broad stretch of undisputed English influence reaching from the Nile-Atlantic watershed to the White Nile, between France and Ethiopia. There was no longer any possibility of French influence reaching Ethiopia from the west.

While these events were taking place in Europe over the situation in the west, the struggle for influence at Menelik's court had continued. Though Italy by her treaty of peace of October 26, 1896, had for the time being dropped out of the contest, both England and France had redoubled their efforts. Because of their peculiar position with Menelik during the Italo-Ethiopian struggle, the French at first had a decided advantage over the English. Early in 1897, therefore, they had completed Lagarde's treaty which, although we are not just certain of its entire provisions, without doubt amounted to an alliance with Menelik. To counter this the English through the efforts of Sir Rennell Rodd, had arranged in May, 1897, a similar treaty. Here again, as in the French treaty, we are not certain as to just what took place behind the curtains. We know enough however, to assure us that though the English did not secure a settlement of the boundary between the Sudan and Ethiopia, they did receive assurances that Menelik had no notion of submitting to a French protectorate.

After the failure of the Franco-Russo-Ethiopian efforts to effect a junction with Marchand, England was the one power remaining to seek further territory at the expense of Ethiopian claims. Though France, when she decided to come to the agreement of March 21, 1899, with England over the western sphere, had lost all hopes of securing Ethiopia for herself, she had not lost her influence at Menelik's court. Then, too, because of her success at Fashoda, England was now more suspected than she had been before. In addition to the natural suspicion of former years there was added the element of fear. Since France could not have Ethiopia for herself, she proposed to prevent England from securing advantages there.⁷⁴ But in the very anxiety to prevent the English from supplanting them in Ethiopia, the French overdid the matter and played right into the British hands when they aroused Menelik's suspicions as to the purity of their own actions.

It will be recalled that back in 1894 Menelik had given to the Swiss counselor, M. Ilg, a concession for construction of a railway extending from Jibuti to the Nile by way of his capital at Addis Ababa. M. Ilg in turn had associated with him the Frenchman M. Chefnieux, who later had become Menelik's adviser and his Consul General for all Europe. This gentleman had considered *France* as all Europe and had recognized in his office, as Consul General for all Europe, a fine opportunity for securing for France complete ascendancy in Ethiopia. In 1896 when the defeat of the Italians

⁷⁴White, *The Expansion of Egypt*, p. 397.

had opened the way for realization of French desires, the importance of M. Ilg's railway as a means for reaching the Nile became evident. In the meantime M. Ilg and M. Chefneux had formed the French joint stock company known as *La Compagnie Impériale des Chemins de Fer Éthiopiens*. This company had offices in Paris and by agreement of March 12, 1897, the control of the railway was placed under the French government.⁷⁵ Under this agreement, the French Colonial Office had authorized the construction of the first section of the railway and operations were under way when the Fashoda incident had overtaken them.

The events connected with the construction of this railway furnish one of the most interesting and instructive illustrations to be found of the complicated and involved circumstances that often have arisen from the eager competition of European states in their efforts to secure advantages in the undeveloped parts of Africa and Asia. It is not our purpose here to give a detailed account of the building of this Ethiopian railway, but enough of its international complications must be narrated to make clear how it came about that England, in spite of most active opposition from France succeeded in getting from Menelik, through diplomacy, practically all she had sought to get from Ethiopia during all these years of international scheming.

Until 1897 little interest had been manifested in the Ethiopian railway, but when actual construction was

⁷⁵The text of this agreement is to be found in T. Lennox Gilmour's, *Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers* which gives the best account of these matters and from which I have secured many facts for this discussion.

begun the imaginations of both Frenchmen and Englishmen were stimulated. That the road might be built with the most possible speed, considerable money was needed. The concessionaires of the railway issued bonds to be sold to the French public in order to secure the necessary funds. When these bonds went on sale a British company, known as the British New African Company, through "some Paris friends took up" a block of them. Later the French *Compagnie Impériale des Chemins de Fer Éthiopiens* found it necessary to secure more funds since construction proved to be more difficult than they had anticipated. The company found it difficult to secure additional funds in France. This was the English company's opportunity and it came forward with offers to furnish the necessary funds in exchange for shares in the French railway company. After another unsuccessful attempt to secure sufficient funds in France the company reluctantly accepted the English offer. Their reluctance was expressed by a clause in the agreement by which the French could buy back these shares by forfeiting 625,000 francs.

The British financial interests concerned now consolidated into a new company to take care of these undertakings. The company came to be known as the International Ethiopian Trust and Construction Company. By 1901 the British had obtained quietly almost a controlling interest in the French company. They had directors on the board and had a monopoly for building future extensions to the road.

When the French colonial-minded people discovered this substituting of English control for French

control of the Ethiopian railway, they were greatly agitated. They saw French economic and political influence in Ethiopia being thus gradually taken away from them. At once the British and French citizens became interested and lined up with the company of their respective countries. The British company through Lord Chesterfield, its president, helped on the struggle by declaring it to be the purpose of the company to build a branch from the present Jibuti-Harrar road to Zeila, the English Port in British Somaliland. This of course, was intended to arouse the French at prospects of losing trade at Jibuti and to please the English in the hope of gain at Zeila. Here we have reenacted the old struggle over the caravan routes at Dongarita in terms of more nearly modern means of transportation.

In their excitement over this prospect the French brought about a situation in connection with this railway which lost them the friendship of Menelik and their influence at his court, and permitted England to slip into Menelik's confidences. There was an appeal to French patriotism in an attempt to raise money to buy back the company's shares held by English interest and thus secure French control of the railway. This appeal failed, but the French company did succeed in securing the interest of the French government which came to the aid of the *Compagnie Impériale des Chemins de Fer Éthiopiens* and saved the Ethiopian railway from the disaster of "foreign control."

By the curious arrangement of voting a subsidy of 500,000 francs annually for the next fifty years, the

government came to the aid of the company.⁷⁶ This assured the French company enough cash with which to purchase the shares held by the British and at the same time furnished capital with which to continue the construction of the railway without the necessity of accepting British aid, but in return for this generosity with the taxpayers' money, the government made such requirement in control of the railway that henceforth, for all practical purposes, it became an enterprise of the French government.

It will be recalled that back in 1894 Menelik had granted the original concession to M. Ilg, the Swiss. He had granted it to an individual, but by 1902 without his knowledge or consent it had passed out of the hands of the original concessionaire and was now under the control of the French government. This was altogether contrary to Menelik's idea of the fitness of things. So long as the railway remained in the hands of an individual he felt he could control the situation, but in its transfer to the French government he thought he saw a threat to his sovereignty and he had no more intention of submitting to French control in 1902 than he had had of becoming a protectorate of Italy in 1889-96. Menelik had been grateful for French aid in combating Italian and English thrusts at his sovereignty in 1889, 1891 and 1894, and he had permitted the French to maintain unusual influence at his court, but when they presumed upon their relation with him to threaten his sovereignty, France seemed to Menelik as


⁷⁶Rossetti, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiopia*, p. 142; Lemonon, *L'Europe et la politique Britannique*, pp. 380-382.

a wolf in sheep's clothing. Under these circumstances he was in the proper state of mind to treat with his former antagonists.

The agreement between the French railway company and the French government was signed on February 6, 1902 and on May 15, 1902, Menelik signed with England the treaty referred to in Chapter V and on the same day he signed an additional agreement with both England and Italy in regard to the boundary of Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁷⁷ In their eagerness to force the English out of control of the Ethiopian railroad, the French had lost their position of greatest influence at Menelik's court. By beating English designs in Paris, they had furthered English purposes in Addis Ababa.

By the treaty of May 15, 1902, with England, Menelik granted to England a large share of that territory east of the Nile which had been assigned to her by Italy in the protocols of 1891. It will be recalled that by the terms of the Anglo-Italian agreements of that year, in general the 35th meridian east of Greenwich was to be the boundary between the English Sudan and the Italian Ethiopia. The treaty of 1902 between England and Ethiopia fixed the boundary between the Sudan and Ethiopia as a line beginning from the north at Kohr Um Hogar and running through Gallabat to the Blue Nile which it crossed at the 35th meridian east of Greenwich. From thence it continued by an irregular line to the Baro river which it intersected near to the 34th meridian. It then followed the Baro to its

⁷⁷Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, p. 433; Comité de l'Afrique française, Bulletin, janvier 1903, supplement I, p. 17.



confluence with the Pibor river which it ascended for some distance, from where it passed through Melile to the intersection of the 6th parallel north latitude with the 35th meridian.⁷⁸ By referring to the map it will be seen that of all the disputed territory lying between the 35th meridian and the White Nile only the triangle of which the junction of the Baro with the Pibor is the apex and the 35th meridian the base was retained by Menelik. Thus England in 1902 won from Menelik, with the exception of the triangle noted above, that broad strip of territory, which had been recognized by Italy in 1891 as a proper English sphere. While it did not include all the headwaters of the Nile, upon which England had earlier insisted, it did secure a suitable route upon which to build Cecil Rhodes' Cape-to-Cairo railway. Provision for this railway was made in the agreement. By Article V, England secured the right to construct a railway across Ethiopian territory so as to connect Uganda with the Sudan. It was for this privilege that England had been working all along. Because of the swampy nature of the area about the Nile in its upper reaches, no suitable territory for railway construction had been won by England at Fashoda. It was necessary, she thought, to secure this from Menelik.

Since England could not have Lake Tsana and the sources of the Nile from the east included within her territory, she proceeded to achieve her purpose by securing otherwise the control of the water supply from these sources. Through the diplomacy of Sir John Harrington, her able diplomat at Menelik's court, Eng-

⁷⁸See *Article I* of the treaty.

land was entirely successful in this effort. By Article III of this treaty Menelik bound himself, and thus Ethiopia, not to construct "any works across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of the waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the government of the Sudan."⁷⁹ In addition to all this England secured the lease of sufficient territory on the Baro river at Itang to be used as a commercial station.⁸⁰

But Menelik did more than grant concessions to England and arrange boundaries with Italy to show his displeasure with French action in regard to the railway. He protested officially to the French government. He declared that the French proposal to acquire the railway finally up to the Hawash river (about two-thirds of the way from Jibuti to his capital) was a direct infringement upon his rights as an independent sovereign. He was so displeased that he refused to attend the ceremonies connected with the opening of the line on Ethiopian territory; but accepted England's invitation to send a representative to the coronation of Edward VII. To do this honor he appointed Makonnen, highest in

⁷⁹*Article III* of the Treaty. Note: This article is now a source of obstruction to Ethiopian progress. Ethiopia would like to impound the waters of Lake Tsana during the rainy season for use in the dry season. She has had an American firm make a survey looking toward construction of such a project but England must be agreed before this may be done. The provision of this Article III, makes it possible for England to prevent such construction by any other power than England. Unless the Emperor of Ethiopia will agree to have England build them, no such works are likely to be built. Menelik was so annoyed at the French apparently, that he overdid his concessions to the English. It is likely, too, that he did not realize the value of the control of these waters.

⁸⁰*Itang* was found to be unsuitable for such a station and Gambela was substituted.

rank in the kingdom and Sir John Harrington saw Makonnen off on the occasion in great style.⁸¹ Moreover Menelik refused to sanction a ten per cent duty on merchandise carried on the railway between Jibuti and Harrar. He lost no opportunity to show his displeasure over the transfer of this concession of the rights to construct the railway from an individual to the government of France.

French writers are prone to lay the blame for their loss of prestige and for British success in 1902 to "the underhand schemes" of Sir John Harrington, the British representative at Menelik's court. They accuse him of having supported the British financial group in the affair of the railway before Menelik. He is blamed for pointing out to Menelik the purposes of the French and in having Menelik believe that they were aiming at his independence of action. It is altogether likely that the French are correct when they make these accusations. It is not likely that the British would try to deny them. Sir John was a British diplomat looking after British interest at Menelik's court, in competition with the French. In diplomatic circles it is not to be expected that a British diplomat would permit such an opportunity as that presented by the Ethiopian railway situation to pass unnoticed. To be convinced of that the French needed only to look upon their own actions at this same court in their having informed Menelik of Italian pretensions in Europe over the treaty of Ucciali. The French lost their influence at Meneilk's court because they could not restrain their

⁸¹Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale*, p. 468.

own actions in face of the opportunity to force the English out of a subtly obtained advantage in their control of the railway, and because of their efforts to copy the English methods in peaceful penetration upon Menelik's sovereignty. Sir John Harrington, being English, recognized the purposes back of these methods just as certainly as the French did, and he acted as any Englishman or alert Frenchman looking out for his own country's interest would have acted under similar circumstances. The surprising thing connected with this transaction is not that Sir John saw his opportunity and made use of it to the disadvantage of the French, but that Menelik should have made such sweeping concessions even to England.

While Anglo-French relations within Ethiopia itself had not improved since Fashoda, back in Europe international relations had so developed that these two governments had been brought closer together. The hostility of France in North African affairs, the evident designs of Russia upon India, the growing rivalry of Germany and England's experiences connected with the Boer War had led England to doubt the wisdom of her policy of "splendid isolation", and she decided to reverse her policy in European affairs. In her decision to abandon the policy of isolation, England had difficulty in selecting her company. After a single gesture toward Russia early in 1898, England turned to Germany. Joseph Chamberlain informed Hatzfeldt, during the course of a dinner at Alfred Rothschild's house, that England had decided to abandon her policy of isolation and suggested an Anglo-German defensive

alliance.⁸² But by this time Germany had decided upon a most ambitious naval program and no Anglo-German alliance was found possible. Germany with a powerful navy, being already supreme on land, would present a decided threat to England's world wide position. England, therefore, decided to undertake negotiations with France and Russia, who, since the Fashoda incident, had been carrying on flirtations with her.⁸³

To bring about friendly relations between England and France was no easy task. In addition to recent events in Africa, there were memories of the colonial empire lost by France to England in the eighteenth century. Waterloo had not been forgotten. Historically France and England were enemies. During the Egyptian controversy and the struggle for the upper Nile valley many in France were willing to forget their differences with their arch enemy across the Rhine and the government, even, had made friendly gestures in that direction in order to secure Germany's aid in an anti-British policy.⁸⁴

With the removal of Gabriel Hanotaux from the French Foreign Affairs and the accession of Théophile Delcassé, a very able diplomat, to this office matters changed rapidly. France dropped her efforts with Germany and devoted her whole attention to England and

⁸²*Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, pp. 193-199, 212-216.

⁸³*Documents Diplomatiques française*, 2^e série, t. IV, Table Methodique II, Grande-Bretagne, entente cordiale; Barclay, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences 1876-1906*, pp. 175-242. Note: Barclay had a very substantial part in bringing about popular cordial relations between the two countries.

⁸⁴*German Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 315; *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 30.

England responded to the French courtship.⁸⁵ Through the efforts of Delcassé in the French Foreign Office, Paul Cambon, the French Representative in London, and Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister, a general understanding of all their differences was arrived at in 1904 and a treaty was signed April of that year which provided for the settlement of those in Africa in particular.⁸⁶ With the famous *entente cordiale* we are not concerned except that it carried along with it more cordial relations between the English and French in their Ethiopian matters.

Then, too, after the Italian excitement over the Anglo-French agreement of March 21, 1899 had subsided, England and Italy had become friends once more by England's assurances that she would support Italy in an effort to secure Tripoli should the "Sick Man of Europe" finally die intestate and it should become necessary to dispose of his property.⁸⁷ Moreover after the fall of Crispi's government Delcassé had been successful in bringing about better relations between France and Italy. This good feeling had been expressed in the Franco-Italian Convention of 1896, some years before the Anglo-French agreement of March 21, 1899

⁸⁵Barclay, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, 1876-1906, pp. 175-242.

⁸⁶*Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series* No. 5 (C-2383) Accounts and Papers, Vol. CIII; *Documents Diplomatiques*, 1904-accords conclus le 6 avril 1904; de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, t. XXXII, p. 3; *Documents Diplomatiques français*, 2^e série, t. IV, p. 533, doc. 389; Note: The best source yet furnished for studying this Rapprochement is to be found in this fourth volume of the *Documents Diplomatiques français*, Contents II Grande-Bretagne-entente cordiale.

⁸⁷*German Diplomatic Documents* (1871-1914) Vol. IV, p. 58 Note.

had been concluded. Though this latter agreement had disturbed these friendly relations somewhat, France was able to overcome this estrangement by assuring Italy in the secret accord of December 14, 1900, of French support in securing Tripoli, in exchange for which Italy had agreed to support France in her aspirations in Morocco.⁸⁸ Then too, by the time of the signing of this Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, France and Italy were just completing their more general accord of July 10, 1902, which confirmed the arrangements of 1900 and bound the two countries into a formal alliance.⁸⁹

Thus when England, aided by the French mistake in securing state control of the Franco-Ethiopian railway and the skillful diplomacy of Sir John Harrington, had supplanted France in dominant influence at Menelik's court, there was no complete break between London and Paris. Their conversations toward the *entente cordiale* were too far advanced and the general European situation was too threatening to permit a break to occur over matters in Ethiopia. Once again, therefore, England scored a decided success through no special planning of her own. She had won from Menelik practically all she had sought to gain from Ethiopia from the beginning of the contest. Both Italy and France had made conscious efforts to secure the

⁸⁸Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, 1879-1914, Vol. II, p. 227, 240-245; *Livre Jaune, Les Accords Franco-Italiens* 1900-1902, pp. 1-4.

⁸⁹*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 2^e série, t. II, p. 390, doc. 329. Note: This volume contains the best material yet published for a study of the Franco-Italian rapprochement. See *Table Methodique I Rapprochement Franco-Italien*.

prize and both had failed. Over the failures of both of them England seemed to move to success.

Though tempered by the general European situation, the controversy over the Franco-Ethiopian railway and England's advantageous treaty of 1902 with Menelik continued.⁹⁰ Apparently the French did not buy up all the English interests in the railway as they had purposed to do when the French state came to the rescue. Between 1902 and 1904 the railway came to need additional money, and strange to say the English company came forward again with an offer to supply the funds. This time, however, the British company demanded certain assurances as to control of the railway. Lord Chesterfield, the president of the British company, made two proposals, upon the acceptance of either of which the British would be willing to provide the funds. His first proposal, and to his company the more desirable, was that the Ethiopian railway should become internationalized over its entire length and that its terminus at Jibuti should be made a free port. The other proposal was Chesterfield's old threat of English competition with France. He proposed that the railway remain a French enterprise but that from Dire Dawa a branch line should connect with the English port of Berbera on the British Somaliland coast. This would give the English the same opportunity for securing Ethiopian trade as that enjoyed by the French through Jibuti, and, as a mild hint to the French, he declared that steps were then being taken by his com-

⁹⁰Charles Michel, *La question d'ethiopie*, *Revue politique et parlementaire*, t. XLV, p. 44.

pany "with a view to putting into effect the (latter) policy which we have so long advocated."⁹¹

Through Lord Chesterfield, England was informing France publicly, as already her diplomats had been carrying on conversations with the French directly and by way of Italy, that France had better agree to internationalization of the Ethiopian railway or England would proceed to connect that railway with Berbera, the English port.⁹² In Menelik's anti-French state of mind, even Frenchmen could see the threat to their Ethiopian trade. The French knew very well the strong influence England then had at Menelik's court. Legarde had already informed his government of that.⁹³ Moreover, Lord Chesterfield could speak with assurance since the British government itself favored internationalization of the railway provided for and wished enough English money invested in the company to insure an English representative upon the council of administration.⁹⁴

This proposal to internationalize the Ethiopian railway was not acceptable to the French people concerned in African matters. In particular the *Comité de L'Afrique française* was against any policy which would mean the abandonment of the exclusive control of the

⁹¹T. Lennox Gilmour, *Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers*, pp. 37, 38.

⁹²*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 2^e série, t. IV, p. 245, Doc. 175; and *Ibid.*, p. 310, doc. 232.

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp. 423-425, doc. 318, Note: Legarde wrote Delcassé that "*Elle (England) fait trembler le Negus, et en Meme temps, lui sauve la face et le flatte en le couvrant d'or et de presents.*"

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 439, doc. 336.

railway by the French government.⁹⁵ Neither was there agreement among the European diplomats at Menelik's court, especially among the English, Italian and French, among whom the relations became more and more strained. The tension became so great that it was feared Addis Ababa might become the spot upon which some event would occur to disturb the peace of the world.⁹⁶

Menelik seems to have favored the idea of internationalization of the railway. No doubt he looked upon that scheme as a sort of guarantee against French peaceful penetration. In April 1905, he summoned the French, English, Italian and Russian Ministers at his court to an audience in which he expressed to them his desire to have the matter settled. He declared that he had hoped to receive from the Powers a proposal upon which they had agreed for the speedy construction of the railway. Since no such proposal had been received he was disappointed and he threatened that, unless he should receive such a proposal reconciling their differences, in order to insure the construction of the railway he would find himself "under the necessity of undertaking its construction myself without asking or accepting assistance from anyone."⁹⁷

To this declaration of Menelik, Sir John Harrington, the British Minister replied.

A railway constructed with the money of a single

⁹⁵E. Rouard de Card, *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, p. 44f.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*

⁹⁷Gilmour, *Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers*. Appendix X, p. 88, (Quotes from *La Depeche Coloniale* of May 18, 1905); Michel, *La Question d'Ethiopie*, in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, Vol. 51, p. 47.

nation, and under the control of a single foreign government, would place Ethiopia in a situation incompatible with its independence or the integrity of its territory. My personal opinion is that the railway ought to remain on a commercial basis, and ought not to be a political instrument. The best means of giving to the various interests the necessary guarantees, would be to permit the capital of all the nations to participate in the construction of the railway It is impossible for me to understand how the maintenance of the independence of Ethiopia can be reconciled with the idea of the construction of a French railway from the coast to the capital, under the sole control of the French government. I regret to be obliged to say that I do not understand this French policy, the less so as the proposals which have been made to me by my colleague, the French Minister, were incompatible with the very principle of the independence of Ethiopia.⁹⁸

In his turn the Italian Minister, the Duke of Gaetano, replied that his government desired to see the railway internationalized and that it proposed to work toward that end. But M. Lagarde informed Menelik when his government had come to a decision upon the subject he should be glad to submit its decision to Menelik.⁹⁹

The French government did not like the situation and expressed its disapproval of it.¹⁰⁰ But Delcassé had so recently come to see his long efforts to bring England and France closer together in the *Entente Cordiale* crowned with success that he did not propose to permit a dispute over a railway in the mountains of Ethiopia to cause the failure of that undertaking which seemed so essential to the safety of France in Europe. Negotiations were therefore undertaken for the settlement of this question.

⁹⁸Gilmour, *Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers*, Appendix X, p. 90.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁰⁰See *Discussion* in the French Senate, April 1, 1905. (*Journal Officiel*), numero du 2 avril 1905, Senat Debats Parlementaire, p. 560.

It may be that Menelik's refusal to permit further extension of the railway until some agreement had been reached, aided in bringing the Europeans to seek to come to agreement upon this question.¹⁰¹ The documents would indicate, however, that prior to his refusal, the diplomats had seen the possibility of such necessity and even Lagarde had considered the proposition.¹⁰² Mr. Gilmour, who wrote in 1905, when the disagreement was at its height, was of the opinion that if the French and English did not settle their differences in Ethiopia, Germany would intervene. He declared that a certain Dr. Rosen, who had been sent to Addis Ababa in 1904 to conclude a commercial treaty with Menelik had hinted to Menelik that Germany would be ready to discuss the question of the railway with him should an occasion arise.¹⁰³ However that may be, wishing to guard against anything that might disturb the delicate European situation, the three Powers, England, France and Italy, decided to call a convention, which, while guaranteeing the integrity and independence of Ethiopia, would also give satisfaction to the legitimate pretensions of each one of them.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹*The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, p. 318.

¹⁰²*Documents Diplomatiques français*, 2^e série, t. IV, pp. 423-425, doc. 318.

¹⁰³Gilmour, *Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers*, p. 57. It should be observed that in March 1905, the first serious matter in the struggle over Morocco was enacted and that in January 1906 the Algesiras Conference met. Here the intentions of Germany were evident and no doubt these events aided London and Paris to arrive at a settlement of the Ethiopian question.

¹⁰⁴E. Rouard de Card, *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, p. 44.

With these intentions, the negotiations were intrusted to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for England; M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, for France; and M. Tittoni, the Italian ambassador in London, for Italy.¹⁰⁵ The negotiators carried on their work at London and seemed to make rapid progress until they came to matters dealing with their own respective interests and for a time they reached an *impassé* over the troublesome question of the railway. Finally, May 28, 1905, a note published in the French journal *The Fargo* and claiming to have originated in London contained the news that only the matter of the railway remained to be completed.¹⁰⁶ But on account of Italy's hesitation the affair dragged on for more than a year. Finally, July 6, 1906, the three negotiators completed an agreement.¹⁰⁷ Because they sought to have Menelik sign this agreement it was not formally signed by the representatives of the three European countries until December 13, 1906.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵E. Rouard de Card, *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁶Comité de l'Afrique française, *Bulletin* du juin 1906, p. 148.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*; *Documents Diplomatiques 1906*, Affaires d'Ethiopie Annex No. 1, to M. Cambon's letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰⁸*Trattati e conventioni fra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, raccolti, per cura del ministero degli affari esteri*, Vol. 18, p. 920; *Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series*, No. 1, 1897, (Cd-3298) (Accounts and Papers Vol. 99); Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, Third Edition, Vol. II, pp. 436-440, (translation pp. 440-444). Note: In the meantime M. Tittoni who had been the Italian negotiator had been recalled to Rome to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, therefore, his name does not appear attached to the treaty. Instead the name of the Marquis de San Giuliano appears with that of Grey and Cambon.

This treaty of 1906 is often referred to as the European guarantee of Ethiopian independence, but it is much more nearly correct to refer to it as the treaty made by France, England and Italy in regard to Ethiopia for their own mutual interests, as, indeed, its preamble declares. While it provides for the independence of Ethiopia in so far as these three nations are concerned, it does so only in the interests of the three nations themselves. In Article I they provided for cooperation in maintaining the political and territorial *status quo* in Ethiopia as at the date of the agreement based upon the several former agreements among themselves, and of any of them with Ethiopia. They agreed to the principle of non-intervention in Ethiopian internal affairs.¹⁰⁹ In the event the *status quo* should be disturbed, they agreed to make an effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia, but if that could not be done they in any case would concert together to safeguard: first, British interests in the Nile valley and the water supply for the Nile; second, the interest of Italy in Ethiopia as regards Eritrea and Somaliland including the Benadir and especially the hinterland of her possessions and the territorial connection between them to the west of Addis Ababa; third, the interests of France in Ethiopia as regards the French Protectorate on the Somali coast, the hinterland of this Protectorate, and the zone necessary for the railway from Jibuti to Addis Ababa.¹¹⁰

In addition to this dividing up of Ethiopia, should

¹⁰⁹Article III of the Treaty.

¹¹⁰Article V of the Treaty.

something disturb the *status quo*, the three European governments agreed that France should own and operate the railway from Jibuti to Addis Ababa on condition that she assure equal treatment for other nationals. France also agreed to endeavor to arrange for the appointment of an Englishman, an Italian, and an Ethiopian upon the board of control of the railway. In return for which a Frenchman should have a like position upon any railway the English or Italians should build in Ethiopia.¹¹¹ To England was granted the right in so far as these three nations were concerned, to construct any railway to be built west of Addis Ababa, and to Italy under the same conditions the right to construct a railway joining Eritrea and the Benadir. Then, too, England was confirmed in the right which she had secured from Menelik in 1904 to build a railway across Ethiopian territory from British Somaliland to the Sudan, but all agreed that no one of them should compete with the railways of any of the others already constructed.¹¹²

It will be observed that the contents of this treaty fall logically under four heads or purposes: first, to maintain the *status quo* in Ethiopia; second, to observe the principle of non-intervention within the country; third, to provide for the protection of the respective interests of the three European Powers; and fourth, to provide for the construction of railways by the Powers. Of the four points to be settled the one dealing with the construction of railways within and across Ethiopia

¹¹¹Articles V, VI, VII of the Treaty.

¹¹²Articles VII and IX of the Treaty.

proved the most troublesome. It will be noticed that the Anglo-Italian contention for the internationalization of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway was omitted from the treaty. The treaty Powers did however, provide for representatives from England and Italy to serve on its board of control. It is likely that the idea of the internationalization of the French railway was dropped because of the rather ambitious programs for railway building of both Italy and England themselves across the same territory. It is not likely that either of them would care to have their proposed railways internationalized. In the face of that situation they could hardly insist that France should permit her road to be internationalized while they forbade the same for their own.

When the treaty of 1906 was completed the three states agreed to secure Menelik's consent to the agreement. They proposed to have their respective representatives in Addis Ababa present the text of the treaty to him all at one time. Accordingly, M. Leon Bourgeois, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for France, on July 7, 1906, notified Lagarde, French Minister in Ethiopia, that he with his Italian and English colleagues at Menelik's court should present the matter simultaneously, being very sure to have him know how careful they had been to assure his sovereignty in Ethiopia.¹¹³ On July 18, Lagarde replied to M. Bourgeois that, according to instruction, the text of the treaty had been presented to Menelik and that Menelik had informed them that he

¹¹³*Documents Diplomatiques-Affaires d'Ethiopie*, 1906, p. 11; *Livre Jaune*, 1907, *Affaires d'Ethiopie*, p. 11 ff.

had reserved to himself the privilege of examining the affair more completely.¹¹⁴

One wonders why they presented this treaty to Menelik at all. So did Menelik. He had not been asked to have any part in its composition. Its ratification, by the three governments concerned, did not at all depend upon his approval. He had not asked them to prepare it, and he certainly had no intention of asking them whether or not he might continue as an independent sovereign in the Ethiopia, whose independence he had maintained in face of all of them one after another. Why should the question of his sovereignty have been raised at all? Nations do not get together unasked and guarantee the independence of another nation when there is no question of that other nation's independence being in danger. The very fact that these three nations felt called upon to guarantee Ethiopia's independence is an indication that her independence was in danger from them themselves.

From the correspondence over the matter among the three European nations one gathers that their reason for presenting it to Menelik was their anxiety that he should be persuaded that they meant no attack upon his sovereignty, as M. Bourgeois had cautioned Lagarde to make clear to him.¹¹⁵ Sir Edward Grey in reply to a question put by Ashley in the parliamentary session of November 1, 1906, said,

The validity of the accord (that of July 6, 1906) among the three powers (England, France and Italy) does not

¹¹⁴*Livre Jaune, Affaires d'Ethiopie*, 1907, p. 12.

¹¹⁵*Comité de l'Afrique française*, Bulletin Nov. 1906, p. 315; *Livre Jaune, Affaires d'Ethiopie*, 1907, p. 11 ff.

depend upon the Emperor Menelik. The accord was communicated to him for the purpose to make clear to him that the agreements among the three Powers did not contain any prejudices to his interests.¹¹⁶

Apparently the only reason for presenting it to him was that its presentation might serve as an apology for having made it at all. These three countries had been worrying over African matters for so many years that they could not cease to concern themselves there so long as there was a bit of it left with any semblance of independence. They still seemed to believe with Lord Salisbury that "Africa has been created to plague Ministers of Foreign Affairs".¹¹⁷

Clearly the Franco-Anglo-Italian arrangement of July 6-December 13, 1906 is much more concerned for the common interests of the Powers guaranteeing than for the interests of the one guaranteed. As a consequence Ethiopia, not having taken part in the convention has no claim or title to insist upon its execution. In case of trouble, she has no rights under the agreement to demand the intervention of the European Powers to assure the maintenance of the *status quo*.

On the other hand, France, England, and Italy have not bound themselves, in case of trouble within Ethiopia to lend aid to that government. By the terms of this treaty, they are not obliged to do so, but they may, when they wish to do so, consult together as to measures that should be adopted to maintain the *status quo*, and if it appears impossible to maintain this *status quo* then they are to decide among themselves what is to be done.

¹¹⁶Comité de l'Afrique française, Bulletin Nov. 1906, p. 315.

¹¹⁷Hanotaux, *Fashoda*, p. 117.

To realize the meaning here, one must observe that these nations reserve to themselves alone the right to decide whether or not the *status quo* should be maintained, and they alone are to decide what shall be done in case they conclude that the *status quo* should no longer be maintained.

We have now traced the devious and complicated route through which Ethiopia, for a quarter of a century, had sought to maintain her independence among the more powerful European powers who, through diplomacy and force, had sought to take away that independence. In their rivalries and jealousies these European Powers, in order to prevent any one of them from securing the prize, had aided Ethiopia at times and Menelik had been quick to see the opportunity thus offered to slip through the net laid for him. England, France, and Italy all had desired Ethiopia. Italy with England's permission had made a desperate effort to take it by force in 1896, but she had failed at Adowa. Here the ability of Menelik and the warlike courage of his people proved to Europe that Italy's method was rather hazardous. Italy's efforts had been followed by the more subtle dealings of France and England through finance and diplomacy. These methods though more successful than those of Italy had also failed. In spite of these intense desires and no doubt because of them, the Pawn for which they strove escaped them all, and Ethiopia stands to-day, as her Emperor wrote the League of Nations, proud and free upon her native mountains.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRESENT SITUATION

ITALY TRIES FOR A COMEBACK

In a sense the struggle for Ethiopia closed with the treaty of 1906. But in a very real sense the diplomatic struggle continues in the form of "peaceful penetration" and the constant threat of more forceful methods. In general the world accords a place of very high honor and respect to the patriotism of a ruler and his people, who have endured great sacrifices to maintain the integrity and independence of their country against the aggressions of more powerful neighbors. Menelik and his highland warriors defended their independence at Adowa against the Italians in the same way that the Greeks defended theirs at Thermopylae, and Marathon. They were as courageous as the Belgians in the face of the German army in 1914. But, while the world sings the praises of the exploits of these, it leaves the no less courageous Ethiopians to their fate in the face of these more powerful Europeans.

One would think that with the sacrifices of the Ethiopians to maintain their independence and the guarantee of 1906, this struggling nation would be assured of its position in the family of nations. But that such has not been the case, recent developments in the Italo-Ethiopian situation fully demonstrate. History indicates that the integrity of small nations is often better assured through the disagreement of European states

in regard to them than in their agreement. Clearly the Franco-Anglo-Italian treaty of July 6-December 13, 1906 is much more concerned for the common interests of the Powers guaranteeing than for the interests of the one guaranteed. In case of trouble, Ethiopia has no rights under this agreement to demand the intervention of these European powers to assure the maintenance of the *status quo*. France, England and Italy have not bound themselves, in case of trouble within Ethiopia to lend aid to the government. While they are not *obliged* to maintain the *status quo* they may, if they wish to do so, consult together as to measures that should be adopted to maintain it, and if it appears impossible to maintain this status then they are to decide among themselves what is to be done. To realize the meaning here, one must observe that these nations reserve to themselves alone the right to decide whether or not the *status quo* should be maintained, and they alone are to decide what shall be done in case they conclude that the *status quo* should no longer be maintained. If the League of Nations, of which Abyssinia became a member on September 28, 1923, proves as helpless in protecting the independence of Ethiopia as it was in the Manchukuo affair there is nothing to hinder England, France and Italy from agreeing among themselves that the *status quo* in Ethiopia should no longer be maintained. The fact that Ethiopia became a member of the League of Nations did not in anyway cancel the tripartite agreement of 1906. All three of these European nations have claimed certain parts of Ethiopia as their respective spheres of influence and

there is no treaty obligation short of common membership in the League to prevent England and France from granting a free hand to Italy in dealing with Ethiopia in exchange for some *quid pro quo* in the Mediterranean or in Europe. Indeed, though the exact nature of their recent agreements is not now known, recent events would indicate that just some such agreement as this has been entered into by these three powers.

Ever since the days of Francesco Crispi, Italy has felt the urge for expansion and it is to Africa that her ardent expansionists have looked for the realization of their hopes. Present day Italy is urged on by two strong motives. Stung by memories of her disastrous defeat at Adowa in 1896 at the hands of the Ethiopians, she feels a strong desire to seek revenge upon the victors. Hitherto her efforts to secure the support of other European states toward annexation of African territory have come to naught. She, therefore, no doubt, feels justified in making demands upon her former allies in war and her partners in Ethiopian interests. The recent conflicts along the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland have afforded the pretext for possible revenge upon the Ethiopians while the general European situation offers opportunity to make demands upon France and England. Apparently, in anticipation of border warfare in Africa, for sometime Italy has been sending troops to Eritrea and Somaliland. She has published as her reasons for such movement of troops that in case there should arise a general European conflict she wished to have her colonies in Africa so well furnished with soldiers that they would be able

to take care of themselves.¹ The accuracy with which Italy seems to have been able to time the strengthening of her Somaliland forces so as to coincide with border skirmishes appears almost canny. On December 5, 1934, an Anglo-Ethiopian commission, while engaged in establishing the boundary line between Ethiopia and British Somaliland, came across a force of Italian colonial troops at Ualual, (Walwal) a town located in southeastern Ethiopia in the province of Ogaden. Upon a demand that the Ethiopians withdraw, there took place a rather formidable battle between the Ethiopian troops and the Italian colonials. The Italians are reported to have had some 30 killed and the Ethiopians 110.² Each side contended that the other had started the battle.

At Addis Ababa the Italian Minister demanded indemnity and moral reparations. His Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia, first invoked the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of amity, conciliation and arbitration of August 2, 1928, asking that the two countries examine the situation to determine the responsibility for the incident. This proposal was rejected by Italy in such an uncompromising manner that the Emperor felt there was no longer any alternative for him.³ He therefore, appealed the question to the League of Nations, charging that the Italian troops had been the aggressors and asking that the League take cognizance of the situation. Furthermore he protested against the sending of additional

¹*New York Times*, September 9, 1934.

²*Ibid.*, February 11, 1935; *L'Afrique française*, January No. p. 23.

³*Ibid.*, March 4, 1935; *Journal des Nations*, Geneve 18 Mars 1935.

Italian troops to Somaliland.⁴ A few days later Italy's diplomatic mission at Geneva released an order from Rome refusing to submit the matter to the League of Nations. Apparently Rome, remembering Italian success in 1923 when she refused to submit the Corfu question to the League, intended to proceed after the same manner in dealing with Ethiopia.

That the Emperor of Ethiopia is willing to make reparations where there is fairly clear evidence that his subjects have been in the wrong, is indicated by his prompt action in acceding to Italian demands for indemnity and official apology in the Gondar matter. On November 17, at Gondar, just north of Lake Tsana, Ethiopian subjects had made an attack upon the native troops guarding the Italian consulate and one of Italy's colonial subjects had been killed. For this Italy had demanded satisfaction and Ethiopia had promptly accorded it. The attack at Ualual, however, was an entirely different matter. Gondar is wholly within Ethiopia. Nobody disputed that unruly subjects of the Negus Negasti had made the attack. Regardless of the provocation Italy's demands were promptly met. Although it is disputed as to who made the attack at Ualual, that is not the most serious question to be determined. The difficulty here is to determine to whom Ualual belongs. Both Italy and Ethiopia claim it. If it is on Ethiopian soil, and the evidence favors that assumption, then clearly Italy was the aggressor and instead of demanding reparations, Italy should tender

⁴*L'Afrique française*, January 1935 Number, pp. 24, 26.

such to Ethiopia. If, however, Ualual is really in Somaliland then Italy is within her rights to demand reparations.

By the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of May 16, 1908, signed at Addis Ababa, the boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland was to be established "on the spot, and as soon as possible"⁵ by representatives of the two governments. This treaty indicated the boundary in a general way. The boundary line was to start at Dolo at the head of the Juba river and proceed north-eastward 180 miles inland in general paralleling the Indian Ocean coast line. The treaty expressly states that the territories of certain tribes shall be included within Italian Somaliland and that of other specified tribes shall belong to Ethiopia. It provides that "all the territory of Ogaden, and all that of the tribes towards the Ogaden, shall remain dependent on Abyssinia."⁶ Clearly Ualual is within Ogaden, but Italy claims that this territory belongs to the Sultinate of Obra the greater part of which tribe lives toward the coast and thus in Italian territory.⁷ Ethiopia, however, claims that Ualual is well within her territory and she cites the official Italian map of 1925 (a copy of which is reported to have disappeared from the halls of the League of Nations since the Italo-Ethiopian dispute

⁵Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3d, Ed. Vol. III, p. 1223.

⁶See Article IV of the Convention of 1908.

⁷New York Times, February 12, 1935.

arose) showing this place to be far beyond the line claimed by Italy at that time.⁸

It is quite natural to inquire as to why the line along this frontier has not been established long ago "on the spot" as the treaty of 1908 provides. It must be remembered first of all that this territory is inhabited by semi-nomadic tribes whose places of abode are continually shifting. These tribes usually do not know exact boundary lines and may not willingly respect those that are set up. Italy explains the delay as due to the procrastination of the Ethiopian government. On the other hand Ethiopia claims that Italian encroachment by gradual occupation has interfered with prompt action. Italy herself claims that Ualual has been occupied by Italian subjects for many years and cites as proof of this assertion the construction of forts, roads and permanent buildings.⁹ It is not likely that the Emperor of Ethiopia could consent to the completion of a boundary line according to the treaty of 1908 while

⁸New York Times, February 12, 1935. Note, a map, probably a copy of the official map referred to here, appeared in the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan as late as November 16, 1934 and again a similar map appeared in the *Stampa* of Turin, December 16, 1934. Both of these maps place Ualual clearly within Ethiopian territory. The *Stampa* in its issue of Dec. 25, made an effort to correct the impression received from its map of December 16. Clearly in Italian circles *even* the inclusion of Ualual within Italian territory is an after thought not claimed before the present situation had arisen. The map of 1925 referred to here was edited by the Italian Somaliland government and shows Ualual (Walwal) 130 Km. within Ethiopia. There can be no doubt but that this place was understood to be within Ethiopia prior to present difficulties. Witness the Italian press *Giornale d'Italia* of Dec. 14, 1934. There is a very good discussion of the map question in the January, 1935, number of *L'Afrique française*. This discussion shows clearly that until now Ualual has been located well within Ethiopia.

⁹*L'Afrique française*, Jan., 1935, Number, p. 28.

Italy persisted in occupying Ualual contrary to the provisions of that treaty. Had Italy really wanted to complete the boundary line between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland according to agreement, no doubt she could have done so long ago. It appears that England and Ethiopia have been able to delimit their respective territories without undue delay.

His Majesty, Haile Selassie I, having reported to the League of Nations and Mussolini's government having objected to having the question settled there, the League referred the whole matter back to the two nations with suggestions that they arrive at a settlement by direct negotiations between them as provided for in Article V of the treaty of 1928.¹⁰ According to this article "The two governments undertake to submit to conciliation or arbitration, the questions that arise between them and which could not be solved by the normal diplomatic means without having recourse to force of arms." With this purpose in view negotiations were renewed in Addis Ababa, and an effort was made to create a neutral zone along the Ethiopian-Somaliland frontier pending settlement of their differences. Difficulties, however, have arisen. Most difficult of all is the question of the composition of the commission to be created to arrive at a settlement. Ethiopia has insisted that she be allowed to place upon this commission certain foreign advisers and officers now in Ethiopian service. To this Italy objects demanding that Italy and Ethiopia proceed without the inclusion of any

¹⁰New York Times, February 19, 1935.

third party.¹¹ It is difficult for one to see any valid objection to having these included. One would think that Italy should welcome such if she is sure of the justice of her cause.

In the meantime Italy continued to dispatch additional military forces to Somaliland. This tended only to increase the nervousness of the Ethiopian tribesmen living along the border and fresh incidents continued to occur. Finally, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, Belatan Geta Herouy, telegraphed a new communication to the League of Nations on January 3, 1935, in which he definitely invoked Article XI of the Covenant, demanding that the League take "every measure effectually to safeguard peace".¹² Thus the whole matter was before the League just on the eve of the prearranged meeting between M. Laval, the French Foreign Minister and Premier Mussolini.¹³

If Mussolini had purposely timed the meeting with M. Laval to coincide with these incidents in Africa he certainly could not have done better for Italian advantages than the stage now presented. In addition to all the Italo-Ethiopian clashes along their frontiers, an unfortunate matter had occurred along the Franco-Ethiopian frontier also. This Mussolini could cite as proof for strong arm methods in his controversy with Ethiopia.¹⁴

Just what took place between Mussolini and M. Laval at Rome early in January we do not know. How-

¹¹L'Afrique française, January 1935 Number, p. 28.

¹²New York Times, January 4, 1935; L'Afrique française, January Number, p. 26f.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴L'Afrique française, February 1935 Number, p. 112.

ever enough has been given out (January 8) to assure one that some sort of a trade has been made whereby Italy has secured a much desired advantage in Africa in exchange for Italy's support of France and England in certain European matters. In particular it is believed that Italy has agreed to use her good offices to get Germany to accept the Eastern Locarno pact, to stop Nazi propaganda in Austria, and to return to the League of Nations. In return for which Italy is to receive certain territorial concessions in Africa and a free hand in proceeding against Ethiopia.¹⁵

Since the failure of France and England at the close of the World War to carry out their agreement with Italy in regard to the division of African territory in the secret Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) Italy has felt aggrieved and she has sought extension of her possessions on that continent at every opportunity. In the midst of a war claimed to be in defense of small nations, England and France secretly agreed with Italy that "In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territory in Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain."¹⁶ There could have been no other possible place for Italy to expand from Eritrea and Somaliland than into Ethiopia except

¹⁵Time, Feb. 18, 1935; L'Afrique française, Feb. 1935, p. 73f.

¹⁶de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 3^{re} série, t. X, p. 335.

at the expense of England and France and no one would accuse these nations of having that in mind when they agreed that Italy might expand in Africa. Then, too, it is now a well known fact that England and France did extend their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany and to date Italy, in her judgment at least, has not received adequate compensation. Our knowledge of European conduct in Africa leaves us with strong suspicions that Italy has claimed her compensations from England and France at the expense of Ethiopia.

In the Franco-Italian conference of last January then, it is not strange that the Italo-Ethiopian situation should prove to be one of the principal subjects for adjustment. As far as the published results of this conference are concerned Italy seems to have secured only two important concessions from France effecting her Ethiopian relations. France has handed over to Italy a small section of land at the Bab-el-Mandeb entrance of the Red Sea and she has assigned to Italy a one-fifth interest in the French controlled railway from Jibuti to Addis Ababa.¹⁷

At first thought these may seem to be rather insignificant concessions. For any nation seeking only legitimate investment and trade they are insignificant. That is exactly what makes their transfer to Italy of greatest importance. There can be no other reason why Italy should value this small barren block of French Somaliland adjoining her own colony of Eritrea than for strategic military purposes. With this position forti-

¹⁷*L'Afrique française*, Feb. 1935 Number, p. 73ff.

fied, in time of war Italy can control the southern entrance to the Red Sea. In case Japan, for instance, should decide to come to Ethiopia's aid when Italy, France, and England decide that the *status quo* in Ethiopia should no longer be maintained, as they may under the tripartite treaty of 1906, Italy would need some protected harbor in which to unload her implements of war—assuming, of course, that Italy should be accorded a free hand by England and France in disturbing that *status quo*. It can hardly be doubted that in securing this small territory just opposite to the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, Italy had Japan in mind. She would not wish to be disturbed by the Japanese fleet within the Red Sea.

Since the French railway connecting the French port of Jibuti and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, is the only railway in the country, control of this railway would be of greatest strategic importance. At present Ethiopia is entirely surrounded by territories belonging to England, France and Italy. This alone permits these three countries to control imports and exports including arms and ammunition. Here again, in securing an interest in the only railway and in operating on a friendly understanding with France and England, Italy will be able to secure a greater share of Ethiopian trade in times of peace and can practically shut off Ethiopia from any additional munitions of war. It may be that this again is aimed at the Japanese who in recent years have captured an unusually large share of Ethiopia's imports.

These are the important published concessions of France to Italy in their recent accord in so far as Ethiopian relations are concerned. By themselves these

concessions have little meaning. They are extremely important, however, especially because their existence would seem to indicate far greater matters kept secret. As far as Ethiopia is concerned the meeting of M. Laval and Premier Mussolini was much more important because of what was not published than because of published results. The supposition is strong that France in addition to the concessions indicated above gave Italy a free hand in going as far as she will or can in dealing with Ethiopia.¹⁸

That there is a similar tacit understanding with England seems possible. Both England and France seek Italy's support in European matters and although the English people are sympathetic toward Ethiopia, England's official attitude since the beginning of the present controversy between Italy and Ethiopia would indicate that she is to maintain a friendly neutrality toward Italy. Moreover, in a very real sense England bound herself by the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1925, to work for Italian interests in Ethiopia in exchange for Italian support of British interests in western Ethiopia.¹⁹ By this arrangement England was to receive the aid of Italy in an effort to secure from the Ethiopian government a concession for the construction of a barrage at Lake Tsana and for a right of way for a road leading from the Sudan to Lake Tsana. In exchange, Italy should receive the support of England in an effort to secure a concession for the construction of a railway from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland. Along with this

¹⁸*New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1935.

¹⁹Rouard de Card, *L'Ethiopie au point de vue du droit international*, pp. 61ff; *British State Papers*, Vol. XXX, (C-2680).

agreement they recognized anew certain parts of Ethiopia as within their respective spheres of influence. When the two governments had matters all arranged, they, through their respective representatives in Addis Ababa, presented simultaneously the finished product to the Ethiopian government.

When this arrangement was presented, June 9, 1926, to Ras Tafari, then regent of Ethiopia, he strenuously objected to it upon the grounds that these two foreign countries were making plans to secure concessions in Ethiopia without even informing the Ethiopian government of the transactions.²⁰ It seemed to him an infringement of Ethiopia's sovereignty and he appealed to the League of Nations.²¹ He recited to the League the actions of these two nations in respect to Ethiopia and called attention to the fact that within the League of Nations all nations had entered upon the same basis as sovereign states and here, it seemed to him, was a direct thrust at the independence of Ethiopia. He wrote,

The people of Abyssinia are anxious to do right . . . but throughout their history they have seldom met with foreigners who did not desire to possess themselves of Abyssinian territory and to destroy their independence. With God's help, and thanks to the courage of our soldiers, we have always, come what might, stood proud and free upon our native mountains.

France, too, objected, not because she wished to defend Ethiopia but because England and Italy had not included France in their partition of Ethiopia as they should have done according to the treaty of 1906. In the

²⁰Ras Tafari, who was regent prior to his coronation as Negus Negasti in 1930 is now the Emperor Haile Selassie I.

²¹*The Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Seventh year, No. 7, p. 1517, annex I, November, 1926.

face of this opposition England and Italy dropped the matter but they did not withdraw their mutual support. Evidently there is now an understanding among them to permit Italy *carte blanche* in dealing with Ethiopia.

If Great Britain and France will not interfere with Italy's aggression what about the League of Nations? It was for just such purposes that the League was created. For the present the League has adjourned the question until its next session. It is difficult to see how the League will be able to do anything. If Great Britain, France and Italy, all members of the League, have an understanding by which Italy may proceed as she wishes there are no powerful nations left within the League to say them nay. Since the League could not control Japan in her aggression upon Manchukuo with all these more powerful nations seeking to do so, it must not be expected that the League can restrain Italy now. In spite of pious protests that Italy's action is merely punitive she continues to prepare for war and to transport additional soldiers. "Incidents" continue to occur and without doubt will continue to increase in numbers. In the Manchukuo affair Japan's action was claimed to be merely punitive. There was no declaration of war but the conquest went on and today Manchukuo is for all practical purposes a part of Japan. Evidently Mussolini intends Ethiopia shall be another "Manchukuo". There will probably be no declaration of war but penetration will likely continue. There is this decided difference between the Manchukuo affair and the present situation in Ethiopia. Ethiopia will not passively submit to Italian penetration. The Ethiopians

are a proud warlike people, jealous of their independence and they will fight to the death to maintain it. Once they met the *fiacchi* Italians (as their Negus Negasti Johannes VI described them) in March, 1896, and the meeting was disastrous to the Italians.²² The Ethiopians believe they can repeat. Ethiopia has a well trained army of some 100,000 men well equipped. In addition she has an unnumbered feudal army which can be mobilized about the chieftains in surprisingly short time. In Ethiopia every man is a soldier from his youth up. They travel light and move swiftly. Should Mussolini proceed, as is now quite evident he hopes to do, in spite of his equipment he will find the subjugation of the Ethiopians no easy undertaking.

Thus far we have but mentioned M. Laval's gains from his accord with Mussolini at Rome. Evidently they consisted in securing Mussolini's acceptance of the Anglo-French declaration of London as it referred to Germany and Austria. Mussolini was to support Great Britain and France in an effort to secure Germany's adhesion to the Eastern Locarno Pact, which was intended to pledge Germany and her eastern neighbors to permit no aggression in either direction across Germany's eastern frontiers. He agreed also to lend his aid toward causing Germany to re-enter the League of Nations and to cease from her efforts to interfere in Austrian affairs. The Italo-Ethiopian situation being thus linked up with European matters has a very close relation with the outcome in Austria. If by sacrificing Ethiopia to Italian aggression France and England may

²²*Documenti Diplomatici*, No. XV, p. 191, doc. 87.

be able to maintain the peace of Europe it is not at all unlikely that such an arrangement would be made. France especially seems determined that Austria shall never become a part of her ancient enemy across the Rhine. If by handing over to Italy a few square miles of African territory and by closing her eyes to Mussolini's advances into Ethiopia she can be sure of Italian support against German annexation of Austria, France will consider her security in Europe, for the time being at least, has been bought at a bargain.

Evidently Ethiopia is to be sacrificed in an effort to maintain the peace of Europe. If such is the case the sacrifice is too great and instead of securing the peace of Europe this utterly unrighteous bartering of a weaker brother among the nations of Europe may easily prove to be the rock of offense upon which Europe herself shall be broken.

It is a pity that so enlightened peoples as those represented by England, France and Italy will not permit this last bit of native-controlled Africa to develop in a free and independent manner. If Italy or France or England or all of them wish to take a long step toward bringing about peace on earth let them give back to Ethiopia a first class port on the sea with a road leading thereto. Let them open to Ethiopia a way by which she can trade with the world without paying tribute to an alien country. Cannot some way be devised by which the nations of the earth may lend sympathetic aid to these freedom-loving Ethiopians that their own peculiar culture may be advanced to its highest possible state free from constant fear of European interference?

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
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
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